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SEXUALITY, RAPE, AND MENTAL
RETARDATION
Deborah W. Denno*
In this article, Professor Denno addresses the question of
when sexual relations with a mentally retarded individual should
be considered nonconsensual and therefore criminal. The article
first explores the early treatment of mental retardation, concluding
that throughout history society has viewed mentally retarded per-
sons as either asexual and childlike or hypersexual and at risk of
producing offspring "as defective as themselves." Professor
Denno then demonstrates how these stereotypes influence the mor-
alism inherent in modern conceptions of consent in rape determi-
nations. Illustrating the point with reference to the Glen Ridge
rape case, the article shows how courts applying contemporary
rape statutes typically hold mentally retarded individuals to a
higher standard of consent than nonretarded individuals. Such a
standard is so strict that it can preclude consensual sex with men-
tally retarded persons under any circumstances. As a result, courts
are hurting the very people they are supposed to protect and failing
to respect those people's dignity. To remedy this incongruity, Pro-
fessor Denno proposes that courts making consent determinations
apply a contextual approach, which incorporates among other
things modern knowledge about the adaptive capabilities of men-
tally retarded individuals as well as the situational context of the
sexual conduct.
Finally, Professor Denno discusses the regulation of sexual re-
lations in the context of institutions and residential homes for men-
tally retarded individuals. This issue is important for two reasons.
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. B.A. 1974, University of Virginia;
M.A. 1975, University of Toronto; Ph.D. 1982, J.D. 1989, University of Pennsylvania. Portions of
this article were presented at the 1994 Annual Meeting of the Law & Society Association in Phoe-
nix, Arizona, where I benefitted from questions and suggestions.
I am most grateful to the following individuals for their comments on this article: Leigh
Buchanan Bienen, Joshua Dressier, Katherine Franke, Paul Goldstein, Keri Gould, Bruce Green,
Nancy King, John Monahan, Joseph Perillo, Stephen Schulhofer, George Thomas III, R. George
Wright, and Benjamin Zipursky. I give special thanks to my research assistants for their excep-
tional and invaluable efforts: Dawne Cummings, Michelle Dobrawsky, Michael Kim, Toni Mele,
Holly Mitchell, Elena Paraskevas, Robert Renzulli, Marni Roder, and Sona Shah. I also appreci-
ate Yvette LeRoy's characteristically diligent research, the resource advice provided by Dianne
Perillo, Samuel DiFeo, and Lorraine Dusky, and the information offered by the many social ser-
vice providers and mental health professionals who graciously agreed to be interviewed for this
article. Fordham University School of Law provided generous research support, for which I am
grateful.
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Such regulation demonstrates the maximum extent to which legal
standards can infringe upon the rights of mentally retarded individ-
uals, and it illustrates the most complicated dimensions of the con-
textual approach. This article concludes that most mentally
retarded individuals have the capacity to consent to sexual rela-
tions, they have the right to do so, and unnecessarily broad and
moralistic restrictions infringe upon that right.
I. INTRODUCTION
A commendable scholarship suggests that legal analysis should
stress the "peculiarities of cases," as well as their factual, moral, and"spiritual" complexities.' Hence the following facts of the Glen Ridge
rape case, one impetus for this article.
On March 1, 1989, "Betty Harris," age seventeen and mildly men-
tally retarded, accompanied Christopher Archer, age eighteen and a
neighbor since childhood, into a dark basement filled with thirteen
young men, most of whom she had also known for many years.2 All
the men were star athletes at Glen Ridge High School, located in the
elite and affluent suburb of Glen Ridge, New Jersey.3 Christopher
had told Betty that, if she entered the basement, she could have a date
later that night with his older brother, Paul.4 According to Betty the
scenario was "romantic because he [Christopher] had his arm around
me"'5 and she had long endured an attraction to Paul.6 Yet the events
1. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PRO-
FESSION 375 (1993) (emphasizing that judgment, or "practical wisdom," derives from experience
with human beings and their affairs and that the "decision of a case occurs at the point where the
law and the facts meet"); see also JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 114-15 (1970)
(noting that a judge has "minute and distinctly personal biases" that operate "constantly" during
a consideration of the facts).
2. See In re B.G., 589 A.2d 637, 638-42 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (holding that
probable cause existed for charges that juvenile defendants had used force or coercion in com-
mitting a sexual assault on a person they knew to be mentally retarded, thereby justifying a
waiver of jurisdiction to adult court); PETER LAUFER, A QUESTION OF CONSENT. INNOCENCE
AND COMPLICITY IN THE GLEN RIDGE RAPE CASE xvii-xviii, 8-9 (1994) (providing a reporter's
daily account of the Glen Ridge rape trial and sentencing); Joseph Phalon, It Happened-But
Could She Consent?, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 28, 1992, at 8 (discussing the Glen Ridge victim's inability
to consent in light of the facts). "Mild" or "educable" mental retardation, which depicts the
highest functioning level of the four traditional levels of mental retardation, is defined in the
Appendix, Table A. Because the victim's name was not revealed by the press or in the court
transcripts made public, it is also not revealed in this article, which adopts the pseudonym Betty
Harris that reporter Peter Laufer created. See LAUFER, supra, at ix, xvii. Because the defend-
ants' names, photographs, and biographies were mentioned continually by the press and
throughout the court transcripts, this article will name them accordingly. See id. at xvii. The
arguments for and against the media's revealing of the names of victims and defendants have
been discussed in detail elsewhere and therefore are not an issue in this article. See Deborah W.
Denno, Perspectives on Disclosing Rape Victims' Names, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 1113 (1993).
3. See LAUFER, supra note 2, at 12-13, 18; Christopher Kilbourne, Glen Ridge Trial Set to
Begin; Will Break Legal Ground, N.J. RECORD, Oct. 14, 1992, at Al.
4. See LAUFER, supra note 2, at 8.
5. Id. at 8, 117.
6. See In re B.G., 589 A.2d at 644.
[Vol. 1997
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that followed over the next hour could hardly be characterized as
romance. 7
Soon after entering the basement Betty was positioned on a
couch surrounded by chairs "set up," in her words, "like a movie."8
Three of the men asked Betty to remove her clothes, put five fingers
up her vagina, and then perform fellatio on one of them, which she did
amidst their laughs and chants encouraging her to "[g]o further, fur-
ther, further."9 As six of the men left the basement,' ° the remaining
seven gave Betty instructions to spread her legs so that a number of
them could insert into her vagina a broomstick covered with a plastic
bag and Vaseline. 11 After masturbating her with the broomstick, they
next inserted and masturbated her with a similarly coated fungo bat' 2
and then an old dowel stick. 3 Betty testified that although all the
objects "hurt" her, she never attempted to leave the basement and
never asked that the men stop. 4 Rather, the men continued to laugh
and cheer, calling Betty a "whore" and discussing how far the objects
could go into her body. 5 Two of the men then sucked Betty's breasts
and requested that she masturbate six of the other men, which she
did. 6 Finally, the men told Betty that she could leave the basement
but that she could not tell anyone what had happened because her
mother would find out and Betty would be expelled from school, all of
which Betty believed.' 7 Indeed, Betty lingered a bit anticipating the
date with Paul, which never took place.' 8
7. All parties and witnesses in the Glen Ridge case were fairly consistent in depicting
what happened to Betty in the basement even though the precise details and order of events
vary when comparing the following sources of information: the police report, the text of the
indictment, Betty's and the defendants' testimony, and the accounts of some of the witnesses
who were not charged with any crime. See LAUFER, supra note 2, at 9; see also In re B.G., 589
A.2d at 641-42 (noting inconsistencies among four of Betty's police reports).
8. LAUFER, supra note 2, at 9, 118.
9. Id. at 118-19.
10. See In re B.G., 589 A.2d at 641-42; Catherine S. Manegold, Abuse Trial Forces Jury to
Ride Tide of Minutiae, N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 19, 1993, at B4.
11. See In re B.G., 589 A.2d at 640-41; LAUFER, supra note 2, at 119-23.
12. See In re B.G., 589 A.2d at 640-41; LAUFER, supra note 2, at 119-23. A fungo bat is "a
lightweight bat that is longer and thinner than the ordinary bat." WEBSTER's TreRD NEW INTER-
NATIONAL DICTIONARY 922 (1993).
13. See In re B.G., 589 A.2d at 641; LAUFER, supra note 2, at 120-24. Initially, Betty said
that the stick had been inserted into her rectum. See In re B.G., 589 A.2d at 640; Christopher
Kilbourne, Grand Jury Names Four Teens-Indictments Handed Up in the Glen Ridge Sex Case,
N.J. RECORD, May 23, 1990, at Al.
14. See In re B.G., 589 A.2d at 641; LAUFER, supra note 2, at 10, 125-26.
15. See In re B.G., 589 A.2d at 641; LAUFER, supra note 2, at 10, 119-20.
16. See In re B.G., 589 A.2d at 641; LAUFER, supra note 2, at 11, 123-24.
17. See In re B.G., 589 A.2d at 641-42; LAUFER, supra note 2, at 11, 125.
18. See LAUFER, supra note 2, at 125; A Real Sickness Behind Glen Ridge's Gang Rape,
N.J. RECORD, Mar. 18, 1993, at B6.
No. 21
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The next day, Betty felt pain and saw blood when she urinated. 19
Two days later she informed her swimming teacher about the base-
ment events.20  Her communication was not intended to reveal or
punish the men's behavior, because she still considered them her
friends, but rather to learn how to say no if she once again encoun-
tered such a situation.21 By mid-March, one high school senior had
complained to Glen Ridge High School officials that the men in-
volved, who had apparently been bragging about the episode, wanted
him to join them for a second session so that he could videotape it.22
Confronted by such information and the growing community gossip
about the event, the Glen Ridge High School principal finally called
the police.23
After a highly publicized six-month trial,24 Christopher Archer
and two twin brothers were convicted of, among other things, first-
degree aggravated sexual assault (rape), while a fourth man was con-
victed of third-degree conspiracy to rape.25 On April 23, 1993, the
court agreed to a defense request that the three men convicted of sex-
ual assault remain free on bail26 while their lawyers appeal.27
19. See In re B.G., 589 A.2d at 643; LAUFER, supra note 2, at 11, 126; Bernard Lefkowitz,
She Saw Blood; For First Time, Glen Ridge Woman Tells Jury of Injuries, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Dec.
17, 1992, at 7; Phalon, supra note 2, at 8.
20. See In re B.G., 589 A.2d at 640 (noting testimony of swimming teacher stating that
Betty had told her that "'the boys asked me to suck their dicks,' and that 'it really hurt me
because they stuck something really big up my butt and it hurt"').
21. See LAUFER, supra note 2, at 20,44; Woman in Sex-Abuse Trial Sought Advice on How
to Say "No" N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 7, 1993, at All.
22. See In re B.G., 589 A.2d at 642; LAUFER, supra note 2, at 20-21.
23. See LAUFER, supra note 2, at 21. Because Betty's parents did not initially believe that
the event took place when a social worker informed them about it two weeks earlier, they had
declined to make such a call. See id. at 20.
24. The trial never resulted in a published opinion. The appellate division's decision to
transfer the juvenile defendants, ages 16-18, to adult court was published. See In re B.G., 589
A.2d at 637. For this reason, this article relies heavily on the news accounts and commentary
about the trial provided by legal reporters who followed the case daily, in addition to the facts
and conclusions presented in In re B.G., 589 A.2d at 640-47.
25. See LAUFER, supra note 2, at 6, 150. Christopher Archer and Kevin and Kyle Scherzer
were convicted of first-degree aggravated sexual assault by force or coercion and second-degree
conspiracy to commit aggravated sexual assault. Moreover, Christopher Archer and Kevin
Scherzer were convicted of first-degree aggravated assault upon a mentally defective person.
Kyle Scherzer was convicted of the lesser included offense of second-degree attempted aggra-
vated sexual assault. The fourth man, Bryant Grober, was convicted of third-degree conspiracy
to commit criminal sexual contact and was acquitted of all other charges. See id. The court's
sentence, which could range between 22 months and 15 years, mandated that Christopher
Archer and the Scherzer twins serve time in a "campuslike complex for young offenders"; Bry-
ant Grober was sentenced to three years' probation and 200 hours of community service. Rob-
ert Hanley, 3 Are Sentenced to Youth Center over Sex Abuse of Retarded Girl, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
24, 1993, at 1 [hereinafter Hanley, 3 Are Sentenced]. In the first half of 1992, Paul Archer and
Peter Quigley pled guilty as coconspirators to endangering the welfare of an incompetent per-
son. See LAU'ER, supra note 2, at 35. Two other teammates were initially indicted but did not
stand trial at the request of Betty's parents who said that further prosecution "would not be in
the best interests of their child." Robert Hanley, One Is Freed in Sex Attack in Glen Ridge, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 29, 1994, at 24.
26. See Hanley, 3 Are Sentenced, supra note 25, at 1. The court relied on two guideposts
for determining whether convicted criminals can remain free on bail while they are appealing
[Vol. 1997
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The Glen Ridge case appeared to be a relatively clear example of
rape because of the number of defendants involved, the vaginal inser-
tion of foreign objects, and the victim's mental retardation.28 Yet, this
article contends that not all rape cases involving mentally retarded
victims are so clear, either legally or socially.29 Indeed, issues con-
cerning sexuality, rape, and mental retardation present a seemingly
unsolvable conundrum." On the one hand, evidence suggests that
their sentences: whether they "posed serious threats to the community" and whether they "had'substantial' legal grounds" to request that their convictions be overturned. Id.; see also
LAUFER, supra note 2, at 89. The court explained that the defendants should not be incarcerated
unnecessarily if their convictions were overturned on appeal. See id.; see also Robert Hanley,
Glen Ridge Bail Hearing Hinges on Assault Claim, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1993, at 24 (noting that
the court allowed Christopher Archer to continue to receive bail despite a Boston College stu-
dent's sworn affidavit stating that in October 1990, Archer "forced [her] to the ground on the
Boston College campus, forcibly removed her clothing and punched her in the vaginal area with
a fist"). Archer allegedly thereafter referred to himself as a "rapist." See LAUFER, supra note 2,
at 33.
27. The court will most likely not hear the appeal for another year. See Telephone Inter-
view with J. Michael Blake, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, Office of the Public Defender,
Appellate Division, Newark, N.J. (Aug. 5, 1996). For a recent analysis of the Glen Ridge rape
case based on numerous interviews and six years of research, see BERNARD LEFKOwrrz, OUR
Guys: THE GLEN RIDGE RAPE AND THE SECRET LIFE OF THE PERFECT SUBURB (1997).
28. See, e.g., In re B.G., 589 A.2d at 644 (emphasizing the "insertion of foreign objects held
by others," the "number of youths in the basement," and the victim's mentally defective status in
a decision to waive the juvenile defendants to adult court); Linda R. Hirshman, Moral Philoso-
phy and the Glen Ridge Rape Case, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 101, 105 (1994) (contending
that, given the context and the "dialogue" between the victim and the defendants, "the defend-
ants justly lost"); Tracy Schroth, "Lolita" Defense Risky in Glen Ridge Sex Trial, N.J. L.J., Nov. 2,
1992, at 1. According to the attorney who prosecuted the New Bedford, Massachusetts "bar
room" rape case, "I don't think anyone is going to readily accept the notion that any woman is
going to have sex of her own accord with a large number of men at any time ... [or] in the
manner you describe." Id. at 32; see also Karen Houppert, Baseball Bats and Broomsticks: The
Glen Ridge Rape Trial Draws to a Close, VILLAGE VOICE, Mar. 16, 1993, at 29, 33 ("All the usual
arguments brought up by rape defendants-she wanted it, she liked it, she was the sexual aggres-
sor-jar even the least enlightened when applied to a 17-year-old mentally retarded girl who had
broomsticks and bats shoved up her vagina.").
29. See, e.g., In re B.G., 589 A.2d at 647 (Dreier, J.A.D., concurring) (emphasizing that if
the Glen Ridge case had involved a "less stressful situation," such as a lone actor, the victim
most likely would not have been considered mentally defective because "a contrary finding
would cause virtually all sexual activity with a mildly retarded individual to be considered crimi-
nal in the eyes of the law"); Alison Carper, Glen Ridge Sex Lesson Is Tough for Retarded, N.Y.
NEWSDAY, Mar. 15, 1993, at 8 (discussing the difficulties of teaching consent and nonconsent to
the mentally retarded); Jodi Enda, Advocates for Retarded See Double Edge of N.J. Rape Ver-
dict, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 21, 1993, at El (noting that some advocates for the mentally re-
tarded view the Glen Ridge rape convictions as a double-edged sword because the public may
think that all mentally retarded people cannot consent to sex or, more generally, interact in
mainstream society); Jane Fritsch, Debating Whether "Yes" Means "No"; Glen Ridge Sex Assault
Trial Tests the Defense of Consent, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1992, at 49 (explaining the difficulty of
determining the Glen Ridge victim's incapacity to consent irrespective of indications that the
notion of consent is "evolving").
30. See State v. Olivio, 589 A.2d 597, 598 (N.J. 1991) (noting the "implications for both
mentally-defective persons who are vulnerable and need the special protections of our laws from
the sexual intrusions of others and persons whose mental deficiencies need not be an impedi-
ment to the enjoyment of a reasonably normal life, including consensual sexual relations"); Paul
R. Friedman, Legal Regulation of Applied Behavior Analysis in Mental Institutions and Prisons,
17 ARIz. L. REV. 39, 77 (1975) ("Under too lax a standard of competency, persons will be al-
lowed to act in ways which may be viewed as being contrary to their best interests. Under too
No. 21
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many mentally retarded individuals require the law's protection be-
cause of their vulnerability-the Glen Ridge case being one example.
Moreover, these individuals are victimized at four-to-ten times the
rate of the general population.3' Yet others claim that this very pro-
tection unconstitutionally limits, or even precludes, the right of men-
tally retarded persons to have sexual relationships and, consequently,
to lead normal lives. 32  "[Tihe mentally retarded person-no more
and no less a sexual being than his non-labeled counterpart-is largely
deprived of legitimated sexual expression by social and legal
attitudes. 33
Although social and legal attitudes have historically dominated
the tenor of rape trials in this country,' their impact is most pro-
nounced in rape cases involving mentally retarded victims, particularly
females. The consent determination, difficult in any rape case,35 is
strict a standard, the opportunity for self-determination may be undermined and personal integ-
rity denigrated by the paternalism of the state.").
31. See infra notes 261-62, 429-36 and accompanying text; see also Righter v. State, 752
P.2d 416,419 (Wyo. 1988) (emphasizing, with reference to mentally retarded individuals, "a pub-
lic policy goal of protecting a class of particularly vulnerable citizens from sexual exploitation");
Kate Stone Lombardi, Rape and the Mentally Retarded, N.Y. TImFS, July 25, 1993, at 1 (noting
opinions held by experts and counselors claiming that mentally retarded and developmentally
disabled individuals "are perfect targets for sexual abuse and assault because they often do not
recognize the activity as criminal, they sometimes can't resist and if they are nonverbal, they
cannot tell anyone what happened").
32. See generally Robert L. Hayman, Jr., Presumptions of Justice: Law, Politics, and the
Mentally Retarded Parent, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1246 (1990) (discussing the "illegitimation of
the mentally retarded person's sexuality"). The right of mentally retarded individuals to engage
in sexual relations may be considered implicit in the constitutional right to privacy. See City of
Cleburne v. Clebume Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 463 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (emphasizing that mentally retarded persons are entitled
to the right to marry and to procreate, one of the "basic civil rights of man"); Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-86 (1965) (protecting the constitutional right to privacy, which in-
cludes certain forms of sexual conduct); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 540-43 (1942)
(protecting the constitutional right to procreate); Olivio, 589 A.2d at 604 (expressing "concern
about unenlightened attitudes toward mental impairment and about the importance of according
the mentally handicapped their fundamental rights"). Under New York state law, individuals
under the jurisdiction of the New York State Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental
Disability are allowed to express sexuality "as limited by one's consensual ability to do so, pro-
vided such expressions do not infringe on the rights of others." 14 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. x, § 633.4(a)(x) (1996); see also People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936, 939-44 (N.Y. 1980)
(protecting consensual sexual intercourse under the New York State Constitution).
33. Hayman, supra note 32, at 1246.
34. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Many Faces of Sexual Consent, 37 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 47, 55 (1995) (explaining that "the issue of legal consent is inherently concerned with legal
status and social policy"). For thorough discussions of this issue, see SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL
RAPE (1987); HUBERT S. FEILD & LEIGH B. BIENEN, JURORS AND RAPE: A STUDY IN PSYCHOL-
OGY AND LAW (1980); Vivian Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the
Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1977); Leigh Bienen, Rape Ill-National Developments in
Rape Reform Legislation, 6 WOMEN'S Rrs. L. REP. 170 (1980).
35. For complete discussions of the consent issue, see Eskridge, supra note 34, at 47-48;
Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986); Douglas N. Husak & George C. Thomas III,
Date Rape, Social Convention, and Reasonable Mistakes, 11 LAW & PHIL. 95 (1992); Stephen J.
Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 2151, 2170-84 (1995)
[hereinafter Schulhofer, Feminist Challenge]; Stephen J. Schulhofer, Taking Sexual Autonomy
Seriously: Rape Law and Beyond, 11 LAW & PHIL 35 (1992) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Taking
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most challenging when the issue involves a mentally retarded victim's
capacity to consent.36 Despite the heated debate over this issue,3 7 no
article has ever thoroughly addressed it.38
This article contends that, for a wide range of reasons, mentally
retarded females are held to a higher consent standard than their
nonretarded counterparts. In some instances, this higher standard re-
flects less of an effort to protect such individuals than a discredited but
long-held view of mentally retarded females as either asexual or
hypersexual-perceptions fueled, in part, by fears of their procrea-
tion. To address this dilemma, this article proposes a contextual ap-
proach to consent that incorporates a range of factors, including
modern knowledge about mental retardation, individual attributes be-
yond the labels of intelligence quotient (IQ) and mental age, and,
most importantly, the context of the sexual encounter. It suggests that
such an approach would avoid the inappropriate moral judgments in-
herent in many state consent tests and discourage pejorative percep-
tions of mentally retarded individuals. A contextual approach also
would contribute to a more informed concept of consent that is appli-
cable to any rape victim, thereby accentuating the clear, yet frequently
ignored, crossroads between mental retardation and normalcy.
Although mentally retarded defendants appear to face similar kinds of
social and legal constraints, their circumstances are beyond the scope
of this article.39
Part II of this article presents a brief history of mental retardation
and sexuality, emphasizing that although societies have perceived
mentally retarded persons in contradictory ways, they have consist-
ently denied such individuals their sexuality.40 Part III explains how
this denial was perpetuated by genetic explanations for mental retar-
dation.41 Part IV shows that the remnants of these eugenic beliefs
also have been incorporated in some current rape statutes and judicial
tests for determining a mentally retarded individual's capacity to con-
sent to sexual intercourse.42 Vague and unduly moralistic, such tests
strictly judge the consent capacity of mentally retarded females while
Sexual Autonomy Seriously]; R. George Wright, Consenting Adults: The Problem of Enhancing
Human Dignity Non-Coercively, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1397 (1996).
36. See Thomas-Robert H. Ames & Perry Samowitz, Inclusionary Standard for Determin-
ing Sexual Consent for Individuals with Developmental Disabilities, 33 MENTAL RETARDATION
264, 264 (1995) (noting that "[t]he principal stumbling block for many professionals, administra-
tors, and parents in enabling individuals with developmental disabilities to exercise their rights
to sexual expression seems to be the issue of consent to sexual interaction with others").
37. See infra notes 254-474 and accompanying text.
38. Robert Hayman's superb article analyzing the social and legal infringements on the
rights of mentally retarded parents addresses this issue only briefly. See Hayman, supra note 32,
at 1246-47.
39. See infra notes 174, 223 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 48-98 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 99-142 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 143-253 and accompanying text.
No. 2]
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failing to control judicial and juror bias toward women and the men-
tally retarded. Such tests also lack guidance for potential defendants,
thereby enhancing the legal uncertainties involved in rape and mental
retardation cases.
Part V proposes a contextual approach to consent that empha-
sizes a mentally retarded individual's adaptive abilities within the situ-
ational context of the particular sexual encounter.4 3 This approach
holds mentally retarded victims to a standard no higher or lower, and
certainly no more moralistic, than that which exists for the
nonretarded. Moreover, it discourages the kinds of stereotyping and
stigmatization that can occur when the rape victim happens to be
mentally retarded. By applying this approach to the facts of the Glen
Ridge rape case, part V illustrates how some of the judicial and tacti-
cal pitfalls of that case could have been avoided and how the contex-
tual approach would operate in other rape cases." Part VI then
demonstrates the extent to which legal standards can infringe upon
the rights of mentally retarded individuals, as well as the scope of this
contextual approach, by examining the situational context of institu-
tions and residential homes for mentally retarded individuals.45 Part
VI focuses in particular on the ongoing debate between "pro-sexual-
ity" and "conservative-sexuality" viewpoints concerning the sexuality
of mentally retarded individuals; it also considers whether mentally
retarded individuals can or should be "taught" how to have sex, and
what such practical attitudes entail.16
In conclusion, this article recommends, among other things, that
legislatures eliminate statutory provisions that separate consent deter-
minations for mentally retarded victims from those made for
nonretarded victims. 47 Statutory separation not only fuels the stereo-
typic presumption that mentally retarded individuals generally cannot
consent to intercourse, it also encourages an artificially rigid emphasis
on IQ and mental retardation labelling. Moreover, a contextual ap-
proach would render such statutory isolation unnecessary by regard-
ing an individual's mental ability as only one of a number of factors
that courts would instruct juries to consider.
This article by no means advocates the criminalization of inter-
personal cruelty or even an "evolving standard of decency" in the con-
text of sexual relationships. It does contend that most mentally
retarded individuals have the capacity to consent to sexual intercourse
but that they should also be protected from harm. This stance recog-
nizes that traditional notions of consent may not apply in all circum-
stances, particularly those involving the most profoundly mentally
43. See infra notes 254-421 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 279-402 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 422-75 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 443-74 and accompanying text.
47. See infra Part VII.
[Vol. 1997
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retarded. For this reason, this article proposes a more realistic con-
sent standard that accommodates personal and situational variations.
If legislatures and courts ignore such human differences in the name
of protection, propriety, or the law, they can ultimately hurt the very
people they are supposed to protect and fail to respect those people's
dignity.
II. A HISTORY OF MENTAL RETARDATION AND SEXUALITY
Historically, societies have perceived the mentally retarded in
contradictory ways-either as harmless or as threats to community
welfare.4" When viewed as harmless, the mentally retarded have ex-
perienced a broad span of treatment-tolerance, indifference, amuse-
ment, or special consideration as "innocents" and the "children of
God."4 9 When regarded as threats, however, the mentally retarded
have been subjected to penalties ranging from persecution to segrega-
tion in various institutions, including prisons and hospitals. 50
Although social perceptions of mentally retarded persons have
changed over time, one constant has remained: a resistance to, or de-
nial of, their sexuality.5'
This part examines briefly the history of mental retardation and
sexuality. Such history is critical for understanding how social atti-
tudes toward the mentally retarded are reflected in current rape stat-
utes, standards, and cases, such as the Glen Ridge rape case. It also
explains some of the difficulties service providers encounter in institu-
tions or residential homes for the mentally retarded.
Several themes are particularly striking. First, throughout history
and up to the present time, mentally retarded individuals have been
isolated in terms of their residential and educational facilities or
through social shunning by those who deride them. Glen Ridge's
Betty Harris is a prime example of both types of isolation. Second,
mentally retarded persons, especially women, have always been
48. For a discussion of the history of mental retardation, see ALBERT DEUTSCH, THE MEN-
TALLY ILL IN AMERICA: A HISTORY OF THEIR CARE AND TREATMENT FROM COLONIAL TIMES
332-86 (2d ed. 1949); R.C. SCHEERENBERGER, A HISTORY OF MENTAL RETARDATION: A
QUARTER CENTURY OF PROMISE (1987) [hereinafter SCHEERENBERGER, 1987]; R.C. SCHEER-
ENBERGER, A HISTORY OF MENTAL RETARDATION (1983) [hereinafter SCHEERENBERGER,
1983]; Ann Craft, Mental Handicap and Sexuality: Issues for Individuals with a Mental Handi-
cap, Their Parents and Professionals, in MENTAL HANDICAP AND SEXUALITY: ISSUES AND PER-
SPECTIVES 13, 13-14 (Ann Craft ed., 1987) [hereinafter MENTAL HANDICAP AND SEXUALITY];
Rita Rhodes, Mental Retardation and Sexual Expression: An Historical Perspective, 8 J. SoC.
WORK & HUM. SEXUALITY 1 (1993).
49. See DEUTSCH, supra note 48, at 334-35.
50. See generally SCHEERENBERGER, 1983, supra note 48, at 34-128.
51. See generally Craft, supra note 48, at 13 (tracing current and historical perspectives on
the sexuality of mentally retarded individuals); Hayman, supra note 32, at 1246 (discussing the
persistent "public prejudice against the sexuality and reproductive interests of the mentally re-
tarded"); Rhodes, supra note 48, at 2 (outlining the centuries-long societal and cultural denial
that mentally retarded individuals are sexual).
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viewed through a distorted lens-either as asexual childlike innocents
who must be protected or as hypersexual eugenic burdens. In the
Glen Ridge trial, Betty Harris was depicted both ways by the prosecu-
tion and the defense who relied heavily on traditional stereotypes of
mentally retarded women. Moreover, even now, social service provid-
ers frequently segregate males and females in institutions or residen-
tial homes for the mentally retarded in part because of outmoded
perceptions of their sexuality. Third, mentally retarded persons con-
tinue to be subject to conflicting definitions of the "mentally re-
tarded" label, a circumstance that mirrors the problematic history of
classifying mental abilities. Much of the Glen Ridge trial focused on
Betty Harris's IQ level and mental age, the inconsistencies reflected
by her test scores and functional capacities, and how these measures
pertained to her ability to consent to sexual intercourse. Fourth,
throughout history, mentally retarded individuals have typically been
evaluated under separate rape statutes and standards that generally
provide a higher, and more morally rigorous, consent standard than
that applied to the nonretarded. In the Glen Ridge trial, for example,
New Jersey's separate rape provision for mentally retarded victims re-
flected the legislature's presumption that mental retardation, standing
alone, can preclude ability to consent. This emphasis can override a
consideration of other factors that may be far more important in con-
sent determinations, most particularly, the situational context of the
sexual conduct. Lastly, an analysis of the institutional setting shows
how legal standards can constrain the sexual rights of mentally re-
tarded individuals. In nearly all institutions, such a high consent stan-
dard can totally prohibit sexual relations among residents.
In light of this overview, this part describes the treatment of men-
tally retarded persons during the prehistoric and ancient period. It
then examines the eugenics movement and how beliefs espoused at
that time are perpetuated in current rape law.
A. The Prehistoric and Ancient Period to the Eighteenth Century
During the prehistoric and ancient period, which spans from the
start of human existence to the destruction of Rome and the western
Roman Empire (476 A.D.), severely handicapped infants oftentimes
did not survive long after birth because this period's societies com-
monly practiced infanticide of those who would not be able to hunt or
gather food.52 With the development of Near East urban societies
such as Mesopotamia and Egypt, protective attitudes toward the weak
52. See John Gerdtz, Introduction: Historical Summary, in MARK MCGARRITY, A GUiDE
TO MENTAL RETARDATION 1 (1993). Because there are few historical records during this period,
most accounts of life are derived from archaeology and from anthropological studies of compa-
rable hunter and gatherer cultures. There is also archaeological evidence suggesting that some
hunter and gatherer groups did support handicapped members who in turn lived full life spans.
See SC-ERENBERGER, 1983, supra note 48, at 5-6.
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and helpless, including the mentally retarded, began to appear in legal
and ethical codes, such as the Code of Hammurabi (around 2500 B.C.)
and the Old Testament. 53 But the rise of Greek culture and society
around 1300 B.C., which prized physical and cognitive abilities, fur-
ther prompted a condemnatory view toward the mentally retarded
and other vulnerable individuals. This view is exemplified by Plato's
and Aristotle's recommendations that deformed children be killed or
socially isolated.54
Until the formal adoption of Christianity in the fifth century, Ro-
man society (which commenced around 800 B.C.) generally followed
Greek society's pejorative attitudes toward handicapped children.55
With the fall of the Roman Empire in the fifth century, church author-
ities created orphanages and hospitals across Europe to care for the
large number of dislocated children and poor that most likely included
many mentally retarded individuals. These medieval facilities, which
seemingly constituted the first "mental hospitals," offered methods of
treatment that were both primitive and barbaric; at the same time,
however, these methods were no worse than those available for physi-
cal diseases.56 Yet, the Inquisition, which strived to eliminate any
threats to society and dissent from official church doctrine, tended to
perceive mental retardation and mental illness as signs of witchcraft.
Such "witches," allegedly possessed by the devil and the cause of all
kinds of disasters, were tortured and killed.57
The decline of the medieval period in sixteenth-century western
Europe commenced with the Renaissance of ancient Greek and Ro-
man culture accompanied by the political development of nations and
53. See SCHEERENBERGER, 1983, supra note 48, at 6-11; Gerdtz, supra note 52, at 2. The
Code of Hammurabi was a vast code of civil and criminal laws which, according to some sources,
the Sun God gave to King Hammurabi, the sixth King of the Semitic Dynasty. See SCHEER-
ENBERGER, 1983, supra note 48, at 7; see also ROBERT M. VEATCH, THE FOUNDATIONS OF JUS-
TICE: WHY THE RETARDED AND THE REST OF Us HAVE CLAIMS TO EOUALITY 22 (1986)
(noting that although the Bible does not specifically discuss mentally retarded persons, an exam-
ination of Biblical writings concerning the oppressed, the needy, the sick, and the poor may
indicate ways the Judeo-Christian tradition might approach mentally retarded persons).
54. See SCHEERENBERGER, 1983, supra note 48, at 11-12; Gerdtz, supra note 52, at 2.
55. See SCHEERENBERGER, 1983, supra note 48, at 20-23; Gerdtz, supra note 52, at 3-4.
Although some records show that a primitive social welfare system of education, orphanages,
and hospitals for the poor developed during the Roman Empire, it is unclear whether mentally
retarded children or adults benefitted from such programs. Moreover, even though the fifth-
century Christian church condemned infanticide-a policy that the state adopted legally-there
is evidence to suggest that such a policy may have reflected theory more than actual practice.
Regardless, the ancient period's most pervasive legacy constituted the teachings and philoso-
phies of those individuals who contributed a number of religions and ethical systems benevolent
toward mentally retarded individuals-Jesus, Buddha in India, Confucius in China, and Moham-
med in the Arab world. See SCHEERENBERGER, 1983, supra note 48, at 20-23; Gerdtz, supra
note 52, at 4.
56. See SCHEERENBERGER, 1983, supra note 48, at 34-36; Gerdtz, supra note 52, at 5-6.
57. See SCHEERENBERoER, 1983, supra note 48, at 32; Gerdtz, supra note 52, at 6. In the
Islamic world, however, where mentally retarded individuals were treated more humanely, phy-
sicians not only studied and recognized different levels of intelligence, but also suggested that
mentally retarded persons be educated. See id. at 5-6.
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states.58 Although the Reformation prompted substantial political
and cultural change, a number of devastating wars between Roman
Catholic and Protestant nations abolished the weak safety net of mon-
asteries and religious houses for the poor. Such developments high-
lighted, in hindsight, the rather negative perceptions that key religious
reformers held toward those with mental retardation.5 9 Although it
appears that most mentally retarded individuals lived with their fami-
lies, others resided in horrible workhouses and residences which, dur-
ing the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, seemingly provided
worse care than those in prior centuries.60  But there was also pro-
gress. Philosophers such as Francis Bacon, Rene Descartes, and John
Locke contributed to the creation of scientific methods that would
support much of the later work in mental retardation and the differ-
ences between it and mental illness.61
B. Nineteenth- Century United States
Until the nineteenth century, professionals had little interest in
mental retardation.62 It appears that modem special education began
in France in the early nineteenth century when Jean-Marc-Gaspard
Itard attempted to educate the child known as "The Wild Boy of
Aveyron, '' 63 by applying operant conditioning and task analysis tech-
niques that are still popular.' Itard's negative assessment of the
child's abilities was influential.6' Regardless, by 1818, the Industrial
Revolution's scientific progress spurred Connecticut to offer the first
58. See SCHEERENBERGER, 1983, supra note 48, at 31-36; Gerdtz, supra note 52, at 7.
59. See SCHEERENBERGER, 1983, supra note 48, at 32-33; Gerdtz, supra note 52, at 7. The
reformers John Calvin and Martin Luther showed particular disdain toward mentally retarded
individuals. See DEuTscH, supra note 48, at 336 (explaining that "many people (including Lu-
ther and Calvin) regarded [the mentally retarded] with deep hatred as being children of the
Devil"); LEO KANNER, A HIsToRY OF THE CARE AND STUDY OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED 7
(1964) (recounting Luther's statements that the feebleminded were "godless"); SCHEER-
ENBERGER, 1983, supra note 48, at 32 (noting that "Luther's attitude toward [mentally retarded
persons] was singularly harsh"); Gerdtz, supra note 52, at 7-8 (emphasizing Calvin's and Luther's
views "that those who were mentally retarded were not completely human").
60. See KANNER, supra note 59, at 6 (noting that "[it was during the period of 'enlighten-
ment' and 'reform' that the mental defectives were at their worst"); SCHEERENBERGER, 1983,
supra note 48, at 43 (specifying that the death rate for children placed in some of these work-
houses was over 90%).
61. See SCHEERENBERGER, 1983, supra note 48, at 41.
62. See KANNER, supra note 59, at 7-8 (stating that relative to other conditions, such as
epilepsy, mental retardation had not been mentioned until relatively recently); Richard C.
Woolfson, Historical Perspective on Mental Retardation, 89 AM. J. MENTAL DEFICIENCY 231, 231
(1984) (noting that despite the dearth of early research on mental retardation, there was an
attempt by one physician, Montalto, early in the 17th century, to study the topic
comprehensively).
63. See generally JEAN-MARc-GASPARD ITARD, THE WILD BOY OF AVEYRON (George
Humphrey & Muriel Humphrey trans., 1962).
64. For a more complete discussion of this issue, see PETER L. TYOR & LELAND V. BELL,
CARING FOR THE RETARDED IN AMERICA (1984); Philip M. Ferguson, The Social Construction
of Mental Retardation, 18 Soc. POL'Y 51, 52 (1987).
65. See, e.g., TYOR & BELL, supra note 64, at 1-43; Ferguson, supra note 64, at 52.
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residential and educational program for mentally retarded children in
the United States.66 The era also marked the start of the scientific
community's focus on mental retardation. Scientists designed classifi-
cation schemes to diagnose mental retardation and its various levels of
severity and to demonstrate its differences from mental illness.67
In general, mentally retarded individuals were viewed as a "nui-
sance" rather than a danger in nineteenth-century United States, a
time when individualism and competition were highly valued.' Con-
trary to Itard's earlier view, scientists focused on the more successful"school-like asylums" for the mentally retarded69 as well as on men-
tally retarded children, who they viewed as more capable of eradicat-
ing what they considered bad and vicious habits than mentally
retarded adolescents or adults.7" One "vicious habit" that greatly con-
cerned reformers was "self abuse" or masturbation, which they be-
lieved violated "natural law" and either caused or exacerbated mental
retardation in both the masturbators and their progeny."
In the late nineteenth century, professionals believed that their
method of treating mentally retarded individuals through training and
education should emphasize instead custodial care and protection, an
approach that seemingly better accommodated adults.72 Crucial to
this change was the creation in 1876 of the American Association on
Mental Retardation (AAMR) which, from the time of its founding to
the present, has led the effort to understand, define, and classify the
66. See TYOR & BELL, supra note 64, at 10; Gerdtz, supra note 52, at 10.
67. See AMERICAN ASS'N ON MENTAL DEFICIENCY, CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETAR-
DATION 5-10 (Herbert J. Grossman ed., 1983) [hereinafter AAMD]; SCHEERENBERGER, 1983,
supra note 48, at 137-47; Patricia T. Cegelka & Herbert J. Prehm, The Concept of Mental Retar-
dation, in MENTAL RETARDATION: FROM CATEGORIES TO PEOPLE 3, 3-20 (Patricia T. Cegelka
& Herbert J. Prehm eds., 1982).
68. See DEUTSCH, supra note 48, at 130 (providing examples of society's indifference to
mentally retarded individuals).
69. See Ferguson, supra note 64, at 52. The years between 1850 and 1880 evidenced a large
growth in the number of institutions for mentally retarded persons, including the founding of the
State Asylum for Idiots in New York in 1851, the Pennsylvania Training School for Feeble-
minded Children in 1853, the Institution for Feebleminded Youth in Ohio in 1857, and the Con-
necticut School of Imbeciles in 1858. This growth reflected the belief that mentally retarded
individuals could be cured or at least bettered if they received the proper training and education
during their youth. See DUANE F. STROMAN, MENTAL RETARDATION IN SOCIAL CoNTEXT 103
(1989).
70. See TYOR & BELL, supra note 64, at 22-23; Samuel G. Howe, On the Causes of Idiocy,
in 1 Tam HISTORY OF MENTAL RETARDATION: COLLECTED PAPERS 31, 54-57 (Marvin Rosen et
al. eds., 1976) [hereinafter THE HISTORY OF MENTAL RETARDATION]; Rhodes, supra note 48, at
3.
71. For example, in his 1848 report to the Massachusetts Legislature, Samuel Howe, super-
intendent of the first training school for mentally retarded persons, emphasized that "ten cases
... [of the] idiocy of the children [could be] manifestly attributable to this sin of the parent."
Howe, supra note 70, at 56.
72. See WILLIAM SLOAN & HARVEY A. STEVENS, A CENTURY OF CONCERN: A HISTORY
OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL DEFICIENCY 1876-1976, at 19 (1976). According
to the President of the American Association on Mental Deficiency in his 1890 Address, the
Association's view was "[olnce feebleminded, always feebleminded, only in a less degree." Id.
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meaning of mental retardation.73 From the start, the AAMR broad-
ened its educational agenda to include adults. It also recommended
institutions patterned on a community structure reflective of "a great
family."'74 However, "[i]mplicit in this view was an understanding that
a sexual life that might enlarge this population was not to be en-
couraged. ' 75 For example, the AAMR made clear that mentally re-
tarded males and females should be segregated.76
Twentieth-century reformers have encouraged the notion that
mentally retarded individuals are trainable and therefore economi-
cally useful,77 "able and willing to do much of the drudgery of the
world, which other people will not do."'78 Although the definition of
economic utility has changed over time, the emphasis on social exclu-
sion of the mentally retarded has remained constant. This theme of
isolation permeates the legal and social boundaries in current rape
law.
C. The Scientific Construction of Mental Retardation
The history of mental retardation and sexuality necessarily con-
cerns determinations of who is to be labelled "mentally retarded."
According to social construction theory, the conceptual foundation for
much of the current commentary on disability reform,79 "much-if
not all-of what we mean by terms such as 'disability' and 'handicap'
is cultural artifact rather than physiological inevitability. '"80 The term"mental retardation," for example, has no inherent meaning, but
rather reflects how others may presuppose certain characteristics of
mentally retarded individuals.8 ' Hence Robert Hayman's conclusion
73. See AMERICAN Ass'N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFIIr-
TION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS iX (9th ed. 1992) [hereinafter AAMR]. Prior
to 1987, the AAMR was known as the American Association on Mental Deficiency. See 1 EN-
CYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIATIONS 1797 (Carolyn A. Fischer & Carol A. Schwartz eds., 30th ed.
1996). This article will refer only to the name AAMR in an effort to avoid confusion and to
reflect the current trend rejecting the term "mental deficiency."
74. See SLOAN & STEVENS, supra note 72, at 19.
75. Rhodes, supra note 48, at 6. As Issac N. Kerlin, superintendent of the Pennsylvania
Training School emphasized in a report to the National Conference on Charities and Corrections
in 1885, "[t]hey 'shall go out no more,' and 'they shall neither marry nor be given in marriage,' in
those havens dedicated to incompetency." Wesley D. White & Wolf Wolfensberger, The Evolu-
tion of Dehumanization in Our Institutions, 7 MENTAL RETARDATION 5, 7 (1969).
76. See SLOAN & STEVENS, supra note 72, at 19.
77. See Ferguson, supra note 64, at 52.
78. HENRY H. GODDARD, FEEBLEMINDEDNESS: ITS CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 588
(1920); see also THEODORA M. ABEL & ELAINE F. KINDER, THE SUBNORMAL ADOLESCENT
GIRL 166 (1942) (noting that, with respect to mentally retarded girls in particular, "[slociety can
. . . emphasize either her potentialities for doing the drudgery of the world or her social
liabilities").
79. See Ferguson, supra note 64, at 54.
80. Id. at 51.
81. For a more complete discussion of this issue, see ROBERT BOGDAN & STEVEN J. TAY-
LOR, INSIDE OUT. THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MENTAL RETARDATION (1982); JANE R. MERCER,
LABELLING THE MENTALLY RETARDED (1973); Burton Blatt, The Definition of Mental Retarda-
tion, 32 MENTAL RETARDATION 71, 71 (1994); Hayman, supra note 32, at 1211-26, 1243-52.
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that "[m]ental retardation is not a disease, disorder or disability," but
a less-than-satisfactory administrative term used to identify the condi-
tion of a broad spectrum of people whose common trait is inadequate
cognitive ability to meet the demands of society.82
A striking example of the power of definition stems from scien-
tific determinations of mental retardation, most particularly the early
twentieth century creation of IQ tests. IQ tests alone substantially
elevated the prevalence of those individuals labelled as mentally re-
tarded mainly because of the leap in the number of individuals in the
highest IQ retardation level.83 Then, as now, a debate focused on the
propriety of classifying as mentally retarded the higher IQ individuals
because most could function relatively independently; low test per-
formance alone justified their new label.8 4 The growing surge in the
testing movement over time only increased the number of persons
classified as mentally retarded.85 In 1973, however, the AAMR again
changed the scope of the definition and the percentage labelled men-
tally retarded declined substantially.86
82. Hayman, supra note 32, at 1213; see also Denise C. Valenti-Hein & Linda D. Schwartz,
Witness Competency in People with Mental Retardation: Implications for Prosecution of Sexual
Abuse, 11 SEXUALrrY & DisAaiLrry 287, 290 (1993) (emphasizing that "[g]eneralizations about
people with mental retardation are particularly problematic because mental retardation, like
competency, is a multi-dimensional concept" representing, for example, people with a wide
range of IQ scores (from 0 to 80) and abilities (from those who cannot feed, dress, toilet, or
speak for themselves to those who reside virtually undetected in the community)).
83. See DEUTSCH, supra note 48, at 354-86; SCHEERENBERGER, 1987, supra note 48, at 11-
36; STANLEY J. VITELLO & RONALD M. SOSKIN, MENTAL RETARDATION: ITS SOCIAL AND
LEGAL CONTEXT 4 (1985). During the first half of the 20th century, the mental testing move-
ment heralded by Alfred Binet, Lewis Terman, and David Wechsler, proposed the term "intelli-
gence" to designate cognitive development. In practice, a person's level of cognitive
development depends upon the score that person obtains on an intelligence test (such as the
Stanford-Binet or the Wechsler Scales), relative to an arbitrarily defined norm, such as 100. A
person whose IQ deviates substantially from that norm is determined to be mentally retarded,
while the degree of that person's retardation corresponds to the magnitude of the score's devia-
tion. In the 1900s, for example, mentally retarded or "feebleminded" persons with an IQ score
below 25 were categorized as "idiots," those with an IQ score between 25 and 50 were catego-
rized as "imbeciles," and later those with IQ scores between 50 and 70 were categorized as"morons." See VITELLO & SOsKN, supra, at 4. Although since 1900 educators have used a
variety of terms to denote general intellectual incompetence, the term "mental retardation"
eventually predominated, mirroring a changing scientific view of mentally retarded persons as
educable. See BERNARD FARBER, MENTAL RETARDATION: ITS SOCIAL CONTEXT AND SOCIAL
CONSEQUENCES 4-5 (1968).
84. See VITELLO & SOSKIN, supra note 83, at 4.
85. For example, before 1959, when the AAMR defined mental retardation in psychomet-
ric terms as an IQ of 75 or 1.5 standard deviations below the mean on a test of general intelli-
gence, there existed a 3% incidence of mental retardation in the general population. Yet in 1959,
when the AAMR redefined mental retardation as an IQ exceeding one standard deviation below
the population mean, the incidence of mental retardation grew to 16%. See Blatt, supra note 81,
at 71.
86. See AAMR, supra note 73, at ix (explaining that the 1973 change: (1) redefined mental
retardation as two or more standard deviations below the mean (i.e., an IQ of 70 or below), (2)
included the word "significantly" before the term "subaverage general intellectual functioning,"
(3) increased the age of the developmental period from age 16 to 18, and (4) deleted the border-
line level of retardation (an IQ of about 70 to 85)); Blatt, supra note 81, at 71 (noting a decline in
the number of mentally retarded individuals). But see ROBERT PERSKE, UNEQUAL JUSTICE?
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Psychometric testing also contributed to the long-held view of the
mentally retarded as a homogenous population, thereby perpetuating
overly generalized labels and diagnostic stereotypes rather than a clas-
sification of specific behaviors and traits.8 7 Because of the growing
recognition that intelligence tests reflect only a portion of a wide
range of behavior,' in 1959 the AAMR incorporated the concept of
"adaptive behavior" into its official definition of mental retardation. 9
The latest (and substantially changed) AAMR definition of mental
retardation has, among other things, extended the concept of adaptive
behavior even further.90 Currently, mental retardation "refers to sub-
stantial limitations in present functioning" that are characterized both
by "significantly subaverage intellectual functioning" as well as by "re-
lated limitations in two or more of the following applicable adaptive
skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social skills, com-
munity use, self-direction, health and safety, functional academics, lei-
sure, and work." 9' Therefore, persons labelled mentally retarded
must have some limited adaptive ability irrespective of their IQ level.
Although courts also typically refer to a victim's "mental age" when
WHAT CAN HAPPEN WHEN PERSONS WITH RETARDATION OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL DISA-
BILITIES ENCOUNTER THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 40 (1991) (contending that although the
removal of the borderline level of mental retardation allowed some individuals to thrive in main-
stream society by lifting the stigma associated with mental retardation, it also withdrew financial
and professional support from others who were in dire need of it).
87. See FARBER, supra note 83, at 16; Blatt, supra note 81, at 71; Ferguson, supra note 64,
at 52-53; Rhodes, supra note 48, at 22-23; Norman D. Sunberg et al., Toward Assessment of
Personal Competence and Incompetence in Life Situations, 29 ANNUAL REV. PSYCHOL. 179, 181
(1978). Indeed, the 19th century's characterization of mental retardation as deviance repre-
sented an effort to integrate a wide range of social problems, such as poverty, alcoholism, crime,
and other conduct that countered social norms. In contrast, with time, a view of mental retarda-
tion as incompetence developed as an effort toward social reform and the use of psychological
testing to select children who were dysfunctional in ordinary classrooms. See FARBER, supra
note 83, at 33; see also LEO KANNER, A MINIATURE TEXTBOOK OF FEEBLEMINDEDNESS 3 (1949)
(noting that psychometry was once praised for its creation of a relative scale on which to judge
feeblemindedness).
88. See AAMR, supra note 73, at 9; Stephen Greenspan & James M. Granfield, Reconsid-
ering the Construct of Mental Retardation: Implications of a Model of Social Competence, 96 AM.
J. MENTAL RETARDATION 442,442-53 (1992). Current commentary has expanded this view even
further, contending, for example, that "emotional intelligence" can be far more important than
IQ in predicting success in life. See generally DANIEL GOLEMAN, EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE:
WHY IT CAN MATTER MORE THAN IQ (1995) (contending that our current notions of intelli-
gence are too narrow, ignoring those critical abilities or "emotional intelligence" that promote
achievement-such as self-awareness, impulse control, persistence, zeal, self-motivation, empa-
thy, and social deftness).
89. See AAMR, supra note 73, at 9 (requiring in 1959 that "subaverage intellectual func-
tioning must be reflected by impairment in one or more of the following aspects of adaptive
behavior: maturation, learning and social adjustment"). As early as the 19th century, scholars
such as Itard emphasized the significance of social competence in diagnosing mental retardation
in part because of the epidemiological finding that mental retardation, unlike other nonfatal
conditions, declined after adolescence. See Greenspan & Granfield, supra note 88, at 443.
90. This change emphasizes even more the interaction between limited intellectual func-
tioning and the environment. See AAMR, supra note 73, at x.
91. Id. at 1 (noting that mental retardation must occur before age 18).
[Vol. 1997
HeinOnline  -- 1997 U. Ill. L. Rev. 330 1997
RAPE AND MENTAL RETARDATION
evaluating rape and mental retardation cases,92 the AAMR93 and
other commentators94 consider "mental age" a misleading concept,
most particularly because it perpetuates beliefs that the mentally re-
tarded are "forever young" or "childlike." 95
The AAMR also has recommended replacement of the tradi-
tional four-level classification of mental retardation.96 Because the
AAMR's replacement system has not yet been referenced in the rape
and mental retardation cases nor in the multidisciplinary literature
discussing this issue, this article will continue to refer to the traditional
four-level classification.97 However, this article will rely on the
AAMR's other new definitional changes because they have been so
widely accepted and because they recently constituted the basis of the
U.S. Supreme Court's definition of mental retardation.98
92. This estimate of courts' references to "mental age" is based on this article's overview of
all rape cases involving mentally retarded persons within the last two decades; see also infra
Appendix, Table E. "Mental age" is defined as
the chronological age for which performance is "average" or "normal"; determination of
[mental age] is based on the examinee's success in passing a series of test items that are
ordered in difficulty and represent age levels at which most children are successful with the
items; the examinee has been successful with all test items at some level (basal age) below
the assigned [mental age] and with none at some higher level (ceiling age).
AAMD, supra note 67, at 183.
93. Telephone Interview with Doreen Croser, Executive Director of the AAMR (Aug. 13,
1996); Telephone Interview with Robert L. Schalock, Chairman and Professor, Department of
Psychology, Hastings College, Member of the Ad Hoc Committee on Terminology and Classifi-
cation, AAMR (Aug. 13, 1996).
94. See AAMD, supra note 67, at 33 ("The comparison of [mental ages] of retarded people
with the characteristics of children whose [chronological ages] are of similar magnitude is insuffi-
cient for describing the course of mental development of retarded children who are still grow-
ing."); Greenspan & Granfeld, supra note 88, at 443 (viewing psychometric testing alone is an
inadequate measure of mental retardation because the concept of a "mental age" does not suffi-
ciently represent an individual's social functioning); Robert L. Schalock et al., The Changing
Conception of Mental Retardation: Implications for the Field, 32 MENTAL RETARDATION 181,
181-93 (1994) (explaining the AAMR's new definition of mental retardation and the exclusion of
mental age).
95. See William Fink, Education and Habilitation of the Moderately and Severely Mentally
Retarded, in MENTAL RETARDATION: FROM CATEGORIES TO PEOPLE, supra note 67, at 260,262
(emphasizing that "a major obstacle to designing functional and appropriate programs for mod-
erately and severely handicapped individuals has been the tendency for programmers to focus on
the retarded individual's mental age, with relative disregard for the individual's chronological
age," a tack that "has resulted in the belief that moderately retarded people remain 'forever
young' or childlike").
96. See AAMR, supra note 73, at x. The AAMR has proposed four levels that classify "the
intensities and pattern of supports systems" (intermittent, limited, extensive, and pervasive), as
substitutes for the four traditional levels (mild, moderate, severe, and profound). See AMERI-
CAN PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERs 39,
40 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV]; infra Appendix, Table A. The critiques of the AAMR
classification system and the raging debates concerning the proper definition of mental retarda-
tion have been addressed elsewhere and are beyond the scope of this article. See generally
Steven Reiss, Issues in Defining Mental Retardation, 99 AM. J. MENTAL RETARDATION 1 (1994);
Schalock et al., supra note 94, at 181.
97. Most significant, perhaps, is the AAMR's recognition that the label "mental retarda-
tion" is scientifically constructed, thereby prompting the AAMR's continuing "attempt to ex-
press the changing understanding of what mental retardation is." AAMR, supra note 73, at ix.
98. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1993).
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III. SOCIETY'S DENIAL OF A SEXUAL LIFE FOR MENTALLY
RETARDED INDIVIDUALS: FROM EUGENICS TO
NORMALIZATION
Throughout history, scientific preoccupation with the genetic
causes of mental retardation has fueled society's denial of a sexual life
for mentally retarded individuals even though such genetic theories
have been discredited. Current research on the intergenerational
transmission of mental retardation highlights the preventable or re-
versible environmental influences that these families share,9 9 as well
as a range of other nongenetic causes, such as head injury. 100 More-
over, such research indicates that individuals' abilities may improve
markedly with adequate training and support. 1°1 Social and legal atti-
tudes have not always reflected this modem view, however, following
instead the dubious early science of "pseudogenetics."' 1 2 As later sec-
tions of this article show, 0 3 these attitudes have been incorporated
and retained, either directly or indirectly, in rape statutes and cases.
A. The Eugenics Movement
The twentieth-century eugenics movement was a major factor in
initiating the differential treatment of mentally retarded persons."
Accompanying the notion that mentally retarded persons should be
protected was a growing concern that such individuals were dangerous
to society. This perception was spurred by the concepts of evolution
and natural selection espoused in Charles Darwin's 1859 publication,
Origin of the Species.10 5
The eugenics movement was appealing to both professionals and
the public because it provided a means for explaining a changing and
increasingly forbidding industrial society in terms of the genetic trans-
99. See AAMR, supra note 73, at 71.
100. See id. at 69-91; SCHEERENBERGER, 1987, supra note 48, at 37-61; Howard L. Garber &
Maurice Mclnerney, Sociobehavioral Factors in Mental Retardation, in MENTAL RETARDATION:
FROM CATEGORIES TO PEOPLE, supra note 67, at 111, 111-45; B.C. Moore, Biomedical Factors in
Mental Retardation, in MErAL RETARDATION: FROM CATEGORIES TO PEOPLE, supra note 67,
at 76, 76-110.
101. See AAMR, supra note 73, at 101-46; SCHEERENBERGER, 1987, supra note 48, at 109-
311; TYOR & BELL, supra note 64, at 123-51; William Christian, Note, Normalization as a Goak
The Americans with Disabilities Act and Individuals with Mental Retardation, 73 TEX. L. REv.
409, 413 (1994).
102. See AAMR, supra note 73, at 71.
103. See infra notes 143-253 and accompanying text.
104. See SCHEERENBERGER, 1983, supra note 48, at 147-75.
105. In 1883, Darwin's cousin, Francis Galton, used the term "eugenics" (derived from the
Greek word "well-born") to depict "the study of the agencies under social control that may
improve or impair the racial qualities of future generations either physically or mentally."
DEUTSCH, supra note 48, at 357-58. The eugenics movement, which stressed the overarching
importance of heredity, likewise encouraged the reproduction of the "socially desirable" (posi-
tive eugenics) and discouraged the reproduction of the "socially undesirable" (negative eugen-
ics). Id. at 358.
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mission of social problems.1°6 This view was enhanced by a number of
genealogical "studies" supposedly illustrating the long-term societal
effects of "degenerate" families, including those with mentally re-
tarded members. 10 7  One of the most significant of these studies,
Henry H. Goddard's 1912 history of the Kallikak family, concluded
that 143 of the 480 descendants of a mentally retarded patient were
also mentally retarded and that three-quarters were degenerates.' 0 8
Similarly, many of the scientific and popular works of the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries commonly referred to mentally retarded
individuals as "criminals," "prostitutes," "parasites," and other such
terms,109 thereby encouraging the public and professional view that
mental retardation was both inherited and linked to social
problems." 0 For these reasons, the eugenics movement's push to seg-
regate the "dangerous minority" of mentally retarded persons re-
ceived widespread support, resulting in vast increases in the number
of institutionalized mentally retarded persons."'
B. Women and Mental Retardation: A Special Case
Increased institutionalization included a separation of the sexes
to prevent sexual activity" 2 and its consequent "social burden.""' 3 In-
deed, "[t]he concern about women with mental retardation became
something of an obsession among administrators and legislators by the
turn-of-the-century."" 4 Mentally retarded women were considered to
106. See Rhodes, supra note 48, at 6.
107. One of the most informative of these works was Richard Dugdale's 1877 analysis of the
Jukes family, which concluded that generational patterns of criminal conduct could be attributed
to bad environmental conditions. See generally RICHARD L. DUGDALE: THE JuKEs: A RECORD
AND STUDY OF THE RELATIONS OF CRIME, PAUPERISM, DISEASE AND HEREDITY (3d ed. 1877).
Yet Arthur Estabrook's 1915 reexamination of Dugdale's work concluded that one half of the
Jukes family were criminals and the other half were mentally retarded. See generally ARTHUR
H. ESTABROOK, THE JuKEs IN 1915 (1916). This finding prompted one scholar of the period to
observe that "what was regarded in 1877 as primarily a problem in criminal degeneracy, became
in 1915, mainly a problem of mental deficiency." Marvin Rosen et al., The Impact of Genetics, in
2 THE HISTORY OF MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 70, at 145, 145-46. But see MARTHA
UFFORD DICKERSON, SOCIAL WORK PRACTICE WITH THE MENTALLY RETARDED 10 (1981)
(stating that Dugdale found that only one of the 709 subjects he studied was mentally deficient).
108. See GODDARD, supra note 78; see also KANNER, supra note 59, at 132 (noting the influ-
ence of Goddard's study).
109. See Gerdtz, supra note 52, at 14.
110. See Rhodes, supra note 48, at 7.
111. See id. at 8-9; Rosen et al., supra note 107, at 146.
112. See TYOR & BELL, supra note 64, at 104; Martin W. Barr, The Imperative Call of Our
Present to Our Future, in 2 THE HISTORY OF MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 70, at 99, 99-
104; see also ABEL & KINDER, supra note 78, at 139 ("[M]any, if not most, subnormal girls are
easily led. They are suggestible and find it difficult to turn down any invitation a boy may make;
they may not even consider declination as a possibility.").
113. See EDWARD T. DEVINE, THE FAMILY AND SOCIAL WORK 44-45 (1912). As Edward T.
Devine of the New York Charity Organization Society explained, "[t]he permanent segregation,
during the reproductive years of life, of the feeble-minded, the insane, the incorrigibly criminal,
and the hopelessly ineffective ... would enormously reduce the total social burden." Id.
114. Rhodes, supra note 48, at 11-12; see also SCHEERENBERGER, 1983, supra note 48, at 124
(emphasizing that "[t]his obsession was reflected throughout the country").
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be not only more sexually promiscuous, but also more fertile, thereby
fueling fears that they would bear children "as defective as them-
selves.""' 5 Yet such fears also reflected continuing social disapproval
of any woman's overt sexuality. 1 6 Some professionals perceived a
causal link between mental retardation and promiscuity, suggesting
that the condition of mental retardation itself could be assumed if a
female were sexually active outside of marriage. 117 It appears, then,
that a number of women were admitted or retained in institutions sim-
ply because of their sexual expression rather than their mental
deficits. 1 8
By the 1920s, the eugenics movement had waned and profession-
als began to regard the mentally retarded not only less harshly but
even as "pure minded" and "sweet.""' 9 Recognizing that the defini-
tion of mental retardation had been so expanded that it included indi-
viduals who would not have been so labelled a decade or two earlier,
professionals started to recommend parole for the more mildly re-
tarded. 120  At the same time, however, there remained a strong eu-
genic attitude toward the sexuality of the mentally retarded,
particularly females. According to Howard W. Potter, director of re-
search at Letchworth Village in New York, males were "far more suc-
cessful in extra-institutional adaption' 12 ' because their parole failure
115. See SCHEERENBERGER, 1983, supra note 48, at 124; SLOAN & STEVENS, supra note 72,
at 76; see also MARTIN W. BARR & E.F. MALONEY, TYPES OF MENTAL DEFECTIvES 2 (1921)
("[T]he sexual desires [in mental defectives] are exaggerated in the various grades in proportion
to the predominant power of the mere animal over the psychic forces. In all grades, the organs
of reproduction are fully developed-in the male frequently enlarged."); G.E. SHurrLEWOR-M,
MENTALLY-DEFICIENT CHLDREN" THEIR TREATMENT AND TRAINING 55 (1895) ("Though chil-
dren in mind, they are very often men and women in wickedness and vice .... ); Walter E.
Fernald, The History of the Treatment of the Feeble-Minded, 20 PRoc. NAT'L CONF. OF CHARI-
TIES & CORRECrIONs 203, 212 (1893) ("[Ihf at large, [feebleminded women] either marry and
bring forth in geometrical ratio a new generation of defectives and dependents, or become irre-
sponsible sources of corruption and debauchery in the communities where they live.").
116. See PEGGY REEVES SANDAY, A WOMAN SCORNED: ACOUAINTANCE RAPE ON TRIAL
121-39 (1996); Deborah W. Denno, Gender, Crime, and the Criminal Law Defenses, 85 J. CRm.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 80, 86-89 (1994); Jane E. Larson, "Women Understand So Little, They Call
My Good Nature 'Deceit"': A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLuM. L REV. 374, 388-93
(1993). For example, the trustees of one New York asylum viewed mentally retarded women as
requiring more care because they were "ungoverned and easily yielding to lust." Peter Tyor,
"Denied the Power to Choose the Good": Sexuality and Mental Defect in American Medical
Practice, 1850-1920, 10 J. Soc. HIsT. 472, 480 (1977) (citation omitted).
117. See Tyor, supra note 116, at 481 (noting that the trustees of a Massachusetts asylum
considered whether "inordinate sexual passion on the part of a young woman [is] to be regarded
by [us] as sufficient evidence of feeble-mindedness to hold her as an inmate of this institution")
(citation omitted).
118. Mildly retarded women were viewed to be the most dangerous. As one superintendent
of the mentally retarded warned, "[t]he segregation of this class should be rapidly extended until
all not adequately guarded at home are placed under strict sexual quarantine. Hundreds of
known cases of this sort are now at large because the institutions are overcrowded." SLOAN &
STIEVENS, supra note 72, at 76-77.
119. See SCHEERENBERGER, 1987, supra note 48, at 158.
120. See TYOR & BELL, supra note 64, at 110-11; Rhodes, supra note 48, at 14.
121. Howard W. Potter & Crystal L. McCollister, A Resume of Parole Work at Letchworth
Village, in 2 THE HISTORY OF MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 70, at 127, 136.
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was typically due to "general incorrigibility"; in contrast, failure
among females was "principally for tendencies or actual expressions
of sex delinquency '"122 marked by "a normal interest in the opposite
sex" and "normal flirtations.' '1 23
The continuing influence of eugenics and the infeasibility of insti-
tutionalizing all mildly mentally retarded individuals forced institu-
tional officials to reconsider their earlier ambivalence toward
sterilization. 124 Rather than recommending that all mentally retarded
individuals be sterilized, officials began to support its selective use,
most particularly for the mildly mentally retarded who would be most
apt to return to the community.'25 In 1927, the Supreme Court in
Buck v. Bell,'26 one of the Court's most "infamous" and "notorious"
opinions, 27 upheld the constitutionality of Virginia's involuntary ster-
122. Id. at 140.
123. Id. As Potter explained, "[many of our paroles would have been considered as having
made a satisfactory extra-institutional adjustment if we had disregarded what one might term a
normal interest in the opposite sex.... [T]he matter of eugenics has made us regard even the
rather normal flirtations of our patients with the opposite sex as a sufficient reason for cancelling
their parole." Id.
124. See TYOR & BELL, supra note 64, at 119. There was no clear consensus in the scientific
community regarding whether the institutionalized should be sterilized. Compare Barr, supra
note 112, at 103 (discussing the benefits of sterilization or "asexualization" "to secure at once
safety to society, less tension to community life, and greater liberty, therefore greater happiness,
to the individual"), and Rudolph J. Vecoli, Sterilization: A Progressive Measure?, 43 WIs. MAG.
HIsT. 190, 196 (1960) ("Sterilization is not nearly so terrible as hanging a man, and the chances
of sterilizing the fit are not nearly so great as are the chances of hanging the innocent.") (citation
omitted), with DEVINE, supra note 113, at 46 (opposing sterilization as "a policy of very doubtful
expediency"). By 1907, Indiana became the first state to pass a sterilization law permitting the
operation on "confirmed criminals, idiots, imbeciles and rapists." DEUTSCH, supra note 48, at
370. By 1917, 14 other states permitted sterilization producing, by 1921, a total of 3,233 steriliza-
tions. See TYOR & BELL, supra note 64, at 118-19.
125. See SCHEERENBERGER, 1983, supra note 48, at 190. The largest sterilization effort took
place at Sonoma State Home in California where, between 1919 and 1943, 4,310 residents under-
went sterilization, "a standard procedure" for those reproductively capable women prior to their
parole. Id. at 226.
126. 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (Holmes, J.).
127. The critical commentary on Buck is voluminous. See Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr. & Marcia
Pearce Burgdorf, The Wicked Witch Is Almost Dead: Buck v. Bell and the Sterilization of Handi-
capped Persons, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 995, 996 (1977) (calling Buck an "embarrassing example of bad
law" and comparing Justice Holmes's reasoning to the philosophies that provided the ground-
work for Nazi atrocities); John M. Conley & David W. Peterson, The Science of Gatekeeping:
The Federal Judicial Center's New Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, 74 N.C. L. REV.
1183, 1184 (1996) (critiquing the science of Buck); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Norms &
Narratives: Can Judges Avoid Serious Moral Error?, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1929, 1949 (1991) (pro-
nouncing Justice Holmes's opinion to be "technically poor-easily his worst ... devoid of any
consideration of [the individual's] interests or of less restrictive alternatives"; an "embarrassing
opinion" which "mars the career of an otherwise eminent Justice"); Paul A. Lombardo, Three
Generations, No Imbeciles: New Light on Buck v. Bell, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 30-31 (1985)
(regarding Justice Holmes's opinion as "histrionic" and "indefensible"); Tracee Parker & Paul R.
Abramson, The Law Hath Not Been Dead: Protecting Adults with Mental Retardation from Sex-
ual Abuse and Violation of Their Sexual Freedom, 33 MENTAL RETARDATION 257, 257 (1995)
(regarding Justice Holmes's statement to be "notorious" and "infamous"); Cass Sunstein, On
Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 757 (1993) (declaring Justice Holmes's reasoning"casual and unpersuasive"). It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss Buck or its after-
math, both of which have been addressed by others in great depth. See generally MENTAL RE-
No. 21
HeinOnline  -- 1997 U. Ill. L. Rev. 335 1997
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
ilization statute,128 which in turn temporarily eased the passage of
other sterilization laws. By 1936, twenty-five states had sterilization
statutes, all of which could apply to mentally retarded individuals. 129
In any event, sterilization efforts were generally considered a failure
for two major reasons: the great majority of mentally retarded indi-
viduals were never sterilized and a disproportionate number of steril-
izations occurred in areas where the eugenics movement was
strongest. 30 The eugenics movement waned further after World War
II in light of publicity highlighting the atrocities inflicted by Nazi Ger-
many against the mentally and physically handicapped.'13
TARDATION AND STERILIZATION: A PROBLEM OF COMPETENCY AND PATERNALISM (Ruth
Macklin & Willard Gaylin eds., 1981).
128. See Buck, 274 U.S. at 207 ("It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute
degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent
those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind .... Three generations of imbeciles are
enough."). Although the Supreme Court has never expressly overruled Buck, subsequent cases
have brought into question the continuing validity of eugenic sterilization even though they have
not gone so far as to regard the mentally retarded as a class warranting strict scrutiny. For
example, in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), the Court struck down an Oklahoma law
involving the sterilization of recidivist criminals, holding that strict scrutiny must be applied to
state legislation affecting the fundamental right to procreate. Id. at 540-42. The Court, however,
did not extend this holding to the mentally retarded. In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, 473 U.S. 432, 442-43 (1985), the Court also did not extend suspect classification to mental
retardation; yet, it arguably achieved somewhat the same result by regarding fear or prejudice-
based motives underlying the classification of the mentally retarded as irrational and illegitimate.
Moreover, the entrenchment of the right to privacy has also eroded the Buck holding. The
Court affirmed the fundamental right of procreation established in Skinner and additionally ac-
knowledged a right to control procreation. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding a state
statute criminalizing abortion an invasion of privacy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
(striking down a state law forbidding the sale of birth control to unmarried persons); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding unconstitutional a law forbidding contraceptive use bymarried couples). Even in Roe, however, the Court stated that the right to privacy is not abso-
lute and that "it is not clear ... that one has an unlimited right to do with one's body as one
pleases." 410 U.S. at 154. Responding to the shadow of doubt cast by cases like Skinner, the
Colorado Supreme Court also recognized the dubious validity of Buck, emphasizing the need for
caution in this area and the fact that "[e]ugenic sterilization theories have since [the early 1900's]
been largely discredited." In re Romero, 790 P.2d 819, 821 (Colo. 1990). Again, however, the
Court has not squarely addressed the issue. As recently as 1995, the Court denied certiorari to a
case challenging a Pennsylvania involuntary sterilization statute. See Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d
427 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1175 (1995).
129. See DEUTSCH, supra note 48, at 370-71.
130. See id at 371-72 (noting that a disproportionate number of sterilizations were concen-
trated in California, where the eugenics movement had substantial financial support).
131. See Rhodes, supra note 48, at 17. In 1924, Adolf Hitler's Mein Kampf proposed that a"pure" German race could be achieved by halting the procreation of the "physically degenerate
and mentally sick." SCHEERENBERGER, 1983, supra note 48, at 210. Toward this end, in 1933,
sterilization laws required the involuntary sterilization of those with hereditary diseases, includ-
ing mental retardation. See Gerdtz, supra note 52, at 21. Moreover, the SS and the Wehrmacht
(regular army) systematically executed psychiatric patients and started a program (called Aktion
T-4) to execute infants and adults with handicaps, including mental retardation. Id. In order to
diagnose mental retardation, the Nazi state physicians followed "Form 5A," an arbitrary and
unreliable test. See Wayne L. Sengstock et al., The Role of Special Education in the Third Reich,
25 EDUC. & TRAIING IN MENTAL RETARDATION 225, 225-36 (1990). Nazi propaganda sug-
gested that for both humane and economic reasons, handicapped individuals were "better off
dead." Gerdtz, supra note 52, at 22-25.
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C. Normalization and Sexual Expression
During the two decades following World War II, the prosperity of
post-war America eluded mentally retarded individuals. 32 Yet a
number of social shifts during these years, most particularly the civil
rights movement and institutional expos6s, propelled the "deinstitu-
tionalization" and "normalization" movements of the 1970s and 1980s
that eventually integrated deinstitutionalized mentally retarded per-
sons into mainstream society.133 Social ideology promoted the view
that society's general welfare could no longer justify infringing upon
the rights of mentally retarded persons, including their fundamental
right to procreate.134 However, this shift also produced some odd,
132. See SCHEERENBERGER, 1987, supra note 48, at 224 (noting that the $5.57 per diem
provided for the institutionalized in 1964 was considerably less than that spent on zoo animals).
133. See id. at 116-21; Gerdtz, supra note 52, at 31; Bengt NirJe, The Normalization Princi-
ple-Implications and Comments, 16 J. MENTAL SUBNORMALITY 62,62-70 (1970). The deinstitu-
tionalization movement aimed to reduce the number of institutionalized persons by releasing
them into the community and by limiting the admission of new persons. See SCHEERENBERGER,
1987, supra note 48, at 116-21. The normalization movement proposed that the deinstitutional-
ized mentally retarded have the right to "conditions of everyday life which are as close aspossi-
ble to the norms and patterns of mainstream society." Nirje, supra, at 63. See generally WOLF
WOLFENSBERGER ET AL, TiE PRINCIPLE OF NORMALIZATION IN HUMAN SERVICES (1972) (ex-
plaining normalization of human behavior). For current data documenting the extent of this
integration, see Peter David Blanck, Employment Integration, Economic Opportunity, and the
Americans with Disabilities Act. Empirical Study from 1990-1993, 79 IowA L. REV. 853 (1994).
134. Normalization implied self-determination, "manifested by a desire to develop social-
sexual relationships that increasingly included marriage and parenthood." Rhodes, supra note
48, at 18-19. According to Robert Edgerton's study in the 1950s, clients discharged from institu-
tions highly valued marriage, which suggested social acceptance and normalcy for them-as well
as many mentally retarded individuals today-more than any other life event. See ROBERT B.
EDGERTON, THE CLOAK OF COMPETENCE 154 (1967); see also ROBERT MEYERS, LIKE NORMAL
PEOPLE (1978) (providing a journalist's account of the life and marriage of his mentally retarded
brother). Other research suggests that perhaps because of this attitude, the mentally retarded
who do marry have durable unions. See SCHEERENBERGER, 1987, supra note 48, at 189. Based
on Edgerton's interviews with discharged clients who had eventually married, "it would seem
that the sexual and marital lives of these retarded persons are more 'normal' and better regu-
lated than we could possibly have predicted from a knowledge of their pre-hospital experiences
and their manifest intellectual deficits." EDGERTON, supra, at 126. The ongoing momentum of
the 1960s Civil Rights movement also challenged, or made unenforceable, sterilization and the
legal prohibition of marriage and parenthood for mentally retarded persons. See SCHEER-
ENBERGER, 1987, supra note 48, at 188.
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Catch-22, dilemmas,'35 and it has failed to halt limits on mentally re-
tarded individuals' expressions of sexuality.' 3 6
Among the "psycho-sexual rules" that society applies to all indi-
viduals are two that pertain specifically to mentally retarded persons:
(1) they should not be sexual; and (2) they should not be allowed"psychosocial-sexual expression and especially sexual intercourse."' 37
135. For example, although many states have removed eugenic sterilization statutes, they
have not substituted in their place legislation for voluntary sterilization of mentally retarded
individuals, a method of contraception available to most American adults. See Rhodes, supra
note 48, at 20; see also A. Carson Irvine, Balancing the Right of the Mentally Retarded to Obtain a
Therapeutic Sterilization Against the Potential for Abuse, 12 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 95, 97 (1988)
(contending that "those retarded in need of therapeutic sterilizations have no method by which
to obtain one"). In those cases where voluntary sterilization is allowed, but the mentally re-
tarded person is not able to consent to it, a third party must make the decision. Yet "[t]he end
result is that without giving consent, the mentally retarded person is denied either her funda-
mental right to be sterilized or her fundamental right to bear children." Eric M. Jaegers, Note,
Modern Judicial Treatment of Procreative Rights of Developmentally Disabled Persons: Equal
Rights to Procreation and Sterilization, 31 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 947, 949 (1992).
Such oddities also pertain to marital rape exemption statutes. For unknown reasons, 30
states have some type of marital exemption relating to rape and other sex offenses for married
mentally retarded victims, while there is no such exemption (or a different kind of one), for
married nonretarded victims. See National Ctr. on Women & Family Law, Inc., Status of Marital
Rape Exemption Statutes in the United States (1996) (on file with the author). It appears that
these laws reflect the view that although some mentally retarded women may be able to consent
to marriage, they may not always be able to consent to sex within marriage; therefore, their
husbands should not be liable for "mistaking" their wives' lack of consent. The laws also may
reflect the presumption that the husbands may also be mentally retarded and thus not liable for
their acts. Regardless, such exceptions for mentally retarded individuals provide no protection
for those mentally retarded wives who are in fact raped under circumstances that would provide
avenues of prosecution for nonretarded women.
Apart from simply legal issues, however, are society's conflicting perspectives toward mar-
riage and parenthood among mentally retarded individuals. In two 1970 opinion polls, 54% of
those surveyed objected to mentally retarded persons marrying, and 80% objected to mentally
retarded persons dating nonretarded individuals. See SCHEERENBERGER, 1987, supra note 48, at
189. Proponents of normalization contend that mentally retarded persons must be allowed a
normal sex life and the right to bear and care for children. Yet this prospect concerns many of
the mentally retarded individuals' parents and relatives who believe that parental responsibilities
may be too great and ultimately harm the mentally retarded couple's child. See generally Craft,
supra note 48, at 13-16 (explaining that both parents and professionals have difficulty con-
fronting the sexuality of mentally retarded persons, in part because they are uncertain about
what a child's future adult role should be); Hayman, supra note 32 (discussing the plight of
mentally retarded parents); Sharynne M. Robinson, Experiences of Sex Education Programmes
for Adults Who Are Intellectually Handicapped, in MENTAL HANDICAP AND SEXUALITY, supra
note 48, at 127, 127-28 (discussing the awkwardness parents feel discussing sexual issues with
their mentally retarded children, in part because of their fear of the potential negative conse-
quences of sexual knowledge, such as pregnancy); Christine Bertelson, Sex Education for the
Retarded; Striving to Define Right, Wrong, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 28, 1993, at 1A (not-
ing the dearth of sex education for mentally disabled persons and the difficulty parents have
acknowledging that their children possess sexual feelings and desires, particularly in light of the
Glen Ridge rape case).
136. See Rhodes, supra note 48, at 22. Even in the 1960s, for example, courts continued to
uphold involuntary sterilizations because of eugenic concerns. See, eg., In re Cavitt, 157 N.W.2d
171, 177 (Neb. 1968) (explaining that "[i]t is an established fact that mental deficiency acceler-
ates sexual impulses and any tendencies toward crime to a harmful degree"), appeal dismissed,
396 U.S. 996 (1970) (case became moot because the Nebraska legislature amended its steriliza-
tion laws before the argument).
137. ROSALYN KRAMER MONAT, SEXUALITY AND THE MENTALLY RETARDED: A CLINICAL
AND THERAPEUTIC GUIDEBOOK 58-59 (1982).
[Vol. 1997
HeinOnline  -- 1997 U. Ill. L. Rev. 338 1997
RAPE AND MENTAL RETARDATION
Such rules ignore evidence that irrespective of their level of mental
retardation, all persons possess "feelings, urges, and sexuality."' 38 Pri-
marily, sex educators must teach mentally retarded individuals to pro-
tect themselves from sexual abuse and to recognize those forms of
behavior that are socially acceptable.
This article uses as a reference point Rosalyn Monat's proposal of
four subgroups of sexual expression among mentally retarded individ-
uals as a means of assessing varying behavioral characteristics and
coping abilities.'39 The labels for Monat's subgroups correspond to
the four traditional classifications of IQ.140 This article focuses on the
coping abilities of mildly mentally retarded persons because they are
most apt to resemble and interact with the nonretarded community. 4'
Yet this article also emphasizes the legal issues concerning sexual ex-
pression among the most severely and profoundly mentally retarded
individuals, whose right to sexual expression has either been dismissed
or ignored, most notably under current rape statutes and case law.'42
IV. THE LAW'S DENIAL OF A SEXUAL LIFE FOR MENTALLY
RETARDED INDIVIDUALS: FROM STATUTES TO
STANDARDS
This part analyzes legislatures' and courts' treatment of mentally
retarded rape victims in light of modern mental retardation research
which is either rarely mentioned or incorrectly deciphered, the Glen
Ridge rape case being a striking example. It then proposes a contex-
tual approach to determining consent that incorporates new knowl-
edge about mental retardation and provides greater decision-making
guidance for both courts and juries.
138. Id. at 23; see also Lous Heshusius, Research on Perceptions of Sexuality by Persons
Labelled Mentally Retarded, in MENTAL HANDICAP AND SEXUALITY, supra note 48, at 35, 47
(explaining that a review of several studies on mentally retarded persons' perceptions of sexual-
ity concluded that "[s]ensual and sexual behavior was for the greater part seen as desirable and
was looked forward to or engaged in with a sense of excitement and joy. Sensual and sexual
experiences were clearly seen as an integral part of life.").
139. See MONAT, supra note 137, at 3-4.
140. See infra Appendix, Table A.
141. According to Monat, mildly mentally retarded individuals can be regarded in much the
same way as the nonretarded because they experience comparable psychosocial-sexual behavior
in exploring, adapting, and controlling sexual impulses. Yet, mildly mentally retarded persons
can still face a range of difficulties that hinder their social integration. For example, some indi-
viduals can be relatively unaware of birth control, venereal disease, sexual intercourse, marriage,
and parenthood. Although they seek psychosocial-sexual relationships, they may often engage
in sexual encounters without realizing the long-term consequences. See MONAT, supra note 137,
at 3-6. Perhaps most problematic, however, mildly retarded persons "have sexual urges and
desires but have not learned the social amenities that will allow them to meet these needs with-
out being abusive to themselves or others." Id. at 6. Because they interact on a "very concrete
language level," they have difficulty learning "the subtleties of sexuality" that the nonretarded
acquire through observation. Id. Lastly, mildly retarded individuals are likely to act "instinc-
tively more than rationally"; if a sexual encounter is pleasurable, "they are not likely to stop to
analyze the appropriateness of the act and then decide whether to act or not." Id.
142. See infra notes 422-75 and accompanying text.
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Although state law definitions of rape vary widely, 43 most con-
tain, implicitly or explicitly, five primary elements: (1) the act of sex-
ual intercourse; (2) the victim's lack of consent to intercourse; (3) the
defendant's mens rea regarding an intention to engage in intercourse;
(4) the defendant's use of force in achieving intercourse; and (5) the
victim's resistance to intercourse, a "floater" element that becomes
more or less important depending on the jurisdiction. 144 Certain
classes of people are prohibited from giving their consent to sexual
intercourse: children up to a certain age, individuals who are related,
and those who are so mentally incapacitated that they cannot provide
consent. 145
Lack of consent to intercourse has constituted an element of the
crime of rape since 1900 B.C., when the first rape law was established
in the Code of Hammurabi. 1' Although frequently referred to as the"consent defense," the absence of consent is an element of the crime
that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. 14 7 In
most state statutes, there are, among other things, two circumstances
that can negate an individual's consent: (1) the person is asleep or
unconscious; or (2) the person is too young, in a drugged condition, or
mentally incapacitated. 18 In either circumstance, there is a presump-
tion that intercourse occurred by force and against the will of the vic-
tim. There are two other factors that the prosecution typically must
show: (1) the victim's mental condition actually precluded consent;
and (2) the accused was aware of the victim's mental incapacity. 149
Because an accused must exhibit a wrongful state of mind, or mens
rea, the defendant's good faith belief that the victim was consenting
can, in many states, negate the nonconsent element of the crime and
143. For more on this issue, see Leigh Bienen, Rape IV, 6 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 1 (1980);
infra Appendix, Tables B and C.
144. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 531-56 (2d ed. 1995); Bienen,
supra note 143, at 1; infra Appendix, Tables B and C. The elements of force and consent fre-
quently merge and change over time. For various discussions of force and consent, see Donald
A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference Between the Presence of Force and the
Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1780 (1992); Donald Dripps et al., Panel Discussion:
Men, Women and Rape, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 125 (1994); Schulhofer, Taking Sexual Autonomy
Seriously, supra note 35, at 35; Robin L. West, Legitimating the Illegitimate A Comment on
Beyond Rape, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1442 (1993).
145. See Eskridge, supra note 34, at 51; Irwin N. Perr, Statutory Rape of an Insane Person, 13
J. FORENSIC Sci. 433, 433 (1968).
146. See Susan L. Brody, Rape of the Mentally Deficient: Satisfaction of the Nonconsent
Element, 15 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 115, 115 (1982); Sally Gold & Martha Wyatt, The Rape Sys-
tem: Old Rules and New Times, 27 CATH. U. L. REV. 695, 696 n.1 (1978).
147. See DRESSLER, supra note 144, at 538-43; Brody, supra note 146, at 116.
148. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 commentary at 301 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
149. See DRESSLER, supra note 144, at 538-46; Bienen, supra note 143, at 1; Brody, supra
note 146, at 116-29; Paul F. Stavis, Harmonizing the Right to Sexual Expression and the Right to
Protection from Harm for Persons with Mental Disability, 9 SEXUALITY & DISABILrY 131, 131-
35 (1991); Clarence J. Sundram & Paul F. Stavis, Sexual Behavior and Mental Retardation, 17
MED. & PHYSICAL DISABILITIES L. REP. 448, 450 (1993).
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produce an acquittal. 150  Alternatively, the defendant's mistaken be-
lief can become a defense that prohibits conviction, typically only if it
is reasonable.' 5'
A. State Statutes
Statutory determinations of a mentally retarded individual's ca-
pacity to consent to intercourse are based on a wide range of predomi-
nantly gender-neutral 152 state sex offense statutes, which typically are
both vague and dated. As Appendix, Table C shows, for example,
only six states provide any statutory definition of consent, 153 the most
important element to analyze when the victim is mentally retarded.
Appendix, Table B demonstrates that every state, except Georgia, has
one or more of ten different statutory terms or categories that can
include a mentally retarded individual. 154 "Mentally defective" is the
most common term that states use either singly 55 or in conjunction
with other terms to incorporate a mentally retarded person.'56
150. See DRESSLER, supra note 144, 545-46; Bienen, supra note 143, at 1.
151. See DRESSLER, supra note 144, at 545-46; Leigh Bienen, Mistakes, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFi.
224 (1978); Husak & Thomas, supra note 35, at 95; Schulhofer, Taking Sexual Autonomy Seri-
ously, supra note 35, at 35; Wright, supra note 35, at 1397.
152. Forty-one of the state sex offense statutes listed in Appendix, Table C of this article (as
well as the state sex offense statutes not specifically referring to mentally retarded individuals)
are gender neutral: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Ha-
waii, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missis-
sippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyo-
ming. Seven states employ statutes containing some sections that are not gender neutral: Ala-
bama (rape in the second degree, ALA. CODE. ANN. § 13A-6-62(a)(2) (1994)); Arkansas (sexual
intercourse defined, ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-14-101(9) (Michie 1993); rape, id. § 5-14-103(a)(4);
and carnal abuse in the second degree, id. § 5-14-105(a)); Indiana (rape, IND. CODE ANN. § 35-
42-4-1(3) (Burns 1994)); Kansas (sexual intercourse defined, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3501(1)
(1995); rape, id. § 21-3502(a)(1)(C)); Maryland (second-degree rape, MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 463(a)(2) (1996); New York (sexual misconduct, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.20(1) (McKinney
1987)); North Carolina (second-degree rape, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.3(a)(2) (1993)). Idaho is
the only state in which none of the applicable statutes is gender neutral (separate statutes for
rape, IDAHO CODE § 18-6101(2) (1987); and male rape, id. § 18-6108(1) (1987 & Supp. 1996)).
Georgia has no statutory provisions specifically addressing sex crimes against mentally retarded
persons. The trend toward gender-neutral rape statutes reflects increasing recognition in recent
years that both males and females can be victims of rape. See Dripps et al., supra note 144, at
127-28.
153. These six states are California, Florida, Minnesota, Missouri, Vermont, and Washing-
ton. Because Appendix, Table C details all statutes for this discussion, such documentation will
not be repeated here.
154. These 10 terms or categories are: (1) "mentally defective," (2) "mentally disabled," (3)
"mentally retarded," (4) "mentally incapable" or "mental incapacity," (5) "mental disease or
defect," (6) "developmental disability," (7) "unsoundness of mind," (8) "without consent," (9)"multiple terms or categories," and (10) "other terms or categories not used elsewhere." Be-
cause Appendix, Table B details all statutes and case law for this discussion, such documentation
will not be repeated in this section.
155. These states include Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, South Carolina, and Tennessee.
156. These states include Alabama, Arkansas, Maryland, Montana, New York, North Caro-
lina, Oregon, and West Virginia.
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There are serious problems with some of these terms, which mir-
ror the historical hazards of scientifically constructing and legally la-
belling mental retardation. 57 First, for nearly a decade the term"mentally defective" has been prohibited from use by the AAMR,
which in 1987 changed its name from the American Association of
Mental Deficiency for the sole purpose of eliminating any reference to
a label it considered "outmoded" and "pejorative."' 15 The mere fact
that states use this label so widely is troublesome, as is Louisiana's
particular retention of "idiocy" and "imbecility," terms regarded as
problematic for nearly a century.' 59 Moreover, states incorrectly de-
fine "mentally defective" very broadly-typically referring to a"mental disease or defect which renders a person incapable of ap-
praising the nature of their conduct"x6--closely resembling the defi-
nitions applied by those states using the terms "mental incapacity" or"mentally incapable." Therefore, in the majority of states, regardless
of the term they use, mentally retarded individuals are conceptually
placed with individuals who are either mentally ill or who possess any
other kind of "disease or defect" that impairs their ability to
consent. 161
Such terminology encourages the perception that mental retarda-
tion is a static condition. It also contradicts research characterizing
mental retardation in terms of a close balance between "individual
capabilities and the demands and constraints of specific environ-
ments"'162 because "virtually all" mentally retarded individuals "im-
prove in their functioning as a result of effective support and
services.'1 63 A few states have incorporated the AAMR's definition
of mental retardation"6 or have applied another modem term. 6 5 Yet
157. See supra notes 79-98 and accompanying text.
158. Telephone Interview with Doreen Croser, supra note 93. See AAMD, supra note 67, at
183 (defining "mental deficiency" as "(1) mental retardation; (2) sometimes used to distinguish
the group of persons having demonstrable organic basis for their intellectual deficits").
159. Because of the pejorative effect of labels such as "idiot," "imbecile," and "moron," and
the difficulties resulting from their imprecision, efforts began as early as 1908 to provide a more
appropriate definition of mental retardation that relied on social incompetence, rather than sim-
ply organic pathology, as a major diagnostic criterion. See Cegelka & Prehm, supra note 67, at 4.
By 1925, the 1916 version of the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale was in wide use, introducing a
new terminology and classification system designed to displace the "negativism" associated with
the earlier tripartite division. See AAMD, supra note 67, at 9-10; SCHEERENBERGER, 1987,
supra note 48, at 11-12.
160. See infra Appendix, Table B.
161. For example, six states refer specifically to mental illness in their definitions: Delaware,
Kentucky, Michigan, Oklahoma, Vermont, and Wisconsin.
162. AAMR, supra note 73, at 12.
163. Id. at 7.
164. Only three states (Kentucky, Michigan, and Vermont) have incorporated portions of
the AAMR's definition of mental retardation. Although Massachusetts is the only state that
singly uses "mentally retarded" as its term to designate victims not able to consent, it provides
no specific definition.
165. See, e.g., California, infra Appendix, Table B ("incapable of consent" because of a "de-
velopmental disability").
[Vol. 1997
HeinOnline  -- 1997 U. Ill. L. Rev. 342 1997
RAPE AND MENTAL RETARDATION
as the following sections indicate, this article recommends that a stat-
ute refer only to an individual's "inability to consent," without further
specification, for two reasons: the ongoing controversy regarding the
correct definition of "mental retardation,"'" as well as the frequently
detrimental repercussions resulting from the statutory isolation of
mentally retarded individuals in the context of rape law.
B. Judicial Standards
When courts test a mentally retarded person's capacity to consent
to sexual activity, they engage in far more than simply a legal venture.
Rather they often dictate whether that individual can ever legally en-
gage in a consensual sexual relationship. Many states criminalize the
conduct of the nonretarded sexual partner of a mentally retarded per-
son if that partner either knew or had reason to know of the person's
mental retardation status 167 or if that partner engaged in sexual con-
duct irrespective of such knowledge. 6
According to some advocates for the mentally retarded, these
rules constitute legally enforced celibacy for mentally retarded per-
sons and overzealous moralizing about who can and cannot engage in
sexual relations and why.169 As one scholar explains, "[o]nce the law
of consent is understood as a regulatory regime, it becomes more co-
herent. The key regulatory policy is procreative companionate mar-
riage. . ... 170 Because of concerns over eugenics and the "sanctity of
the family unit," courts constrain the sexual lives of certain classes of
people, including the mentally retarded.' 7' Rape statutes and judicial
standards become proxies for these regulatory goals. In State v. Wy-
man, 72 for example, the Connecticut Supreme Court in 1934 made
clear that the mentally retarded victim's capacity to consent to sexual
intercourse was not the issue in convicting the defendant of rape.
166. See Greenspan & Granfield, supra note 88, at 442; Reiss, supra note 96, at 1; Schalock
et al., supra note 94, at 181. The AAMR notes that even many developmentally disabled indi-
viduals disagree about the continuing use of the term "mental retardation," which they perceive
as "stigmatizing" and "frequently mistakenly used as a global summary about complex human
beings." AAMR, supra note 73, at xi.
167. See infra Appendix, Table C.
168. See, e.g., State v. Sullivan, 298 N.W.2d 267, 273 (Iowa 1980) ("The fact an erroneous
judgment by an offender may still subject him or her to criminal sanction if the partner in fact
does not possess the requisite mental capacity does not make the statute unconstitutional. This
crime does not require knowledge or intent.... [T]he policies in support of protecting those who
suffer mental incapacities outweigh the danger of mistake.").
169. See infra notes 460-75 and accompanying text.
170. Eskridge, supra note 34, at 55.
171. Id. at 56; see also Hayman, supra note 32, at 1246 ("The illegitimation of the mentally
retarded person's sexuality may ... reflect a more pragmatic prejudice against the reproductive
interests of mentally retarded persons. The Malthusian nightmare of a world overrun by mental
defectives may well linger in the public consciousness, and may explain at least part of the desire
that these people not reproduce.") (citation omitted).
172. 173 A. 155 (Conn. 1934).
N~o. 2]
HeinOnline  -- 1997 U. Ill. L. Rev. 343 1997
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
Rather, the concern was whether she was in a class of individuals for
whom intercourse and marriage were prohibited for eugenic reasons.
The history of the statute [General Statutes sec. 6277, providing
that "any man who shall carnally know any female under the age
of forty-five years who is epileptic, imbecile, feeble-minded or a
pauper shall be imprisoned"] shows the classification to be sound,
its moving purpose being to check the increase of mental defectives
and abnormal persons in the community which results by inheri-
tance from defective parents. . . . In view of the purpose of the
statute in question (section 6277), it is of less importance whether
the woman has sufficient mental capacity to know the distinction
between right and wrong. She may be able to draw these distinc-
tions and yet be "epileptic, imbecile [or] feeble-minded," and so
within the prohibited class, for either marriage or carnal
intercourse.173
The courts are no longer as explicit as Wyman in their efforts to
control the sexual lives of mentally retarded individuals. However,
the next section suggests that current judicial standards can enforce a
result similar to the Wyman court's, albeit less directly.
1. Testing the Capacity to Consent to Sexual Conduct
Based in part on state statutes, courts have created six tests to
serve as standards for determining a mentally retarded individual's ca-
pacity to consent to sexual activity. 174 These tests reflect a continuum
ranging from the most expansive definition of incapacity (the morality
test) to the most narrow one (the nature of the conduct test). 75 Each
of these tests is laid out in more detail in the Appendix. 76 Courts
define these six tests as follows:
1. Morality. New York1 77 and six other states 78 require that the men-
tally retarded individual have an understanding of the nature and
173. Id. at 156 (emphasis added).
174. Three of these tests were outlined in State v. Olivio, 589 A.2d 597, 602 (N.J. 1991). See
also Sundram & Stavis, supra note 149, at 451 (referring to the "morality" test, the "nature and
consequences" test, and the "nature of the conduct" test). Some of these tests are comparable in
some respects to those used to assess an accused's mental capacity for the purpose of determin-
ing criminal liability when insanity, or a similar disorder, is raised as a defense. See K. H. Lar-
sen, Annotation, Rape or Similar Offense Based on Intercourse with Woman Who Is Allegedly
Mentally Deficient, 31 A.L.R. 3D 1227, 1231 n.10 (1970 & Supp. 1996). Courts have rarely com-
pared the inverse circumstances of victims and defendants. See id. One exception is Lee v. State,
64 S.W. 1047, 1047-49 (Tex. 1901) (holding that the same test of mental capacity should be used
for both victims and defendants).
175. See Olivio, 589 A.2d at 602; Paul F. Stavis, Recent Developments in Law and Recent
Data on Sexual Incidents: Policy Considerations for Providers, QUALITY OF CARE, Apr.-May,
1996, at 6.
176. See infra Appendix, Table D.
177. People v. Cratsley, 653 N.E.2d 1162, 1165 (N.Y. 1995); People v. Easley, 364 N.E.2d
1328, 1332-33 (N.Y. 1977). These New York cases contain the most detailed and explicit discus-
sion of this test.
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consequences of the sexual conduct as well as an appreciation of the
moral dimensions of the decision to engage in such conduct.
2. Totality of the Circumstances. Illinois's 179 recent test expands upon
the nature and consequences portion of its morality test.' 8 0 Prior
consideration only of the act, its nature, and consequences did not
sufficiently address either the victim's particular situation at the time
of the crime or the perpetrator's intent. 181
3. Nature and Consequences. Iowa' 82 and twelve other states' 83 re-
quire that the mentally retarded individual comprehend the nature
of the sexual activity and its potential consequences, such as preg-
nancy and disease. This nature and consequences test is incorpo-
rated into the morality test and Illinois's totality of the circumstances
test.
4. Judgment. Georgia' 84 and Minnesota 185 apply a scant test that re-
fers to whether the victim can exercise judgment regarding consent
to sexual activity.
5. Evidence of Mental Disability. Nine states186 have no explicit test,
but rather discuss evidence of the victim's mental disability as a
means of determining capacity to consent.
6. Nature of the Conduct. New Jersey'8 7 and eighteen other states 188
require only that the mentally retarded individual understand the
sexual nature of the conduct and is voluntarily able to participate.
These states do not require that the individual understand the mo-
178. These states are Alabama, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, and Washington. Illinois
also has recently introduced a "totality of the circumstances" test. See infra notes 179-81 and
accompanying text.
179. See People v. Whitten, 647 N.E.2d 1062, 1066 (Il1. App. Ct. 1995).
180. See People v. McMullen, 414 N.E.2d 214, 217 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
181. See Whitten, 647 N.E.2d at 1066.
182. See State v. Sullivan, 298 N.W.2d 267, 272-73 (Iowa 1980). Iowa is the only state to
render its state sex offense statute unconstitutional because of its reference to a morality test,
substituting instead a nature and consequences test. See id. at 271-73.
183. Although some states, such as Alaska, use the term "nature or consequences," these
states have been included in this generic category because their analyses of the facts and circum-
stances in competency to consent cases are comparable to those states following the "nature and
consequences" test. In addition to Iowa, these 12 states are: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Indi-
ana, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, and
Wyoming.
184. See Ely v. State, 384 S.E.2d 268, 270-71 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
185. See State v. Willenbring, 454 N.W.2d 268, 270 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
186. These states are Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Mis-
souri, South Dakota, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
187. See State v. Olivio, 589 A.2d 597, 599 (N.J. 1991) (holding that a person is "mentally
defective" if "he or she is unable to comprehend the distinctively sexual nature of the conduct or
is incapable of understanding or exercising the right to refuse to engage in such conduct with
another").
188. New Jersey's test has not been followed explicitly by other courts in that they do not
directly cite Olivio. Indeed, only one state court has cited Olivio in the sexual capacity context,
and that court adopted the nature and consequences test. See Adkins v. Virginia, 457 S.E.2d
382, 388-89 (Va. Ct. App. 1995) (referring to the mentally retarded person's need to understand
the "nature and consequences" of the act). In addition to New Jersey, 18 states rely on a nature
of the conduct test devoid of any mention of the consequences: California, Delaware, Florida,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, and Utah.
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rality or the nature and consequences of the act and New Jersey
makes these omissions explicit.' 9
The morality test, exemplified by the New York Court of Appeals
in People v. Easley' 9° and reaffirmed in People v. Cratsley,191 has been
most avidly critiqued by some commentators contending that its broad
standard would per se prohibit sexual activity by many mentally re-
tarded individuals."9 Yet, both the Easley and Cratsley courts appear
to reflect modern views of sexuality and mental retardation.
Although the courts insist they would not "adopt the fiction that all
persons are mentally or judgmentally equal,"' 93 they also would not"presume" that a mentally retarded person was incapable of consent
to sexual intercourse.'94 Indeed, "[t]he requisite degree of intelli-
gence necessary to give consent may be found to exist in a person of
very limited intellect."' 95 This presumption suggests that "proof of in-
capacity must come from facts other than mental retardation
alone,"' 96 most importantly, "how such a person actually functions insociety. ' ' 97
The controversial issue in Easley concerned the meaning of the
trial court's instructions to the jury that the victim be able to under-
stand the moral quality of the act of intercourse. The appellate court
explained that knowledge of the "moral quality" went beyond simply
understanding the act's "physiological nature"; rather "[a]n apprecia-
tion of how [intercourse] will be regarded in the framework of the
societal environment and taboos to which a person will be exposed
may be far more important."' 98 Therefore, a court must determine
whether the victim is able to "appraise the nature of the stigma, the
ostracism or other noncriminal sanctions which society levies for con-
189. See Olivio, 589 A.2d at 604-05.
190. 364 N.E.2d 1328, 1330-31 (N.Y. 1977) (affirming the rape conviction of the nonretarded
defendant, a family friend and neighbor of the victim, a 20-year-old moderately mentally re-
tarded woman with an IQ range of 45-54 and the estimated sexual knowledge of an eight-year-
old).
191. 653 N.E.2d 1162, 1163-64 (N.Y. 1995) (upholding the rape conviction of the
nonretarded defendant who admitted to having intercourse with the 33-year-old victim who he
knew was mentally retarded, noting that although the victim socialized with a "steady boy-
friend," she was unable to cook for herself, handle money, engage in daily tasks requiring capa-
bilities beyond her IQ of 50, and did not understand the link between intercourse and
pregnancy).
192. See infra notes 460-75 and accompanying text.
193. Easley, 364 N.E.2d at 1331.
194. See Cratsley, 653 N.E.2d at 1165.
195. Easley, 364 N.E.2d at 1331.
196. Craisley, 653 N.E.2d at 1165 n.3 (noting that, in contrast, New York penal law "creates
an irrebuttable presumption" that a child age 16 or below cannot consent to sexual intercourse
with an adult age 21 or older).
197. Easley, 364 N.E.2d at 1331.
198. Id. at 1332.
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duct it labels only as immoral even while it 'struggles to make itself
articulate in law." ' 199
The Easley court cautioned that an understanding of society's
view of the "moral quality" of intercourse was separate from a vic-
tim's "personal sense of morality. '20 0 "The object is not to probe the
degree of her conformity or nonconformity to the norms of society. A
knowing defiance of social mores, a mere yielding to temptation or
passion, even an inclination to vice, these are not the concern of this
statute. '20 1 The Cratsley court further warned that "care must be
taken not to restrict the freedom of persons with mental retardation
who are capable of knowing consent to a sexual relationship by con-
fusing deliberate failure to adhere to a particular set of values with
lack of understanding that values exist. 202
Regardless of this attempt at caution, the morality test has been
adopted in only seven states in part because of courts' concerns with203 Steits scope. In State v. Sullivan,2" for example, the Iowa Supreme
Court rendered unconstitutional a state statute prohibiting sexual ac-
tivity with a person "suffering from a mental defect or incapacity
which precludes giving consent, or lacks the mental capacity to know
the right and wrong in sexual matters. 2 °5 The court insisted that "no
matter how carefully circumscribed in a jury instruction," the statute
will produce convictions "based not on the jury's view of the facts, but
on its view of the morality of certain sexual conduct."2 6 Emphasizing
that the words "right" or "wrong" should reflect their "legal" and not
their "moral" meaning, the court highlighted the "futility" of "pre-
tend[ing] that our society maintains a consensus on moral questions
beyond what it writes into its laws."2 7 Even philosophers and theolo-
199. Id at 1333 (quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, PARADOXES OF LEGAL. SCIENCE, 17, 41-
42 (1928)). In Easley, the victim appeared to lack both physiological and normative knowledge.
A psychologist testified that although the victim was able to "respond sexually if stimulated" as
well as engage "in the concrete act of sexual intercourse," she was unable to comprehend the
other consequences of intercourse even though she understood that it could result in "having a
baby." Id. at 1331. Similarly, the victim's grandmother emphasized that her repeated attempts
to discuss the subject of sex had revealed her granddaughter's "almost total incomprehension" of
the subject matter. Id.
200. See id. at 1332.
201. Id.
[T]o flaunt society or to arraign [sic] oneself against its views is entirely different from hav-
ing an understanding, or the capacity to understand, that one is doing so. Whether there is
an awareness of the social or other cost of one's conduct is a legitimate area of inquiry in
determining whether one is so mentally defective that the protective shield [of the penal
law] is invoked.
Id.
202. People v. Cratsley, 653 N.E.2d 1162, 1165 (N.Y. 1995).
203. See State v. Olivio, 589 A.2d 597, 603 (N.J. 1991) (referring to those states "eschewing
such expansive applications of the statutory concept of mentally defective").
204. 298 N.W.2d 267 (Iowa 1980).
205. Id. at 269 (quoting IOWA CODE § 709.4(2) (1979) (emphasis provided)).
206. Id. at 271 ("Sexual conduct, qua conduct, is not proscribed.").
207. Id. at 272; see also People v. Easley, 364 N.E.2d 1328, 1333 (N.Y. 1977) (noting that
"[tihe law does not mirror all prevailing moral standards").
N~o. 2]
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gians fail to agree on society's "general mores," rendering "the moral'right' and 'wrong' test" an "unfit tool" in assessing an individual's
mental competency to consent to sexual conduct in the same way that
it was unfit for measuring insanity.208 Regardless, the Sullivan court
upheld the remainder of the statute delineating a nature and conse-
quences test.20 9
The Sullivan court never cited Easley; nor did it acknowledge the
Easley court's qualification that Easley's brand of morality did not
mirror exactly what the Sullivan court feared. Rather, the Sullivan
court's warning reflected a more general concern over explicitly using
morals as any guide for assessing competency. In State v. Olivio,210
the New Jersey Supreme Court went even further, proposing a nature
of the conduct test that qualified a victim as "mentally defective" only
if "at the time of the sexual activity, the mental defect rendered him
or her unable to comprehend the distinctively sexual nature of the
conduct, or incapable of understanding or exercising the right to re-
fuse to engage in such conduct with another."' 211 Consistent with the
concerns of Sullivan, the Olivio court explained that the New Jersey
legislature had substituted the word "understanding" for the word"appraising" because "appraise" entailed determining if the conduct
was "either morally right or wrong. ' 212 Noting that New York's "ex-
pansive view" was "overly protective of mentally handicapped per-
sons," the Olivio court emphasized that it specifically excluded "value
judgments" or "morality" because such concepts do not provide "a
workable standard or definition" of mental defectiveness. 13
The Olivio court also eschewed the nature and consequences test,
stating that a victim's knowledge of the sexual conduct pertains "only
to the physical or physiological aspects of sex. '2 14 It does not include
the victim's "awareness that sexual acts have probable serious conse-
quences, such as pregnancy and birth, disease, infirmities, adverse psy-
chological or emotional disorders, or possible adverse moral or social
effects."2 5 In order to avoid confusion or misunderstanding, how-
ever, a trial court should instruct the jury that the alleged victim's ca-
208. See Sullivan, 298 N.W.2d at 272 (emphasizing that "[a]pplication of the 'right' and'wrong' dichotomy in the legal context would require the victim to analyze his or her own mental
capacity to assent to a sex act").
209. See id. at 272-73.
210. 589 A.2d 597, 599-605 (N.J. 1991) (upholding conviction when there was sufficient evi-
dence that the victim was mentally defective and that the defendant knew of her condition and
admitted to having sexual intercourse with her; the 16-year-old victim was enrolled in a high
school special education class, her IQ range was 40-65 (86 using a Spanish language test), and
she functioned socially at the level of a seven- or eight-year-old).
211. Id. at 605 (emphasis added).
212. Id. at 601 (emphasizing that "consensual sexual activity should not generally be
criminal").
213. Id. at 603.
214. Id. at 605.
215. Id.
[Vol. 1997
HeinOnline  -- 1997 U. Ill. L. Rev. 348 1997
No. 2] RAPE AND MENTAL RETARDATION
pacity to consent to "sexual conduct must be considered in the context
of all of the surrounding circumstances in which it occurred. 216
2. Morals but No Guidance
As part V of this article more thoroughly demonstrates, all three
of the most widely used tests just discussed have drawbacks, irrespec-
tive of their stated purpose and language, because courts apply them
in ironically similar ways.217 Most striking is that all tests appear to
judge mentally retarded victims under a higher consent standard than
nonretarded victims. 2 18
This dilemma is fueled by courts' willingness to establish tests
without providing any guidance for applying them. By requiring that
mentally retarded individuals know the possible social taboos and
stigma of sexual intercourse, for example, the morality test courts fol-
low a heavily value-laden standard that presumes there are morally
inappropriate forms of intercourse that warrant social ostracism. In
light of the continuing double sexual standard that society still applies
to men and women,219 this stance, amorphous as it is, becomes most
stringent for mentally retarded women, countering feminists' efforts
to eliminate courts' and society's tendency to become women's "sex-
ual judges. '22° By definition, the test also presumes that nonretarded
men and women could "pass" it, although there are no data available
to support this view,22' particularly among young people.222 The Sulli-
216. Id. at 606.
217. Rather than applying its own nature of the conduct test to the facts, for example, the
Olivio court relied on the outcomes and analyses of cases using the morality and nature and
consequences tests in supporting the defendant's conviction. See id. at 605-07.
218. See infra notes 254-421 and accompanying text. See generally Hayman, supra note 32,
at 1201 (contending that mentally retarded parents also face a relatively higher standard of
parenthood, thereby easing courts' attempts to remove their children).
219. Whereas societal views continue to associate early, frequent, and aggressive sexual en-
counters with masculinity, and therefore reward such behavior for young men, such behavior is
not viewed as acceptable for young women. See TIMOTHY BENEKE, MEN ON RAPE-WHAT
THEY HAVE TO SAY ABOUT SEXUAL VIOLENCE 13 (1982); MYRIAM MIEDZIAN, BoYs WILL BE
Boys: BREAKING THE LINK BETWEEN MASCULINITY AND VIOLENCE 39-74 (1991); SANDAY,
supra note 116, at 142-44, 191-207; ROBIN WARSHAW, I NEVER CALLED IT RAPE-THE Ms.
REPORT ON RECOGNIZING, FIGHTING, AND SURVIVING DATE AND ACQUAINTANCE RAPE 53-92
(1988); Robin Warshaw & Andrea Parrot, The Contribution of Sex-Role Socialization to Ac-
quaintance Rape, in ACQUAINTANCE RAPE: THE HIDDEN CRIME 73, 73-82 (Andrea Parrot &
Laurie Bechhoer eds., 1991); see also Denno, supra note 116, at 133-34 (discussing cases, such as
the "Spur Posse" episode, where defense tactics relied on the "boys will be boys" and "testoster-
one theory" defenses to explain the "normal" sexual aggression of young male defendants).
220. See SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL 397 (1975); Berger, supra note 34, at 3
n.12; Bienen, supra note 34, at 171. See generally Tracy E. Higgins, "By Reason of Their Sex":
Feminist Theory, Postmodernism, and Justice, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1536 (1995) (critiquing femi-
nist theory in the law).
221. Debates abound regarding the appropriate standards for consent in rape law, irrespec-
tive of available data on what people know about sexuality or what behavior would constitute
"social ostracism." See Dripps, supra note 144, at 1780; Dripps et al., supra note 144, at 125;
Estrich, supra note 35, at 1087; Husak & Thomas, supra note 35, at 95; Schulhofer, Feminist
Challenge, supra note 35, at 2170-84; West, supra note 144, at 1442. Normative data on social
standards for consensual sexual activity are lacking, apart from a few exceptions. See Charlene
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van court's worst fears are thus potentially realized: courts' pretense
of a societal moral consensus encourages judges and juries to deter-
mine consent not on the basis of facts and law but rather on the basis
of their moral view of the world.
This proclivity is illustrated by courts' attitudes toward adultery
when the nonretarded defendant is married but the mentally retarded
victim is not.22 3  Although adultery is still a crime in half of the
states,224 it is rarely prosecuted 22 and popular politicians have admit-
L. Muehlenhard & Lisa C. Hollabaugh, Do Women Sometimes Say No When They Mean Yes?
The Prevalence and Correlates of Women's Token Resistance to Sex, 54 J. PERSONALrry & SOC.
PsYcoL 872, 874 (1988); Warshaw & Parrot, supra note 219, at 73-82; George C. Thomas III,
Should Rape Be a Strict Liability Crime? The Politics and Data of Dating (1995) (unpublished
manuscript on file with the author).
222. See Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls into Women: Re-evaluating Modern Statutory
Rape Law, 85 J. CRiM. L. & CRimrNOLOGY 15 (1994) (analyzing modem statutory rape law); see
also ANDREA PARROT, COPING wITH DATE RAPE & ACOUAINTANCE RAPE 37 (1991) (stating
that teenagers, often unsure of their self-esteem or their sexuality, "struggle through their rela-
tionships hoping to do the right thing, without knowing what the right thing is or how to accom-
plish it").
223. In nearly all rape cases involving mentally retarded victims, the defendants are not
mentally retarded. See Clarence J. Sundram & Paul F. Stavis, Sexuality and Mental Retardation:
Unmet Challenges, 32 MENTAL RETARDATiON 255, 260 (1994). Occasionally, courts will refer to
a defendant's mental limitations. See infra Appendix, Table E (Defendant's Mental Abilities).
The closest parallel to a rape case between two mentally retarded individuals are those cases
involving mentally retarded adult defendants and nonretarded child victims. In People v. Burt,
492 N.E.2d 233 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986), for example, the Appellate Court of Illinois held that, as a
result of mental incapacitation, the defendant did not possess the mental state required for three
counts of criminal sexual assault involving two acts of penetration with a seven-year-old girl and
one act of penetration with an eight-year-old girl. Id. at 236. Because the defendant functioned
at the level of a seven-year-old, the appellate court determined that he was unable to fulfill the
state's requirement that he know that "the victim was unable to understand the nature of the act
or was unable to give effective consent." Id. at 234-35. Burt demonstrates the difficulties of
establishing the elements of a crime during the prosecution of a mentally retarded person.
Although the government prosecutes some mentally retarded defendants for sexual acts with
victims who are unable to consent, such defendants must be able to meet the competency re-
quirement. See generally Ballou v. Booker, 777 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1985) (upholding prosecution
of a defendant bordering on mental retardation for rape of an 11-year-old girl); Blacklock v.
Texas, 820 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (reviewing conviction of mentally retarded defend-
ant found competent to stand trial for aggravated sexual assault of a child under age 14); In re
D.C., 618 A.2d 1325 (Vt. 1992) (sentencing mildly mentally retarded 27-year-old man for at-
tempted sexual assault). Courts have difficulty determining the capacity of a mentally retarded
defendant, particularly when dealing with questions of knowledge and consent. See In re Grady,
405 A.2d 851, 855 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1979). Furthermore, prosecution of a mentally re-
tarded defendant may conflict with the current trend of encouraging normal lifestyles and inter-
action within the mentally retarded community, especially when dealing with sexual relations
between two mentally retarded individuals. See iL at 856.
224. See Richard Green, Griswold's Legacy: Fornication and Adultery as Crimes, 16 OHIo
N.U. L. REv. 545, 546 (1989) (stating that one-half of the states and the District of Columbia
criminalize adultery and 13 states and the District of Columbia penalize fornication); Martin J.
Siegel, For Better or for Worse: Adultery, Crime & the Constitution, 30 J. FAM. L. 45, 50 (1991-
92) (noting that 26 states and the District of Columbia still criminalize extramarital sex).
225. See Siegel, supra note 224, at 49 (emphasizing that in 1955 the American Law Institute
dropped the offense of adultery from its Model Penal Code, explaining that the adultery laws
were "dead-letter statutes" that invaded "personal liberty" and drained law enforcement
resources).
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ted their marital infidelities,226 thereby suggesting that at least this
form of "immoral" conduct generally does not result in social ostra-
cism. Even so, several recent, significant cases have required victims
to know of the wrongfulness of adultery as a basis for their ability to
consent to sexual activity on any level. The moral inverse of this re-
quirement, of course, is that married defendants appear to be pun-
ished as much for their infidelities as they are for their sexual acts with
mentally retarded females. 227  In People v. Cratsley,228 for example,
the New York Court of Appeals emphasized that not only was there"no suggestion" that the victim's and defendant's sexual conduct"arose out of an emotional bond," but also that the victim "displayed
no understanding that defendant was married, or that engaging in sex-
ual conduct with him might be considered inappropriate."229 Like-
wise, in People v. Whitten,23 o the Appellate Court of Illinois explained
the defendant's conviction by highlighting, among other things, that
"he knew that he was a married man, who should not be having sexual
relations with persons other than his wife"; although the defendant's
adultery and other acts "standing alone, might be insufficient to sup-
port a conviction, taken together they are certainly evidence of de-
fendant's malice aforethought."23 '
Such attitudes appear to be exacerbated when the mentally re-
tarded victim is married but the nonretarded defendant is single. In
State v. Soura,23 2 for example, the unmarried, nonretarded defendant
commenced a social relationship resulting in several acts of inter-
course with the mentally retarded victim, whose husband was also
mentally retarded.233 The Supreme Court of Idaho acknowledged the
victim's legal capacity to consent to marriage and sexual relations
226. For example, during his 1992 campaign, then-Governor Bill Clinton did not deny "un-
specified instances of marital infidelity" when interviewed on the CBS News program, 60 Min-
utes. See Gwen Ifill, The 1992 Campaign: Democrats; Clinton Attempts to Ignore Rumors, N.Y.
Ti s, Jan. 28, 1992, at A16. He also explained that he had experienced "rocky passages in his
marriage," thereby "allowing the public to draw its own conclusions." See R.W. Apple, Jr., For
the Front-Runners, Crucial Days Are Here, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1992, at A16. Regardless, an
ABC News poll conducted the next day reported that 73% of the 790 adults surveyed said that
they "agreed with Gov. Bill Clinton that the question of whether he had had an extramarital
affair was between him and his wife." Ifill, supra, at A16. In turn, 66% stated that they could"vote for a Presidential candidate who had had an extramarital affair," while 80% said that "the
accusations should not be an issue in the campaign." Id.
227. See Eskridge, supra note 34, at 55.
[There is an] intimate connection between consent and status .... What is recognized as a
valid choice cannot, even in a liberal society, be separated from the status of the chooser(s)
and the chosen. The connection between choice and status is not an historical accident, the
chance perpetuation of status categories in the modem regulatory categories of consent.
Instead, status and consent are both conceptions serving a larger cultural script.
Id.
228. 653 N.E.2d 1162 (N.Y. 1995).
229. Id. at 1166 (emphasis added).
230. 647 N.E.2d 1062 (Il1. App. Ct. 1995).
231. Id. at 1066.
232. 796 P.2d 109 (Idaho 1990).
233. See id. at 110.
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within marriage, as well as her ability to consent to the termination of
her parental rights, resulting in the removal of her infant daughter.2M
Yet the court drew a clear distinction between the victim's sexual rela-
tions within and outside of marriage not because of her inability to
consent to intercourse, but rather on the basis of society's "favorable"
views toward marriage and its unfavorable views toward intercourse
outside of it.235 Thus, the defendant's conviction rested in large part
on the victim's marital status.
Courts also point a moral finger at nonmarital sexual relations
involving mentally retarded women in general. In applying the moral-
ity test, for example, they have inquired specifically whether an un-
married mentally retarded woman has the "capacity to appraise the
nature of the stigma, ostracism, or other noncriminal sanctions associ-
ated with sexual intercourse outside of marriage ... components of
the normal woman's decision to participate in sexual intercourse. "236
In Adkins v. Commonwealth,237 a Virginia appellate court dismissed
the defendant's rape conviction and twenty-year sentence in light of
the trial court's apparent attempt to punish him when it was clear that
the mildly mentally retarded victim, a young single woman, took the
initiative in having sex.238 The court recounted the victim's testimony
concerning her active participation in the conduct. When she first met
the defendant at a mall "she did so on her own initiative" and gave
him her telephone number; she then "called [him] with the idea of
having sex with him, and she asked him to meet her"; while at his
apartment she "'made love' with him twice," adding that "it was'mostly' her idea to have sex"; she "knew that she could get pregnant
from 'making love' and could 'catch AIDS"'; she had taken sex educa-
tion classes in school; she "used the words 'penis' and 'vagina' when
234. See id. at 114.
235. See id. As the court explained,
the laws reflect a certain favorability toward creating and maintaining stable and harmoni-
ous marriages. The same cannot be said about non-marital sexual relations which are not
considered by society in a favorable light, in part because of the difficult consequences that
may follow, e.g., unplanned pregnancy, single parent families, divorce, venereal disease and
AIDS. The laws reflect this societal attitude against non-marital sexual intercourse and aim
to protect those most vulnerable, due to unsoundness of mind or immaturity, from incurring
some of the resulting difficult consequences.
Id. The court analogized this situation to the law's treatment of juvenile women, noting that a
man is allowed to have sexual relations with a 15-year-old female within the institution of mar-
riage, but not outside of it. See id. But, as this article makes clear in part V, it is inappropriate to
treat a mentally retarded woman on the same level as a juvenile female. See infra notes 332-53
and accompanying text. The law acknowledges that at some point in her life, the juvenile female
will reach an age when she can decide whether she wants to engage in sexual relations outside of
her marriage. The mentally retarded woman will never reach such an age. Nor are the two
women equivalent in their social and life experiences given the differences in their chronological
age, which varies substantially from whatever "mental age" the court might ascribe to the men-
tally retarded woman.
236. In re Doe, 918 P.2d 254, 256 (Haw. Ct. App. 1996) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
237. 457 S.E.2d 382 (Va. Ct. App. 1995).
238. See id. at 388-89.
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describing the act of sexual intercourse"; she knew "how to take care
of herself, how to call 911, and how to go shopping"; she "knew that
her mother did not want her to talk with or to see [the defendant]"
but lied to her mother about her whereabouts when she left to meet
him; and she hid in the defendant's apartment when the police arrived
(at her mother's request) "because she did not want to go home. "239
Courts have also stressed the particular "moral" ramifications of
homosexuality in determinations of consent.240 In one case involving
a nonretarded male defendant, for example, the court noted that
although both mentally retarded male victims understood "the differ-
ence between having sexual intercourse with a woman as opposed to a
man, and to some degree the social stigma often associated with homo-
sexual relations, neither victim was considered to be capable of mak-
ing adult rationalizations or decisions about the activity itself."24
Moreover, although one of these victims "would be able to repeat so-
ciety's negative views of those who engage in homosexual activity, if he
heard them," a psychologist testified that he "would seriously question
the victim's ability to understand those views. '"242
3. Tests but No Guidance
The dilemma involving morals and lack of guidance also pertains
to other judicial tests. As the next part of this article demonstrates,
morals, the victim's knowledge of the nature and consequences of her
acts, and a range of typically nonlegal issues pervaded the Glen Ridge
rape trial even though the trial court relied on the most narrow com-
petency standard, State v. Olivios243 nature of the conduct test.
Olivio did not meet attorneys' expectations that the New Jersey
Supreme Court would provide a ruling "that explicitly defines the fac-
tors to be included in the instructions to a jury in future prosecutions"
involving mentally retarded victims. 2' Although the Olivio court's
239. See id. at 384-85, 389. As the court emphasized, the rape "statute was not designed to
unfairly punish the sexual partners of those mentally impaired or mentally retarded persons who
have a basic understanding of the act and consequences of sexual intercourse and are capable of
making a volitional choice to engage or not engage in such conduct." Id. at 388.
240. See generally Eskridge, supra note 34, at 47 (explaining the impossibility of divorcing
consent from context and social policy).
241. See Righter v. State, 752 P.2d 416,421 (Wyo. 1988) (emphasis added); see also People v.
Howard, 172 Cal. Rptr. 539, 540-41 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) ("Because of [the victim's] mental
retardation, the acts of sodomy and oral copulation meant nothing to him. He was not aware of
the nature of these acts. He liked the defendant, wanted to please him and actually liked it when
the defendant [sodomized him]. This is unconsciousness of the nature of the act."); infra Appen-
dix, Table E.
242. Righter, 752 P.2d at 421 (emphasis added).
243. 589 A.2d 597 (N.J. 1991).
244. Ronald J. Fleury, Justices Poised to Redefine Rape of Mentally Disabled, N.J. L.J., Nov.
29, 1990, at 1. The Olivio court's lack of guidance is puzzling in light of its awareness of the
problem and apparent wish to remedy it.
[During their discussion of Olivio some justices] questioned whether a mentally retarded
victim's failure to comprehend the potential consequences of sexual intercourse-notably
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charge to the jury incorporated the legislature's definition of "men-
tally defective" and instructed that the jury consider any circum-
stances of the case that would have rendered the victim "temporarily"
incapable of consent,245 the court did not indicate what those circum-
stances should be. This approach contradicted the court's warning
that "an instruction solely in terms of the language of the statute will
not give sufficient guidance to the jury.'"2" The court's instruction
also gave no guidance to the prosecuting attorneys.247 Although at-
torneys expected that the Glen Ridge rape case would "gradually fill
in the details, 248 the Glen Ridge jury was also instructed
amorphously.249
The other capacity tests share similar types of problems. Some
mental health professionals decry the nature and consequences test
because of its vagueness,25 ° emphasizing research showing that deter-
minations of a victim's volition and her knowledge of the nature and
venereal disease and pregnancy-would be sufficient to invoke the statute's protection.
Some lawyers agreed it would.
But [one justice] remarked that many young people without mental defects might suffer
from the same ignorance, while [one] defense attorney emphasized that the statute's pur-
pose is to protect the retarded against rape, not venereal disease or pregnancy.
The justices kept coming back to their criticism of instructions that leave juries guessing
about the standards to apply. "The statutory language is sufficiently broad that you could
have widely disparate results from different juries."
Id. at 20.
245. See Olivio, 589 A.2d at 599-601 (referring to N.J. STAT. AN. § 2C:14-1(h) (West 1983),
which defines "mentally defective" as a "condition in which a person suffers from a mental dis-
ease or defect which renders that person temporarily or permanently incapable of understanding
the nature of his conduct, including but not limited to, being incapable of providing consent").
246. Id. at 606.
247. See Ronald J. Fleury, Justices Redefine Rape of Mentally Retarded: Jury Must Weigh
Consent in Context of "Surrounding Circumstances," N.J. L.J., May 9, 1991, at 5. According to
Assistant Passaic County Prosecutor Steven Braun,
[w]hen the [Olivio] case was tried we had nothing to work with.... They're saying use the
statute but plug in the facts. I can see judges giving [jurors] an instruction on capacity to
consent and telling them the factors they should consider are the following, A, B, C, D, etc.,
which would have to be hammered out with both attorneys before the jury is charged.
Id. at 23.
248. Id. (quoting Assistant Passaic County Prosecutor Steven Braun's expectation that "fu-
ture cases-like the Glen Ridge case-will gradually fill in the details").
249. See Ronald J. Fleury, Glen Ridge Victim "Temporarily" Incapacitated: Panel Finds
Group Sex Scenario May Have Undermined Her Consent, N.J. L.J., Apr. 25, 1991, at 3.
250. See Parker & Abramson, supra note 127, at 262. As the authors explain, determining a
mentally retarded victim's understanding of the nature and consequences "is far more ambigu-
ous" than determining that victim's understanding of volition:
Specifically what, and how much, information must a person with mental retardation pro-
vide about sexual activity in order to pass this "test"? Do they have to know that a woman
can get pregnant? That both men and women can get diseases? Must they know the names
of the diseases? Should they be able to tell us why people have sex? Should they be able to
tell us who are the "right" partners to have sex with? . . . Perhaps, to compensate for this
deficiency, there is a tendency to deemphasize nature and consequences and rely on voli-
tion-at least in ambiguous cases-when attempting to determine the consent capability of
a person with mental retardation.
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consequences are not made independently. 251 The judgment and evi-
dence of mental disability tests fail to provide even conceptual gui-
dance, much less direction on the details of a case. Although Illinois's
totality of the circumstances test is conceptually commendable, it too
lacks sufficient specificity, going little beyond a two-sentence descrip-
tion.252 Moreover, no test accommodates or even acknowledges the
more serious consensual conduct problems confronted by mental
health professionals working with the institutionalized retarded.253
V. RAPE, MENTAL RETARDATION, AND CONTEXT
This part proposes a contextual approach to determining a men-
tally retarded victim's capacity to consent, thereby offering the kind of
guidance that courts and legislatures have so far shunned. It applies
this approach to the facts of the Glen Ridge rape case and shows how
some of the problems and pitfalls of that case could have been
avoided. This part also illustrates how such an approach may be used
in future rape cases, including those involving the institutionalized
mentally retarded as well as the nonretarded.
A. Foundations of the Contextual Approach
Mental health professionals voice two consistent concerns about
rape standards for mentally retarded persons. The first is that men-
tally retarded individuals should not be judged from a higher consent
standard than nonretarded individuals.254 The second is that consent
251. See id. Upon reporting the results of their study of professionals' determinations of
whether a victim can pass the nature and consequences test, the authors stated that
professionals do not necessarily independently evaluate both of the concepts required for
consent (i.e., understanding of nature and consequences and acting with volition). For ex-
ample, the presence or absence of volition appears to have a greater impact on evaluations
of nature and consequences than the reverse....
Perhaps this finding is understandable when one considers investigations of rape or
sexual assault involving people without mental retardation. In such cases, investigators are
more commonly concerned with the question of volition than with whether the victim un-
derstood the nature and consequences of the sexual act. Thus, because investigators are
likely to have more experience addressing questions of volition, it is perhaps not surprising
that they would focus on this concept in the present study when attempting to determine
consent.
Id.
252. See People v. Whitten, 647 N.E.2d 1062, 1067 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) ("[W]e believe that
the courts should broaden their inquiry in cases involving the inability to give knowing consent
to more than just focusing on the IQ or mental ability of the alleged victim. All of the circum-
stances, including those facts that demonstrate control and its misuse by defendant over the
exercise of complainant's free will, are germane to the issue of whether a particular complainant
gave knowing consent.").
253. See John M. Niederbuhl & C. Donald Morris, Sexual Knowledge and the Capability of
Persons with Dual Diagnoses to Consent to Sexual Contact, 11 SEXUALIrY & DISABILrTY 295, 304
(1993) (noting the dearth of clear, professional standards for mental health professionals for
determining a mentally retarded individual's ability to consent to sexual conduct).
254. See id. This includes those nonretarded individuals who barely meet the legal age of
consent. Assuming that age 17 is the point when individuals are legally capable of consenting to
sexual intercourse, the authors, who are mental health professionals, noted that they
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determinations should be considered within the context in which they
occur rather than according only to the attributes of a particular indi-
vidual,255 an approach taken in other areas of the law. 256 Legal pro-
ceedings, for example, can be highly contextualized and normative;257
a mentally retarded person may be deemed capable of making one
kind of decision but incapable of making another, even during the
same proceeding.258 Some scholars apply this concept of "situational
competency" to the realm of sexual relationships, contending that a
mentally retarded individual "may be capable of consenting to some
forms of sexual contact with a certain individual in a particular setting
but not to other forms of sexual contact with the same, or other, indi-
viduals in other settings. '25 9
Variations in mentally retarded persons' abilities to consent based
upon the particular situation are not typically reflected in the legal
system, which oftentimes presumes incompetency in key areas, for ex-
ample, the ability to provide accurate and valid testimony. 260  This
often considered how a [mentally retarded] client's understanding of sexual contact, its na-
ture, possible outcomes, and social/moral context compared with that of a 17-year old who
had never had a sex education course. Such a person is presumed capable: it is rare that
anyone seeks to limit his/her freedom of sexual expression based on lack of consensual
ability.
Id. Therefore, "drawing on their personal knowledge of local standards," the authors "tried not
to apply a higher standard to [mentally retarded] individuals served than many people living in
the community and presumed capable would be able to meet." Id. at 304.
255. See id. at 305 (emphasizing that "[s]pecific, rather than general, determinations of capa-
bility are the rule in other domains").
256. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 133
(1995) (noting that the "[clapacity to make a will is governed by a different legal test and re-
quires less competency than the power to make a contract or a gift"); Stephen J. Anderer, Sym-
posium, Integrating Legal and Psychological Perspectives on the Right to Personal Autonomy, 37
VILL. L. REV. 1563, 1567 (1992) (discussing the numerous legal, psychological, and contextual
issues concerning competency decisions, and concluding that competence "varies with the com-
plexity and importance of the subject matter of the proposed decision"); Thomas Grisso & Paul
S. Appelbaum, The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study. III: Abilities of Patients to Con-
sent to Psychiatric and Medical Treatments, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 149 (1995) (discussing the
implications of research on the patterns of deficits affecting competency decisions to various
psychiatric and medical treatments); Symposium, The Law of Competence, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV.
539 (1993) (exploring the varying laws and contexts of competency concerning, for example,
criminal defendants, the disabled, the mentally ill, and women).
257. For a thorough discussion of this issue, see Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of
Criminal Defendants with Mental Retardation to Participate in Their Own Defense, 81 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 419 (1990), and Norman G. Poythress et al., Client Abilities to Assist Counsel
and Make Decisions in Criminal Cases, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 437 (1994).
258. See Bonnie, supra note 257, at 428-29 (noting that courts have acknowledged that de-
fendants considered "competent to stand trial" may not be capable of engaging in more specific
determinations, such as the decision to raise an insanity defense or to decline submitting mitigat-
ing evidence in a capital case). But see Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 398 (1993) (rejecting an
argument that a defendant's "competence to plead guilty or to waive the right to counsel must
be measured by a standard that is higher than (or even different from) the [competency standard
for standing trial]").
259. Niederbuhl & Morris, supra note 253, at 305.
260. See Valenti-Hein & Schwartz, supra note 82, at 289 (contrasting the American Bar
Association's statement that alleged childhood victims of sexual abuse should be considered
competent to serve as a witness, with the Association's failure to propose a comparable recom-
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presumption is especially injurious in sexual abuse cases because esti-
mates suggest that mentally retarded individuals are sexually victim-
ized at four-to-ten times the rate of the nonretarded 261 and that this
disparity is greatest for those who are institutionalized.262
To address these concerns, this article proposes a contextual ap-
proach to determining consent that focuses on the situational context
and particular circumstances of each case in light of current research
on mental retardation. This approach is derived, in part, from a wide
range of case law and multidisciplinary literature:
1. Rape cases involving mentally retarded victims that considered in
their decisions the "totality of the circumstances, '' 263 the "surround-
ing circumstances," 26  a "blend" of factors,265 or "situational"
factors;266
2. Rape cases involving mentally retarded victims that were prosecuted
under only the "force and coercion" subsections of the rape statutes
and not the subsections encompassing the mentally retarded, but
that included the victim's mental ability among the "totality of the
circumstances '267 or the number of factors268 considered in their
decisions;
mendation for mentally retarded persons); infra Appendix, Table E (Testimony of Experts/
Laypersons).
261. See Ruth Luckasson, People with Mental Retardation as Victims of Crime, in THE CRIM-
INAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFENDANTS AND VICTIMS 209, 209-20
(Ronald W. Conley et al. eds., 1992); Dick Sobsey & Tanis Doe, Patterns of Sexual Abuse and
Assault, 9 SEXUALITY & DISABILITY 243, 244 (1991); Sundram & Stavis, supra note 223, at 256;
Valenti-Hein & Schwartz, supra note 82, at 291.
262. See infra notes 422-75 and accompanying text.
263. See People v. Whitten, 647 N.E.2d 1062, 1065-66 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
264. See State v. Olivio, 589 A.2d 597, 606 (N.J. 1991) ("The trial court's instructions should
inform the jury that the alleged victim's capacity to understand and consent to the proffered
conduct must be considered in the context of all of the surrounding circumstances in which it
occurred.").
265. See People v. Easley, 364 N.E.2d 1328, 1333 (N.Y. 1977) (insisting, with reference to the"morality" instruction objected to by the defendant, that "[i]ndeed, no factor was elevated over
the others and the effect was to present a blend of all these considerations. This encouraged the
jury to more freely decide the weight to be accorded to each factor against the perspective of the
total picture.").
266. See infra Appendix, Table E; see also In re B.G., 589 A.2d 637, 647 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1991) (Dreier, J.A.D., concurring) (noting the "stressful situation," the "situational
confusion," and the "situational inability of the victim to cope with a sexual situation"); State v.
Ortega-Martinez, 881 P.2d 231, 238-39 (Wash. 1994) (explaining that a jury could consider,
among other things, "a victim's ability to translate information acquired in one situation to a new
situation," a victim's "ability to understand the nature and consequences at a given time and in a
given situation"); Fleury, supra note 249, at 3 (noting that the panel's decision in In re B.G., 589
A.2d at 637, was "the first in which a New Jersey court has used the stress of the situation as the
measure of a rape victim's ability to consent" and that it "may have wider ramifications").267. See Salsman v. Commonwealth, 565 S.W.2d 638, 641-42 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (noting
that in determining whether the victim submitted to forcible compulsion, "the jury was entitled
to consider a number of factors," including the victim's mental retardation, her deafness, her
difficulty understanding the communications of others, her aloneness in the house, defendant's
disregard of her physical resistance and "repeated indications that she did not wish to have sex
with him," and his physical act of pulling her from the chair; considering "all of the circum-
stances," the jury could believe that the victim "was terror-stricken at the time" of the sexual
acts); People v. Kline, 494 N.W.2d 756, 758-59 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (rejecting defendant's claim
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3. Relevant key factors considered by courts in determining rape cases
involving mentally retarded victims regardless of the type of test the
court applied;26 9
4. Rape cases involving nonretarded victims that considered in their
decision making "situational constraints" ;270
5. "Situational competency" parallels involving mentally retarded
defendants;27 1
that the introduction of evidence concerning the complainant's mental capacity "changed the
charge against him at trial because he was charged under the 'force and coercion' subsection of
the [rape] statute, and not the 'incapacity of the complainant' subsection," noting that such com-
plainant evidence was necessary "to show that the complainant may have had a somewhat di-
minished capacity to consent" and "that such diminished capacity may have made her more
susceptible to defendant coercion"; therefore, "the complainant's mental capacity was a part of
the totality of the circumstances surrounding the issue whether defendant compelled the com-
plainant to participate in sexual intercourse by the use of force or coercion"); Barnett v. State,
820 S.W.2d 240, 242 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (applying a "totality of the circumstances" analysis,
incorporating the victim's mental incapacity, in determining the victim's lack of consent under
the "physical force or violence" subsection of the rape statute); Ortiz v. State, 804 S.W.2d 177,
179 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) ("Based on the totality of the circumstances, the jury could infer that
appellant's overall conduct reasonably placed the [mentally retarded victim] in fear of death or
serious bodily injury.").
268. See People v. Herring, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 213, 216 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (emphasizing that
even though the defendant "was not prosecuted under the section which alleges sexual inter-
course with a person incapable of giving legal consent due to unsound mind or incapacity,"
evidence of "[tihe victim's ability to perceive and recollect were still at issue"); State v. Hawkins,
778 S.W.2d 780, 782 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (noting that evidence of the victim's "limited mental
capacity" would affect her ability to consent and that "[e]vidence that a twenty-year-old woman
could not read or write has at least some arguable bearing on the issue of mental capacity").
269. Courts typically focus on similar kinds of factors when determining whether a defend-
ant should be convicted of rape of a mentally retarded woman. See Sundram & Stavis, supra
note 223, at 259. Factors that courts find particularly important include the following: the vic-
tim's IQ and level of mental retardation; the difference between the victim's chronological age
and mental age; the victim's capacity to function, such as the ability to read, engage in household
chores, use public transportation, manage or count money, be employed; the victim's residence
in an institution, or attendance at a school, for the mentally retarded; the victim's knowledge and
understanding of the physiological act of sexual intercourse; the victim's knowledge and under-
standing of the nature and consequences of sexual intercourse, such as pregnancy and diseases,
and the ability to specify certain diseases, such as AIDS; degree of passivity; the defendant's
chronological age; the difference between the defendant's and victim's IQ or capacity to func-
tion; the relationship between the defendant and the victim-for example, whether the defend-
ant is a caregiver, family member, friend, neighbor, or stranger; and the victim's personal
situation at the time of the offense, e.g., social isolation. See id.; see also infra Appendix, Table E
(detailing factors that courts consider).
270. See, eg., State v. Rusk, 424 A.2d 720, 728 (Md. 1981) (considering a wide range of
factors in upholding a rape conviction, including lateness of the hour, the victim's geographical
isolation and immobilization (removal of her car keys), as well as "light" choking); Common-
wealth v. Sherry, 437 N.E.2d 224, 227-34 (Mass. 1982) (emphasizing the victim's geographical
isolation, number of the defendants, and the "entire atmosphere" of the situation in upholding
rape convictions); see also Susan Stefan, Silencing the Different Voice: Competence, Feminist
Theory and Law, 47 U. MiAMi L. REV. 763, 799 (1993) (favoring a case where a court does not
have to justify a nonretarded victim's incapacity to consent "by reference to some pathology or
defect within her, but finds her incapacity in the constraints of her situation").
271. See supra notes 257-58 and accompanying text.
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6. "Totality of the circumstances" or "situational" parallels utilized in
contract law2 72 and other civil law areas involving incapacitated
individuals;2 73
7. Recent research on mental retardation within and outside of the in-
stitutional context;274
8. Legal and multidisciplinary literature emphasizing that legal deci-
sions consider the factual, moral, and contextual aspects of each
case275 as well as social science research in general;276
9. And the philosophical concept of "dignity of the risk," introduced at
the start of the normalization movement, which encourages the men-
tally retarded and nonretarded to be treated as similarly as possible
by allowing (within bounds) the mentally retarded to assume the
same kinds of life risks as the nonretarded.277 However, there is no
dignity in treating people as though they possess capacities that they
do not in fact have.278
272. See James D. Sears, Mental Retardation and Unconscionability, 13 LAW & PsYcH. REV.
77 (1989). Noting that the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) lacks specific provisions for the
mentally disabled individual as a contracting party, James Sears recommends an individualized,
"totality of the circumstances" approach in analyzing contracts and contracting parties using the
UCC's unconscionability provisions. See id. at 84-85. This approach provides "each case an
independent reading taking into consideration the degree of mental retardation and the circum-
stances of the writing of the contract at the time the contract was written." Id. at 84. Circum-
stances warranting consideration include the individual's ability to read and write, whether the
contract contained terms that were unfair or surprising, and whether there was evidence of op-
pression due to the imbalance in bargaining power between the parties. See id. As Sears con-
cludes, "The total circumstances standard allows consideration beyond the statement of the fact
of the presence of mental retardation in one of the parties to the contract," emphasizing that
"[t]here are some circumstances where the contract is made unconscionable only because of the
cumulative impact of all of the variables that are present in a very specific situation." Id. at 89.
273. See generally Stefan, supra note 270 (discussing, among other things, factors influencing
a mentally incapacitated woman's competence to enter divorce and separation agreements, to
consent to the adoption of a child, and to decide to have children).
274. See generally AAMR, supra note 73; Hayman, supra note 32 (discussing a mentally
retarded woman's ability to raise children); infra notes 422-75 and accompanying text.
275. See KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 375; see also Eskridge, supra note 34, at 48 (emphasiz-
ing "the impossibility of divorcing consent from context and social policy"); Hirshman, supra
note 28, at 105 ("A person's identity is a dialogue. The roles of the person as narrator, and other
people as reader-revisionists of her life, will ebb and flow depending on the context.").
276. See John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating and
Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (1986); Laurens Walker & John
Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559 (1987).
277. Wolf Wolfensberger, the most prominent early proponent of normalization, empha-
sized that all handicapped individuals, especially the mentally retarded, should be integrated into
community life as much as possible, as well as face the same risks as any other person who lives
in the community. Wolfensberger's concept, "dignity of risk," was premised on his philosophy
that there is a certain "dignity" in allowing mentally retarded individuals to assume the same
risks as nonretarded individuals. See WOLFENSBERrER ET AL., supra note 133, at 194-205; see
also Peter R. Johnson, Becoming Real: A Developmental Approach to Relationship Education,
in MENTAL HANDICAP AND SEXUALrIY, supra note 48, at 62, 81-82 (contending that "our society
oppresses people with a handicap, by denying their reality in order to prevent the formation of
sexual relationships").
278. See Wright, supra note 35, at 1397.
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B. Applying the Contextual Approach
This section discusses the facts and flaws of the Glen Ridge rape
case and how the case would have developed differently using a con-
textual approach. It contends that the Glen Ridge rape trial itself is
best viewed in terms of a series of judicial mistakes that inadvertently
defied the legislature's intent to constrain nonlegal influences. The
trial also illustrates the consequences of a court's stereotypic igno-
rance of the capabilities of a mildly mentally retarded victim and of
too rigidly applying New Jersey's two-part standard requiring the
prosecution to show that (1) the victim was mentally retarded and that
(2) the defendant knew or should have known this.2 79
1. The Facts of the Glen Ridge Rape Case
The New Jersey Supreme Court accepted expert testimony classi-
fying Betty Harris as mildly or "educably" mentally retarded based
upon her general IQ score of 64, a verbal IQ of 70, and a performance
IQ of 59211 -results fitting the AAMR's requirement of "significantly
subaverage intellectual functioning." 1  Experts estimated that
Betty's mental age was equivalent to that of an eight-year-old.2
Although Betty had been officially classified as mentally retarded only
two years preceding the sexual assault, she had long been a special
education student and was also considered neurologically impaired. 83
Furthermore, Betty showed "related limitations" in nearly all of
the ten AAMR-designated adaptive skill areas.' According to wit-
nesses, for example, Betty's comprehension of math and reading
279. The Code of Criminal Justice, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2(c)(2) (West 1995), criminal-
izes the sexual penetration of a person who is "mentally defective," rendering such an act to be
sexual assault: "An actor is guilty of sexual assault if he commits an act of sexual penetration
with another person under ... the following circumstances: (2) The victim is one whom [sic] the
actor knew or should have known was physically helpless, mentally defective or mentally inca-
pacitated." Id. "'Mentally defective' means that condition in which a person suffers from a
mental disease or defect which renders that person temporarily or permanently incapable of
understanding the nature of his conduct, including, but not limited to, being incapable of provid-
ing consent." Id. § 2C:14-1(h).
280. See In re B.G., 589 A.2d 637, 640 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991). According to a
school record, Betty's IQ was 49. See id. at 640 n.3.
281. See AAMR, supra note 73, at 5.
282. See In re B.G., 589 A.2d at 645; LAUFER, supra note 2, at 8.
283. See In re B.G., 589 A.2d at 640; LAUFER, supra note 2, at 20; Robert Hanley, 4 Are
Convicted in Sexual Abuse of Retarded New Jersey Woman, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1993, at Al;
Bernard Lefkowitz, Reported Victim's IQ 49, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Dec. 24, 1992, at 31. On Decem-
ber 15, 1987, the Glen Ridge School system found Betty's tested IQ of 49 sufficiently low to
justify moving her educational classification from "neurologically impaired" to the more serious
"educable mentally retarded." See Lefkowitz, supra, at 31. Betty entered special classes for the
educable mentally retarded at nearby Columbia High School and West Orange High School
because such classes were not offered in Glen Ridge. See LAUFER, supra note 2, at 20. In June
1992, at age 21, she finally left high school because she was no longer eligible for public educa-
tion. See Hanley, supra, at Al. Her psychological evaluations preceding the Glen Ridge trial
showed an IQ of 64. See Lefkowitz, supra, at 31.
284. See AAMR, supra note 73, at 38-41.
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never excelled much beyond that of an eight-year-old. 85 She could
not understand what coins equalled a dollar, had difficulty reconciling
change at a store after a purchase, and could not comprehend the
mechanics of a bank account.286 She could not name four American
presidents, believed that the United States had five states, and re-
ferred to its major political parties as "public" and "primary. ' '2 7 She
could not take public transportation by herself288 or participate in a
credible job interview.289 She could not cut a pie in half,29° cook or
understand a recipe,29' wash the family dishes alone, or comprehend
the plots of popular television dramas.292 As the prosecution ex-
plained, "What Betty was never able to understand is how could a
character be shot and killed one day and be alive again on another day
in another TV program, walking around as if nothing had
happened. 293
Testimony indicated that Betty was always vulnerable socially.
Betty's sister recounted, for example, that when they were young
Betty was the only one to comply with a command from a group of
girls to eat mud pressed into the shape of a chocolate bar.294 As an
adolescent, Betty played on the Glen Ridge High School basketball
and softball teams even though she attended special education classes
elsewhere.295 Yet a high school guidance counselor explained that she
was socially isolated. Students "ridiculed and taunted" her, no one
wanted to be seen with her, and her need to be liked and accepted
made her vulnerable to manipulation.296
Because of such vulnerability and her ignorance about sex, all the
high school counselors were "concerned about her being a victim of a
sexual attack. ' 297 For example, Betty did not comprehend the mean-
ing of sexual intercourse or her right to say "no" when a classmate
285. See LAUFER, supra note 2, at 99; Hanley, supra note 283, at Al.
286. See LAUFER, supra note 2, at 39.
287. See id. at 99; Hanley, supra note 283, at B4.
288. See Wendy Lin, Rape Victim Was "Childlike," N.Y. NEWSDAY, Mar. 17, 1993, at 35.
According to the prosecution, Betty "wouldn't be capable of getting on a bus, knowing where to
get on, get off, what route to take, couldn't take a train or think about getting on an airplane by
herself." LAUFER, supra note 2, at 39.
289. See LAUFER, supra note 2, at 39.
290. See id. at 99; A Real Sickness Behind Glen Ridge's Gang Rape, supra note 18, at B6.
291. See LAUFER, supra note 2, at 38.
292. See id. at 39.
293. See id.
294. See id at xviii.
295. See id. at 28.
296. See id. at xviii (referring to the testimony of Carol Bolden, a counselor at Columbia
High School, who met with Betty daily during her sophomore year and who explained that Betty
"had a real need to do anything she felt would make a friend"); Bernard Lefkowitz, Case De-
pends on Her, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Dec. 9, 1992, at 23 ("Most of the students around her knew
something was wrong," the counselor testified. "They either teased her or ignored her. She was
in her own little world. It was very sad.").
297. Lefkowitz, supra note 296, at 23.
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fondled her breasts.29 She "knew nothing of birth control, nothing of
venereal disease, nothing of pregnancy. She did not understand the
concept that . . . her body was very private."2 99 Those witnessing
Betty's testimony or testifying on her behalf described her as "child-
like" or "infantile" in her communication skills, demeanor, and depic-
tions of sexual conduct.300 As the defense painfully revealed, Betty
also either did not comprehend, or denied, her mental retardation.30'
Betty and the three primary defendants, Christopher Archer and
twins Kevin and Kyle Scherzer, had known each other since child-
hood, having attended the same kindergarten class.3° Their child-
hood interactions predicted those in adolescence. When Betty was
age five, the Scherzers and other boys convinced her to eat dog feces;
when she was age eleven, Christopher Archer was among a number of
youths who called her "retard" and "stupid" 303-names and a reputa-
tion that followed Betty throughout the Glen Ridge area.301 Testi-
mony also made clear, however, that as she grew older Betty became
enamored with the popular young athletes and considered them good
friends.3 °5
2. How the Defense Depicted the Facts
The facts of the Glen Ridge case would not be complete without
including at least some of the ways the court allowed the defense to
298. See id. at 23 (quoting the testimony of Carol Bolden). According to Bolden, "[Betty]
would use sexual terms, but when you asked her what they meant she had no understanding."
Id. Although Bolden and other counselors attempted to explain what "sexual intercourse
meant," Betty still did not understand, responding "I know, it's when you bend over and some-
one pokes you." Id.
299. Id. (quoting the testimony of Carol Bolden).
300. See LAUFER, supra note 2, at 112-44 (describing Betty's in-court testimony and de-
meanor); Lefkowitz, supra note 296, at 23 (depicting Betty as "childlike" and "infantile"); Chris-
tine Schaack McGoey, When "Regular Guys" Rape: The Trial of the Glen Ridge Four, ON THE
IssuEs, Fall 1993, at 13 (noting that Betty's "face registered emotions in response to questions
with the kind of directness and intensity typical of children").
301. According to the prosecution, "If you ever were to tell Betty that she is mentally re-
tarded, she wouldn't believe that. She wants to be normal, and she wants to be accepted."
LAUFER, supra note 2, at 40. The defense, however, approached this issue differently by ques-
tioning Betty directly:
Q: "Some people say you're retarded, but that's not true is it?" asked [the defense].
A: "A lot of people call me that at school," [Betty] answered, hanging her head.
Q: "But you're not retarded.... If you were retarded you couldn't answer these questions,
right?"
A: [Betty] vehemently agreed.
Q: [The defense] then pointed to the prosecutors. "Those people," he told [Betty], "the
ones you think are your friends, they're telling 'the whole world' that you are
retarded."
A: [Betty] went white with pain.
McGoey, supra note 300, at 14.
302. See LAUFER, supra note 2, at xvii.
303. See id. at xviii.
304. See id.; see also id. at 31 (noting commentary that the word "retarded" frequently ac-
companied Betty's name).
305. See generally id. at 112-44 (recounting testimony).
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depict Betty based on her past sexual history. The press and commen-
tators considered this part of the trial the most controversial. Perhaps
most striking, however, is the extent to which the defense relied nearly
exclusively on a broad range of sexual stereotypes of all women, and
mentally retarded women in particular, in lieu of factual evidence.
Despite Betty's lack of sexual knowledge, she had engaged in
some sexual activity and her past sexual life was discussed in detail.306
Witnesses were asked whether she ever mentioned "boys or sex,"
swore, smoked cigarettes, or "display[ed] any 'other' immoral behav-
ior."3 °7 The court allowed the defense to introduce evidence that,
since age twelve, Betty had been "sexually active"; 30 8 yet it disallowed
prosecution evidence showing that this "activity" was actually sexual
molestation that occurred two weeks before Betty's twelfth birth-
day.3° The defense's unprecedented access to all of Betty's medical,
psychological, and gynecological records310 fed accusations that her
use of birth control pills proved promiscuity; yet Betty's mother de-
scribed a daily regime of hiding the pills in Betty's food when Betty's
vulnerability to sexual assault became clear.31'
Defense attorney Michael Querques used Betty's history exten-
sively to fuel his defense. In his eyes, Betty was a "full breasted, 312
"devious," 313 "sexually aggressive,' 314 "Lolita, '315 "who liked 'to see
306. See McGoey, supra note 300, at 13. For example, a psychologist for the prosecution
stated that Betty had informed her that she was sexually experienced, that boys offered her
money for masturbating them, and that she had tried twice to have sexual intercourse with
Christopher Archer. See LAUFER, supra note 2, at 46. Defense counsel were allowed to admit
into court evidence that Betty had been expelled from school for sexual misbehavior, that she
had bared her breasts while in school, and that she had engaged in intercourse in a school tower.
Betty's mother countered, however, that she had not been expelled, only transferred because she
needed special classes; she had not bared her breasts but, like a small child, had difficulty remov-
ing pullover shirts without the underlying T-shirts lifting; and she had only been "touched" in the
school tower. See Christopher Kilbourne, Rape Trial Break Gives Both Sides Time for Strategy:
Glen Ridge Accuser Testifying, N.J. RECORD, Dec. 12, 1992, at A3; McGoey, supra note 300, at
13.
307. McGoey, supra note 300, at 13.
308. See id.
309. See Bernard Lefkowitz, Prosecution Gagged; Judge Rules '83 Molestation of Girl Can-
not Be Introduced, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Nov. 7, 1992, at 8 (noting court's rejection of a prosecution
attempt to introduce evidence that Betty was sexually molested when she was age 12, particu-
larly in light of the exception made under the rape shield law regarding her past sexual history).
310. See infra note 354 and accompanying text.
311. See McGoey, supra note 300, at 13; see also Lisa Belkin, Sexuality of Retarded Children
a Worrisome Fact of Life, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Mar. 8, 1993, at E4 (describing inter-
views with parents concerned about their mentally retarded children's sexuality in light of the
Glen Ridge case).
312. Schroth, supra note 28, at 28.
313. McGoey, supra note 300, at 13.
314. Robert Hanley, Defense Lawyers in Glen Ridge Abuse Case Say Woman Was Aggres-
sor, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1992, at 31; McGoey, supra note 300, at 13.
315. LAUhER, supra note 2, at 52 (noting Querques's comment that "[a]ll girls are not the
same. There are some girls who are Lolitas. Do you know Lolitas, fourteen, fifteen, and dress
up like they are eighteen and nineteen, to entice and attract?"); Christopher Kilbourne, Defense
Blames Accuser's Mom; Fiery Summation in Glen Ridge Case, N.J. RECORD, Feb. 10, 1993, at A5
(highlighting the "Lolita" defense).
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the joy on a boy's face when he ejaculates' and hungered for sex the
way a starving person hungers for food. '316 According to Querques,
she was "ready, willing, able, and anxious" to engage in the acts at the
time and "would do it again, '317 thereby endangering the defendants
who needed to be protected from her.318 Moreover, Betty's mental
retardation supposedly made her sex drive even more uncontrollable
than "normal." "She thrived for affection," Querques stated.319
"[B]ut she also thrived for the kissing, she craved the caressing, she
craved the embracing, she craved the euphoria because her brain func-
tioned in that way."'320 He emphasized further, "You may very well
find, in the condition she had, her feelings for sex and her drive, her
genitals' signals, are greater than normal. " 321 "No matter how she tests
on an IQ test, when the trigger goes off, you do it."32
In pursuing evidence of Betty's promiscuity, Querques even re-
ferred to the physical features of other women-his daughters' differ-
ent breast sizes, for example,323 and the "pretty" but "cold to the
touch" female police detective. 24 These accounts placed Betty, whom
"1325he viewed as "used merchandise, in some frame of reference rela-
tive to the sexuality of all women.
Querques also attributed the defendants' actions to "out-of-con-
trol hormones and a society obsessed with sex."' 3 26 Yet they, in con-
trast to Betty, were simply going through a "rite of passage," "a time
of experimentation," engaging in sexual acts that could "best be de-
316. Schroth, supra note 28, at 28.
317. McGoey, supra note 300, at 13.
318. See Schroth, supra note 28, at 28. As Querques explained, "[Betty] wasn't kept home.
She was normal as far as she was concerned, and the parents let her be as normal as she wanted
to be, and if somebody else thought she was normal, too, and they did something with her, they
are not criminals.... Everybody, but everybody needs protection." Id.
319. LAUFER, supra note 2, at 51.
320. Id. (emphasis added).
321. Id. (emphasis added); Hanley, supra note 314, at 31 (emphasis added). Another de-
fense attorney shared Querques's characterization of Betty. "She knew what she was doing,"
adding that, "[w]e don't know fully what lies behind the psychological makeup" of the victim.
Robert Hanley, Glen Ridge Defense Summary: Immoral but Not a Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1,
1993, at B15. "This is the way she operated normally in her life." Id But see LAUFER, supra
note 2, at 57-58 ("Even calls I made to the providers of a wide range of sexual services who
advertise in the back pages of America's sexually explicit tabloid newspapers failed to locate a
subculture where broomsticks and baseball bats play a role in consensual sex.").
322. Bernard Lefkowitz, Teen Called Sex Obsessed, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Oct. 17, 1992, at 74.
323. According to Querques, "Girls will be girls. There are some girls who are like nerdy
boys, very bashful. I have a daughter, big-breasted girl, walks this way to hide her breasts. Her
sister is fiat, she sticks it out, what little she has got, so I know what I am talking about."
Schroth, supra note 28, at 28.
324. The female police detective who testified about investigating the case was never ad-
dressed by her name; rather, she was referred to as "the pretty one." Querques warned, "Pretty
and all doesn't matter. Doesn't matter what she looks like. You can't feel the heat of a woman
until you touch her. You can't tell till you touch her she's ice cold." Houppert, supra note 28, at
31.
325. Id. According to Querques, "You can tell from her testimony that this car is not brand
new. They turned the speedometer back on this car." Id.
326. Schroth, supra note 28, at 1.
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scribed as a very brief moral indiscretion. 3 27  "Boys," he explained,"will be boys. Pranksters. Foolarounds.... Are men going to forget,
'hey, I got a girl who is loose, do you want to join me?' ' 328 In other
words, Betty Harris, the quintessential "available" woman, would be
hard for any young man to resist sexually.
It is beyond this article's scope to discuss the ethical issues per-
taining to stereotype-laden defense tactics, 329 except to make two
parting notes: Aside from their controversy, such tactics are fre-
quently unnecessary (typically the facts speak for themselves), and
they can backfire. 330  From all accounts, Querques's tack only hin-
dered his client's defense.33 ' The contextual approach rests on the
principle that stereotype-laden tactics will decline when courts are ap-
propriately trained in the subjects raised by their cases and are pro-
vided sufficiently specific standards to guide them.
3. Evaluating the Glen Ridge Rape Case
A contextual approach to the Glen Ridge case would attempt to
ensure, first, that Betty Harris would not be held to a higher consent
standard than her nonretarded counterpart and, second, that her abil-
ity to consent would be considered within the context in which it oc-
327. Christopher Kilbourne, Teens' Acts "Stupid, Not Criminal"-2 Lawyers Sum Up Glen
Ridge Defense, N.J. RECORD, Feb. 11, 1993, at A3.
328. Manegold, supra note 10, at B4; see also Christopher Kilbourne, Protestors: "Lolita
Excuse Won't Work", N.J. RECORD, Oct. 25, 1992, at A3 (describing how Querques's statements
initiated a demonstration of about 200 people in Glen Ridge yelling, "Boys will be boys, men
will be men, that excuse won't work again."); Robert Lipsyte, Must Boys Always Be Boys?, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 1993, at B7 (noting that "we'll really need the second trial, on the moral issues of
a culture of violence ... that shrugs and smirks and says that boys will be boys").
329. See Eva S. Nilsen, The Criminal Defense Lawyer's Reliance on Bias and Prejudice, 8
GEO. J. LEGAL ETmcs 1, 1 (1994) ("Criminal defense lawyers are frequently required to utilize
legal strategies that are morally repugnant because they perpetuate racial, gender, or cultural
stereotypes"; yet "legal and factual argument often persuades to the degree it piggybacks on the
existing prejudices of a listener."); see also GREGORY M. MATOESIAN, REPRODUCING RAPE:
DOMINATION THROUGH TALK IN THE COURTROOM 19 (1993) (suggesting that rape law reform
has focused on statutes and trial outcomes while ignoring the more subtle, yet perhaps more
important, linguistic mechanisms that attorneys use to frame what juries hear; indeed,
"[c]ourtroom talk captures the moment-to-moment enactment and reproduction of rape as crim-
inal social fact"). See generally Bruce A. Green, Zealous Representation Bound: The Intersec-
tion of the Ethical Codes and the Criminal Law, 69 N.C. L. REV. 687 (1991) (emphasizing the
weaknesses inherent in the ethical codes pertaining to criminal defense attorneys); Russell G.
Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding Professional Ideology Will Im-
prove the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1229 (1995) (tracing the
changes in the legal profession and offering a paradigm that focuses on a "community ethic of
commitment to the common good").
330. See Denno, supra note 116, at 145.
331. See Enda, supra note 29, at E2. After the verdict, the Glen Ridge jurors claimed they
could not believe that any woman would consent to the acts that had been described. See id.
"'Boys can be boys at times,' juror Mario Tolentino said, citing another of Querques's argu-
ments. 'But not by using instruments on another person's body."' Id.; see Schroth, supra note
28, at 28 (noting that "[t]he chief problem with [Querques's] strategy, other than the danger of
offending jurors' sensibilities, is that painting the retarded victim as a sexually active and even
promiscuous teen-ager could tend to support prosecutors' arguments that she was incapable of
exercising judgment or understanding that she could refuse to engage in sex").
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curred rather than only according to her particular attributes. In
reaching these goals, the Glen Ridge case would take a substantially
different route than the one the New Jersey court followed.
a. IQ and Mental Age
First and foremost, the contextual approach, as well as this arti-
cle's proposed elimination of the separate statutory section for men-
tally retarded individuals,332 would curtail the extent to which Betty's
IQ and mental age could be used by either the prosecution or the
defense in their arguments. Courts nearly always refer to a victim's
IQ when the crime charged is rape or an assault against a mentally
retarded person.333 Although IQ is a convenient clinical and adminis-
trative tool, alone it has limited predictive value and may mis-
characterize an individual's adaptive abilities,334 particularly when it is
used by inexperienced evaluators.335 Although courts also typically
refer to a victim's "mental age," it too is considered misleading and
controversial.336
The Glen Ridge trial showed that these concerns are warranted.
Despite the substantial evidence presented on Betty's limited adaptive
abilities, for example, even the prosection mischaracterized and stere-
otyped her and all mentally retarded individuals by exaggerating the
significance of her "IQ of 64"-a label that failed to account for both
her strengths and weaknesses.337 This effect was heightened by discus-
sions of Betty's mental age. "At age eight, [Betty] became frozen in
332. See infra notes 403-21 and accompanying text.
333. This estimate is based on this article's overview of all rape cases involving mentally
retarded persons within the last two decades; see also infra Appendix, Table E (IQ).
334. See AAMR, supra note 73, at 5-19; Hayman, supra note 32, at 1213-16; Telephone
Interview with Robert Schwartz, Ph.D., clinical psychologist in private practice, New York City
(July 15, 1996). Dr. Schwartz was the Chief Consulting Psychologist for Project L.I.F.E., Inc.,
where he provided assessment, counseling, and referrals for developmentally disabled partici-
pants, as well as weekly staff supervision and staff training in the area of developmental
disabilities.
335. See Parker & Abramson, supra note 127, at 261. In one study of the extent to which
three different professional groups (law enforcement officers, licensing personnel, and sex edu-
cators/counselors) relied on legally relevant criteria (such as the nature and consequences test)
when examining the sexual abuse of a mentally retarded individual, researchers found that"whatever personal or professional biases exist, the assessments appeared to be fairly consistent
across the three groups and often within the parameters of the law." Id. At the same time,
however, the study found that law enforcement and licensing professionals were more likely to
rely on the victim's IQ in their evaluations of possible sexual abuse, in part because sex educa-
tors/counselors "are generally more attuned to the sexual needs and rights of their clients" and"possess a much more intimate knowledge of their clients' abilities to understand and desires to
engage in sexual relationships." Id. In turn, one recent study showed that an interdisciplinary
team of professionals working at a state-operated facility relied on similar factors to determine
the capacity for mentally retarded individuals to consent to sex: the individual's sexual knowl-
edge, diagnosed level of mental retardation, social adaptive age, participation in a sex education
course, psychiatric diagnosis, and consensual ability in other areas. See Niederbuhl & Morris,
supra note 253, at 301-02.
336. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
337. See Houppert, supra note 28, at 32.
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time, 338 the prosecution explained, depicting her as "incapable of
having any sexual desires of her own 339 and only mimicking sexual
words and behaviors from her peers or television. 340 Betty's school
counselor agreed, describing her as "someone with the body of a wo-
man and the mentality of a first-grader."'341
The prosecution also stressed Betty's isolation in a stereotypical
and derisive way. Noting that Betty "wanted to be someone who
could go out on dates like normal teenage girls do... [i]n reality, [she]
had almost no friends.... How could Betty Harris go out on a date
with an ordinary teenager," the prosecution asked the jurors, "when
she couldn't really carry on a normal conversation?" 342 Even "femi-
nists" depicted Betty as "pathetic, '' 343 with a "plain, pudgy face." 3
According to advocates for the mentally retarded, the Glen
Ridge prosecution's comments fueled long-held public images of the
mentally retarded as abnormal, asexual, "perennial" children.345 Yet
unlike mentally retarded adults, eight-year-olds cannot work, marry,
procreate, or engage in romantic love. 6  As Leslie Walker-Hirsch,
president of the AAMR's special interest group on sexual and social
concerns has noted, "there is a belief that, when a person is mentally
retarded everything else is at the same level of advancement as the
intellect, when really the body is very on target with the age."' 347 Men-
tally retarded persons merely demonstrate "a developmental lag" be-
cause their social skills and biological development are not
commensurate a.3
338. See LAUFER, supra note 2, at 37.
339. See Houppert, supra note 28, at 32; see also LAUFER, supra note 2, at 49 (noting a
prosecution psychiatrist's testimony: "I had a feeling she was quite asexual. It was an activity
without gratification or great joy.").
340. See Houppert, supra note 28, at 32.
341. Lefkowitz, supra note 296, at 23.
342. LAUFER, supra note 2, at 40 (emphasis added).
343. See id. at 36 (noting the comment of New Jersey's NOW chapter president, Myra Terry,
that "[t]his is a pathetic eight-year-old in a woman's body. How could she consent?").
344. McGoey, supra note 300, at 13. McGoey, a New Jersey NOW member, monitored the
Glen Ridge rape trial daily.
345. See Houppert, supra note 28, at 32 (quoting Celine Glagola, Director of Public Rela-
tions for the New Jersey chapter of the Association for Retarded Citizens); see also All Things
Considered (National Public Radio broadcast, Mar. 16, 1993). According to Douglas Biklen,
Professor of Special Education at Syracuse University, "The message that the [Glen Ridge] pros-
ecution sent out was that adults who are classified as mentally retarded are really like children.
And I think that's an old stereotype that we put aside a number of years ago but which has been
reinvigorated by this case." Id.
346. As Liz Moore, a spokeswoman for The Arc, a national organization for mentally re-
tarded persons commented, "In many areas of their life, [the mentally retarded are] definitely
adults. That's the problem with saying that a person has the mental ability of an eight-year-old."
Alison Carper, When Is Yes a No? Glen Ridge Trial Hinges on Woman's Competence, N.Y.
NEWSDAY, Jan. 25, 1993, at 19.
347. Houppert, supra note 28, at 32.
348. See id. According to Houppert, "Walker-Hirsch's explanation could do much to recon-
cile [Betty's] explorative sexual gestures-remember the boy's penis she asked to see at summer
camp? the fellow special-ed classmate she had sex with? the way she bared her breasts in cho-
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Of course, the prosecution used its stereotypical tack to support
its contention that Betty could not consent to or encourage the de-
fendants' behaviors. Yet a contextual approach incorporating current
research on mental retardation would emphasize other issues. For ex-
ample, a more accurate and seemingly more convincing stance would
emphasize that Betty experienced sexual desire and a need for con-
sensual sexual relationships like anyone else her age but that men
could still sexually assault her. Due to the court's circumvention of
the rape shield statute, Betty's past sexual experiences, her interests in
men, and her knowledge of sex were discussed throughout the trial.349
Irrespective of any concerns over stereotyping, the prosecution was
perhaps ineffectively disingenuous with a jury that needed guidance in
reconciling Betty's past or present sexual life with her sexual assault.
In sum, treating a mentally retarded individual differently from a
nonretarded individual in the same situation could potentially weaken
a prosecution's stance in a case where the trappings for conviction are
less clear.
In line with Walker-Hirsch's recommendation, the prosecution
should have put the basement assault in the context of Betty's "rela-
tively uneven social skills."' 35 ° To do this, the prosecution would ex-
plain to the jury that even though Betty could intellectually
comprehend that she could have said "no" in the basement (as she
testified she could)-and may even have said no to her mother's past
request that she eat her spinach-Betty may not have "internalized"
this ability.351 This limitation explains why Betty could say she real-
ized her choice to say "no" and yet be unable to exercise that right in
a dark basement filled with thirteen male companions.352 As the psy-
chiatrist testifying in the Glen Ridge juvenile court waiver hearing ex-
plained when asked about Betty's ability to consent, "there is no
particular reason to believe that there is consistency in her refusal, just
as there is no particular reason to believe that there is consistency in
her consent. 353
b. Sexual History
In light of this emphasis on the situational aspects of Betty's abil-
ity to consent, the contextual approach would also render unnecessary
the Glen Ridge court's most controversial ruling-to admit evidence
rus?-with her utter inability to navigate normal sexual terrains: she was simply making the
usual teenage sexual forays but lacked the social skills to act in the usual covert fashion." Id.
349. See infra notes 354-59 and accompanying text.
350. Houppert, supra note 28, at 32.
351. See id. As Walker-Hirsch explained, "People with mental disabilities, if they've learned
something in one setting, can know it there, and appear to process it but can't really translate it
into general knowledge that they can apply in a different setting." Id.
352. See id.; LAUFER, supra note 2, at 171-75 (interview with Walker-Hirsch); Evelyn
Nieves, Witness Calls Woman Mentally Defective, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1992, at B5.
353. In re B.G., 589 A.2d 637, 646 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
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of Betty's sexual history under New Jersey's rape shield statute354
(once again illustrating the frailties of the Olivio court's "narrow" na-
ture of the conduct test). Contending that "the need to protect the
woman was outweighed in this case by the right of the defendants to a
fair trial, '355 the court determined that the jury should consider
Betty's sexual history for two reasons: to decipher the prosecution's
claim that she was mentally defective and incapable of consent 356 and
to evaluate the defense's arguments that she voluntarily participated,
understood the acts, and could make "sexual choices. '317 Yet the
court's stance was seriously flawed for a range of reasons: it was atyp-
ical even compared to other rape and mental retardation cases; 358 it
defied current science and knowledge of sexual consent among the
mentally retarded; and it permitted gender stereotypical prosecution
and defense tactics that relied most heavily on the stereotypes of men-
tally retarded women. Indeed, the ensuing outrage over the defense's
tactics immediately prompted the New Jersey legislature to narrow its
rape shield statute.359 By implicitly presuming that Betty may not be
354. The rape shield laws were enacted during the 1970s in an effort to prevent defendants
from using the victim's past sexual history in order to contest a rape accusation. See Ann Alt-
house, Thelma and Louise and the Law: Do Rape Shield Rules Matter?, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REV.
757 (1992); Bienen, supra note 34, at 170. Typically under New Jersey law, information about a
victim's past sexual history and medical records, such as a gynecological file, are protected by the
state's rape shield law and statutes on patient-physician privilege. See Linda Robayo, Note, The
Glen Ridge Trial: New Jersey's Cue to Amend Its Rape Shield Statute, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J.
272, 303-21 (1994). According to one lawyer, the Glen Ridge rape case was the first time a New
Jersey court had discarded doctor-patient confidentiality in a sexual assault case. See Robert
Hanley, Victim's Past Is at Issue in Rape Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1992, at B6.
355. Robert Hanley, Judge Rules Sexual History Is Admissible in Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29,
1992, at A21.
356. See id.
The judge said one reason for his admitting the woman's sexual history was the state's reli-
ance on it to bolster its arguments before the grand jury and in pretrial hearings that she was
mentally defective and had shown in previous sexual encounters that she was incapable of
understanding them or exercising her right to say no to them.
Id.
357. See Phalon, supra note 2, at 8 (noting the court's desire to admit past sexual history
evidence to ensure defendants' right to a fair trial); see also LAUFER, supra note 2, at 64 (ex-
plaining that the court's impression was "that the rights of the defendants included the opportu-
nity to use some evidence of Betty's sexual past to try to prove that she functioned well enough
to make sexual choices").
358. See infra Appendix, Table E (Prior Sexual Behavior).
359. See LAUFER, supra note 2, at 64; Robayo, supra note 354, at 306-08; Tamar Lewin,
Rape and the Accuser: A Debate Still Rages on Citing Sexual Past, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1993, at
B16; Ivette Mendez, Shielding the Victim, N.J. STAR LEDGER, Aug. 12, 1994, at Al. On August
11, 1994, A. 677 was signed into law amending N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-7, New Jersey's prior
rape shield statute, to reflect issues raised by the Glen Ridge rape case. Subsection (c) of N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-7, was redrawn to eliminate the admission of prior sexual conduct with indi-
viduals other than the defendant as material to "negating the element of force or coercion" and
also to prohibit any evidence of prior sexual conduct "by any lay witness or expert witness." N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-7(c) (West 1995). Subsection (d) was added to restrict the admission of
evidence of prior sexual conduct with the defendant. Such evidence was considered relevant
only "if it is probative of whether a reasonable person, knowing what the defendant knew at the
time of the alleged offense, would have believed that the alleged victim freely and affirmatively
permitted the sexual behavior complained of." Id. § 2C:14-7(d). The definition of "sexual con-
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able to consent to sexual intercourse under any circumstances, the
court's ruling also ensured that she would be judged from a higher
consent standard than her nonretarded counterpart.
c. "Nature and Consequences" and Morality
Critical to the prosecution's case, however, was the related issue
of whether Betty understood the nature and consequences of sexual
intercourse 360-an ironic disregard of the Olivio court's express con-
demnation of the morality and nature and consequences tests.36' With
a contextual approach, a victim's knowledge of the nature and conse-
quences of sexual intercourse may become relevant but only within
the confines of the situation. In no situation, however, would a con-
textual approach require that the victim know the moral and social
consequences of her conduct, the key feature of the morality test. Not
only is there evidence to suggest that a substantial portion of mentally
retarded individuals, including Betty, would not be able to fulfill the
morality test under the best of circumstances (such as a consensual
sexual relationship), but the test once again holds mentally retarded
persons to a higher consent standard than the nonretarded. As this
article earlier showed,3 62 courts may use the morality test either to
prohibit sexual intercourse among the mentally retarded altogether or
to enforce highly questionable moral norms.
The nature and consequences test also may prohibit consensual
sexual intercourse among even the mildly mentally retarded, such as
Betty, who did not meet the test's most basic requirements (e.g.,
knowledge of pregnancy and disease). As this article has discussed,
knowledge of the nature and consequences is so amorphous that even
a substantial portion of nonretarded individuals may not be able to
pass the test. Therefore, a contextual approach would consider nature
duct" was also modified to include gynecological records as evidence that is explicitly inadmissi-
ble under the statute. See id. § 2C:14-7(e). The history of New Jersey's rape shield legislation is
critical for analyzing this evolving chain of developments. See Leigh Bienen, Rape 1, 3 WOMEN'S
Rs. L. REP. 45, 47 (1976) (noting that under both the 1976 rape statute and the original 1796
law, the issue of consent in New Jersey may be addressed through past sexual conduct evidence);
Leigh Bienen, Rape H, 3 WOMEN's RiS. L. REP. 90, 112-13 (1977) (analyzing as a comparison,
Michigan's 1975 rape shield statute); Bienen, supra note 34, at 171 (describing grass-roots lobby-
ing of state legislatures by women's organizations, coordinated nationally by the NOW National
Task Force on Rape); Bienen, supra note 143, at 35 (discussing changes in the definition of rape
to gender-neutral terms following the passage of the 1979 New Jersey rape shield statute; as of
1980, all states had gender-neutral rape shield statutes).
360. See Lefkowitz, supra note 296, at 23 (noting "prosecution sources" stating that
Bolden's testimony regarding Betty's knowledge of the nature and consequences of sexual inter-
course "was crucial to their case because she countered the defense's argument that the young
woman understood the meaning of sex and was capable of resisting unwelcome sexual
advances").
361. One could either criticize the Glen Ridge court for failing to limit the prosecution's
focus or, more realistically, commend the court for acknowledging (however implicitly) that un-
derstanding the "distinctly sexual nature" of the act entails comprehending its nature and
consequences.
362. See supra notes 177-78, 190-242 and accompanying text.
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and consequences only when it appeared likely that an individual may
be vulnerable to serious bodily harm. For example, if Betty seemed
susceptible to having intercourse with an individual (either mentally
retarded or nonretarded) who had AIDS, and evidence suggested that
she could not comprehend the consequences of her sexual conduct
with that individual, then her knowledge of the nature and conse-
quences would be relevant to determining her ability to consent. On
the other hand, a blanket requirement that she know the dangers of
AIDS would most likely prohibit her from having any kind of a sexual
life.
d. Defendant's Knowledge
A contextual approach would consider not only the victim's par-
ticular situation at the time of the crime, but also the defendant's
knowledge in relation to the victim's ability to consent.363 Although a
comprehensive discussion of defendant's knowledge is beyond the
scope of this article, it warrants mention that defendant's knowledge
also has been amorphously defined and inconsistently treated in rape
statutes and case law. 36  As Appendix, Table C shows, for example,
the category "defendant's knowledge of victim's capacity" '365 is either
incorporated as part of the consent element, or constitutes an explicit
element of the sex offense itself, in thirty-six states.366 However, it is
statutorily defined in only six states.367 Other states variously treat
defendant's knowledge as an element of the offense or as an affirma-
tive defense. 3
363. This is a feature of the Illinois totality of the circumstances test. See People v. Whitten,
647 N.E.2d 1062, 1066 (Il1. App. Ct. 1995) (proposing a "totality of the circumstances" test).
364. In the Glen Ridge rape case, for example, the defense contended that experts had of-
fered conflicting reports about Betty's mental abilities over the years, emphasizing that their
clients were "in no better position" to assess her abilities "than any of these people." See
LAUFER, supra note 2, at 49.
365. This category refers only to those state statutes that explicitly mention the defendant's
knowledge of the victim's condition as a factor or prerequisite to a conviction based upon the
literal language of the statutes. Thus, under these statutes, the defendant must know that the
victim is mentally retarded (or defective, etc.) and therefore unable to consent, understand, or
appraise the nature of his or her conduct.
366. These states are: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii,
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Caro-
lina, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Vir-
ginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See infra Appendix, Table C.
367. These states are: Arizona, Delaware, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and Virginia. See infra
Appendix, Table C.
368. As Appendix, Table C shows, of the 14 states that do not incorporate defendant's
knowledge as an element, five allow it as an affirmative defense if the defendant, for example,"reasonably believed" that the victim was capable of consent or did not know of the victim's
condition (Arkansas, Connecticut, Kentucky, New York, Washington). TWo states have the "de-
fendant's knowledge of victim's capacity" as both an element of the offense and as an affirmative
defense (Missouri and West Virginia). Whether the defendant's knowledge is an element of the
offense or an affirmative defense can be crucial given that the prosecution has the burden of
proof in the former instance (as in the Glen Ridge case), whereas the defense has the burden of
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The lack of statutory and judicial guidance allows courts consid-
erable discretion in the extent to which they will rely either on the
defendant's own mental abilities in determining his mens rea369 or on
characteristics of the victim that have no officially recognized associa-
tion with mental retardation. One of the more controversial factors,
for example, concerns the tendency for some courts to emphasize the
victim's actual physical appearance while testifying, oftentimes signi-
fying a court's presumption that, with regard to mental retardation,
"they know it when they see it" and therefore the defendant should
"know" too. In State v. Soura,370 for example, the Idaho Supreme
Court highlighted the victim's "facial expressions consist[ing] of a'sagging jaw, mouth open,"' and tendency to "stare off into space,"'37 1
as evidence of her mental retardation. This prompted a heated retort
from one Justice: "If I did not know better, I would have thought that
the day was long gone when a person's intelligence was judged by a
person's appearance. 372 A contextual approach would require courts
to be educated about matters relating both to consent and mental re-
tardation in an effort to discourage their reliance on such inappropri-
ate physical attributes.373
More appropriate is a court's consideration of the victim's rela-
tionship to the defendant. Although this factor is important in all rape
cases, 374 it becomes a major issue in cases involving a mentally re-
tarded victim because it bears on whether the defendant knew or
should have known that the victim was capable of consent in a partic-
ular situation. Indeed, Betty's mental retardation status accentuated
some of the social and cultural scenarios evident in the defendant and
victim relationships characteristic of the rape of nonretarded teenag-
proof in the latter instance. For example, in New Jersey the prosecution has the burden of
proving that the victim was mentally defective, that she could not consent, and that the defend-
ant knew she could not consent. In New York, however, the prosecution's claim that a victim
could not consent due to mental defectiveness is an affirmative defense to be proven by the
defendant, that is, that he had no knowledge of the victim's incapacity. For an interesting discus-
sion of these differences in the context of the Glen Ridge rape trial, see Judith A. Zirin, What If
It Were Glen Ridge, N.Y.?, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 7, 1993, at 1.
369. See infra Appendix, Table E.
370. 796 P.2d 109 (Idaho 1990).
371. Id. at 115.
372. Id. at 116 (Bistline, J., concurring).
373. A recent planning and educational seminar held for 35 judges on issues related to ge-
netics and genetics research provides a model for educating judges on issues related to consent
and mental retardation. See Sandra Blakeslee, Genetic Questions Are Sending Judges Back to
Classroom, N.Y. TimEs, July 9, 1996, at C1. During the six-day genetics seminar run by the
Einstein Institute for Science, Health and the Courts, judges were trained by 20 scientists who
offered instruction on tasks ranging from hands-on laboratory work to round-table debates on
the kinds of cases or ethical dilemmas that judges would soon be confronting. See id. at C9.
Judges could engage in a similar type of multidisciplinary seminar on mental retardation and
rape so that they would be better prepared to handle evidentiary problems and provide more
precise and accurate jury instructions.
374. For a more thorough discussion of this issue, see FELD & BIENEN, supra note 34, at
102-43; Dripps et al., supra note 144, at 125.
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ers. Like most rape victims, 375 for example, Betty knew her offenders,"gang acquaintance rapists, ' 376 and trusted them in a way she would
not trust a stranger.377 Betty and her offenders, all teenagers, repre-
sented that age group most apt to commit and be victimized by ac-
quaintance rape.378 Lastly, gang acquaintance rapists typically select
victims who are incapacitated in some way, either through alcohol,
drugs, or mental impairment.379  All these factors should bear on a
jury's consideration with a contextual approach.
e. Situational Context and the "Dignity of the Risk"
With a contextual approach, the situational context of the sexual
conduct is the most critical factor for courts to consider. Although the
situational context was relatively underplayed by the Glen Ridge
prosecution, which focused on Betty's mental ability, it was key to
convicting the defendants for aggravated sexual assault (rape) by
force or coercion.380 The Glen Ridge trial court's opinion was never
published,38 ' but in In re B.G. ,382 the appellate division emphasized
the stress of the situation in holding that probable cause existed for
charges that the juveniles used force or coercion when committing a
sexual assault on a person they knew to be "mentally defective,"
thereby supporting a waiver of jurisdiction to adult court.383 Accord-
ing to the B.G. court, Betty was rendered at least temporarily incapa-
ble of consent due to an accumulative set of circumstances indicating
force or coercion, including: (1) one defendant's act of pushing
Betty's head down to his lap after he requested that she perform fella-
tio;384 (2) the vaginal "insertion of foreign objects held by others";385
375. See Dripps et al., supra note 144, at 136; see also LINDA A. FAIRSTEIN, SEXUAL VIO-
LENCE-OUR WAR AGAINST RAPE 129 (1993) (stating that more than 50% of victims who re-
port rapes know their assailants).
376. Betty's rape has been characterized as "gang acquaintance rape." See LAUFER, supra
note 2, at 55. "Acquaintance rape is forced sexual intercourse (or other sexual act) that occurs
between two people who know each other.... Gang rape is forced sexual intercourse by more
than one assailant." PARROT, supra note 222, at 23-24.
377. For a more complete discussion of this issue, see Beverly Balos & Mary Louise Fellows,
Guilty of the Crime of Trust: Nonstranger Rape, 75 MINN. L. REV. 599 (1991).
378. See PARROT, supra note 222, at 36.
379. See WARSHAW, supra note 219, at 103. Scholars suggest that an individual who engages
in acquaintance or date rape is attempting to get what he feels he deserves after a sexual rejec-
tion. See PARROT, supra note 222, at 25. A gang rapist is attempting to affirm his masculinity
within the group. See WARS-AW, supra note 219, at 101.
380. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2a(5)(a) (West 1995) (aggravated sexual assault by force
or coercion); Fleury, supra note 249, at 3 (explaining that although the prosecution focused on
the victim's inability to consent due to mental deficiency, the Appellate Division's ruling in In re
B.G. indicated that "it really doesn't matter: The situation was so overwhelming-and the na-
ture of the conduct committed against her so foul-that the victim was rendered at least tempo-
rarily incapable of saying no").
381. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
382. 589 A.2d 637 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
383. See id. at 638-48.
384. See id. at 641-42.
385. Id. at 644.
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(3) the number of men in the basement;386 (4) threats to tell Betty's
mother about the incident and threats that she might have to leave
school; 38 7 (5) the men's use of Betty's "known attraction" to Paul
Archer as "enticement"; 38 8 and (6) Betty's "history of believing in the
sanctity of secrets in relation to peer acceptance. 389
The situational factors in the Glen Ridge case closely parallel
those occurring nearly four years later in Troutman, North Caro-
lina.39 In Troutman, five young men, between the ages of sixteen and
eighteen, engaged in sexual intercourse two times in two days with a
nineteen-year-old, mildly mentally retarded woman. On the second
day, the men penetrated her with a broom handle, a pipe, and a can-
dle, while videotaping it all in color and sound.3 9 ' Like Betty, the
Troutman victim had limited educational ability. She also occasionally
dated before the incidents and was enrolled in a neighborhood school
where she mixed and socialized with the general school population. 392
Like Betty, the Troutman victim believed that on the days in question,
the men, whom she had known for years, were going to take her on a
date, particularly because she had previously dated one of them.393
Like Betty, the Troutman victim claimed that she had never felt
threatened by the men.394 She went out with them more than once
and did not resist them because she thought she would "get to go
home and it would be all over. '395 Yet unlike the Glen Ridge case,
the Troutman case ended with four of the five men pleading guilty,
and one pleading no contest, to various counts of second-degree rape





390. See State v. Horn, 446 S.E.2d 52,52 (N.C. 1994); B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Rape, Retar-
dation and a Town Aghast, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1993, at A10.
391. See Horn, 446 S.E.2d at 52; Ayres, supra note 390, at A10; Paul Nowell, 5 North Caro-
lina Teens Accused of Raping Retarded Woman-On Tape, L.A. TIMES, July 11, 1993, at A4.
392. See Ayres, supra note 390, at A10. Evidence suggested that the Troutman victim's
functional abilities were somewhat higher than Betty's. At age 15, a school psychologist classi-
fied the Troutman victim as mildly mentally retarded, possessing the "IQ and visual-motor skills
of a nine and one-half year old." See Horn, 446 S.E.2d at 52. A clinical psychologist who tested
the victim one month after the attack testified that her IQ was 73, "the borderline for mild
retardation or for low intelligence." Shannon Buggs, Rape Trial Fails to Answer Questions of
Consent, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 30, 1995, at A3. The defense emphasized that
the victim "appeared normal." She graduated from high school, was employed as a cashier at a
fast food restaurant, and moved from her mother's house to a trailer with her new boyfriend and
five other individuals. Moreover, her class ranking at graduation was higher than the defendant
she had dated. Id.
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the men received prison terms ranging from five to fifteen years.396
Moreover, the victim's sexual past was never revealed.397
Relative to the Glen Ridge case, the Troutman case placed far
less emphasis on the victim's mental abilities and sexual history than
on the situational context of the conduct. This approach comports
with the recommendations of mental health specialists who critiqued
the Glen Ridge prosecution's stereotypical focus on Betty's mental
retardation over and above the situational facts and circumstances.398
As part VI of this article further discusses,39 the situational context
takes on even more importance when an individual resides in an insti-
tution or group home.
With a contextual approach, the situational stress factor also can
be critical for ensuring fairness for defendants and sexual freedom for
victims. For example, if Betty Harris had engaged in "normal" sexual
intercourse with one of the defendants in the basement, that defend-
ant should not be prosecuted if there was no evidence of situational
stress or other indications of force and if Betty had satisfied the con-
sent requirements applicable to nonretarded individuals. The defend-
ant should not be prosecuted even if he were to boast later about the
act and make cruel and derisive comments to Betty. Exposure to
emotional cruelty is a risk that all individuals take when deciding to
engage in any kind of sexually intimate relationship, most particularly
among the young.4°° To so zealously protect Betty from the possibil-
ity of such cruelty under the guise of a rape statute would hold her to
a far higher consent standard based only upon her particular intellec-
tual attributes. It would also deny her the "dignity of the risk," one
principle of the normalization movement premised on the belief that
there is a certain dignity in allowing the mentally retarded to assume
396. See Beverly James, 4 Teens Sentenced in Rape Case That Drew National Attention Ends
with Guilty Pleas for Sex Acts with Retarded Woman, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Oct. 17, 1995, at
1C. Two of the men were sentenced to five years in prison followed by five years probation. A
third man, previously convicted for beating a handicapped person, received a nine-year prison
sentence followed by five years probation. The fourth man was sentenced to 45 days in jail and
five years probation. The fifth man, who had agreed to testify against the others, pled no contest
and was sentenced to 15 years in prison. Id.
397. One legal result of the Troutman case was the Supreme Court of North Carolina's
holding that a trial judge is not authorized to order a victim to submit to a psychological exami-
nation, even when the victim's mental status is an element of the crime charged. Instead, the
defendant can submit evidence rebutting the victim's mental status, for example, by employing a
health expert to evaluate and interpret studies already conducted on the victim. See Horn, 446
S.E.2d at 54.
398. See All Things Considered, supra note 345 (interview with Douglas Biklen, Professor of
Special Education at Syracuse University):
I think in any situation like this, one has to look at the particular facts and ask, in this case,
could she make a judgment? Did she know what was going on? Was she outnumbered?
Was she vulnerable? There are a whole lot of questions that come up before one gets to the
issue of mental retardation.
399. See infra notes 422-75 and accompanying text.
400. See Oberman, supra note 222, at 15.
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the same risks in life as the nonretarded.4 10 This principle presumes,
however, that there is no dignity in treating people as though they
possess capacities that they do not in fact have.4"2
C. Consent, Degrees of Offenses, and Jury Instructions
Some commentators find it troublesome that, in a number of
states, the more general consent statutes fail to distinguish the men-
tally retarded from those unable to consent for other reasons4 03-the
intoxicated or comatose, for example.4°4 On the face, this objection
seems reasonable, particularly in light of mentally retarded individu-
als' situational variations in their capacity to consent and the evolving
nature of their condition. Yet as this article has shown,40 5 first-step
assessments of whether a victim is in fact "mentally retarded" in an
effort to determine his or her capacity to consent, necessarily fuel an
artificially rigid emphasis on IQ and mental retardation labelling.
With a contextual approach, evidence of mental retardation
would constitute only one of a series of factors at issue in a rape case.
Because these other factors typically are not specified in rape statutes,
it would be consistent to exclude from statutory specification "mental
retardation" or any other pejorative label currently encompassing it.
Such exclusion would also appropriately foster the presumption that
most mentally retarded individuals are able to consent to sexual rela-
tions under most circumstances, in contrast to the comatose or heavily
intoxicated who cannot consent in any situation. At the same time,
however, a contextual approach requires that when mental ability
does become relevant in a rape case specific jury instructions should
designate how it should be weighed in light of current knowledge and
definitions, such as those used by the AAMR.
If, as this article proposes, the specific terms encompassing
mental retardation are removed in those state statutes that currently
have them, mentally retarded individuals would then be encompassed
under the general sex offense statutes applicable to the nonretarded.
This aggregation would render irrelevant the statutory differences in
degrees and penalties applicable to sex offenses incorporating men-
tally retarded victims in most states.4 °6 For example, under the Model
Penal Code, rape is ordinarily a felony of the second degree; however,
it is a felony of the first degree if "the actor inflicts serious bodily
injury upon anyone" or the "victim was not a social companion and
401. See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
402. See generally Wright, supra note 35, at 1397 (discussing the role of consent in the law
and its relationship to human dignity).
403. See infra Appendix, Table B.
404. See LAUFER, supra note 2, at 8.
405. See supra notes 143-253 and accompanying text.
406. See infra Appendix, Table C (Offenses & Degrees).
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had not previously permitted him sexual liberties. '40 7 Yet a male who
engages in sexual intercourse with a female other than his wife com-
mits not rape but "gross sexual imposition," a felony of the third de-
gree, if "he knows that she suffers from a mental disease or defect
which renders her incapable of appraising the nature of her con-
duct."408 The latter category arguably would encompass a mentally
retarded woman.
The Model Penal Code's degree distinction does not mean, of
course, that an actor who inflicts serious bodily injury on a mentally
retarded woman could not be prosecuted for rape as a first-degree
felony. But the degree distinction does create an artificially separate
category for mentally retarded individuals that promotes stereotypes
and a presumption of consensual incapacity. Oddly enough, it also
provides an additional statutory hurdle that could potentially preclude
a rape conviction in a case involving a mentally retarded victim in a
way that it would not if the victim were nonretarded, assuming the
facts are the same. In State v. Ortega-Martinez,4° 9 for example, the
defendant appealed a conviction for second-degree rape under the fol-
lowing jury instruction: "A person commits the crime of rape in the
second degree when that person engages in sexual intercourse with
another person by forcible compulsion OR when the victim is incapa-
ble of consent by reason of being mentally incapacitated.4 1 0 Even
though the jurors unanimously agreed on a conviction, the defendant
contended that the jurors failed to specify which of the two alternative
means of committing a rape applied in his case.411 The defendant did
not dispute the sufficiency of the evidence suggesting he committed
second-degree rape by forcible compulsion, given the victim's injuries
and vaginal trauma. Rather, he claimed there was insufficient evi-
dence to show that the victim was mentally incapacitated and there-
fore unable to give consent.412 Although the Supreme Court of
Washington ultimately held that there was sufficient evidence to sug-
gest that the victim was incapacitated and could not consent,413
Ortega-Martinez makes clear that determining a victim's capacity can
be far more difficult than estimating a defendant's use of force.414
407. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(1) (1962).
408. Id. § 213.2(2)(b).
409. 881 P.2d 231 (Wash. 1994).
410. Id. at 234 (emphasis added). In other states, the degree of the offense differs according
to whether the element of the offense is determined by forcible compulsion as opposed to inca-
pacity to consent. See Salsman v. Commonwealth, 565 S.W.2d 638, 640 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978)
(noting that, in Kentucky, forcible compulsion is rape in the first degree whereas incapacity to
consent is rape in the second degree).
411. See Ortega-Martinez, 881 P.2d at 234.
412. See id. at 234-35.
413. See id. at 237-39.
414. See, e.g., People v. Kline, 494 N.W.2d 756, 758-59 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (declining
defendant's contention that the introduction of evidence at trial concerning the plaintiff's mental
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Part of this difference in difficulty may be due to the ambiguity
involved in assessing a mentally retarded victim's capacity to con-
sent.415 In Righter v. State,41 6 the Supreme Court of Wyoming re-
jected the defendant's claim that, because the state's first-degree
statutory section pertaining to mentally retarded victims was so vague,
it should carry instead a third-degree status and penalty similar to that
applied by the Model Penal Code and other states.417 Although the
court listed those states that offered the same first-degree penalty as
that applied in Wyoming,418 the defendant's argument highlights the
vulnerability of a statutory section separating the mentally retarded
from the nonretarded. Ironically, these separate statutes mirror the
way the mentally retarded always have been viewed-as isolated and
segregated individuals perpetually warranting different standards.
This part concludes that a contextual approach would render such
statutory isolation unnecessary. Indeed, this article's proposed test
was derived in part from totality of the circumstances analyses applied
to mentally retarded victim cases prosecuted only under the force and
coercion sections of general sex offense statutes. In those cases, an
individual's mental retardation status constituted only one of a
number of factors that the courts and juries considered in determina-
tions of consent.
In order to curtail any potential vagueness inherent in the contex-
tual approach, courts must provide specific instructions detailing to
juries (1) which factors they should consider in their determinations of
a victim's consent, (2) if necessary, how those factors should be de-
fined (e.g., mental disability), and (3) the weight such factors should
be accorded relative to one another (e.g., situational context should
carry the most weight). The factors that courts could instruct a jury to
consider include many of those listed in Appendix, Table E,4 9 those
used by prior courts with the approval of mental health profession-
als,42 and those that most courts have yet to incorporate sufficiently,
such as situational stress and the victim's ability to consent under
capacity should change the charge against him from one coming under the "force and coercion"
subsection of the statute to one coming under the "incapacity of the complainant" subsection).
415. See generally Parker & Abramson, supra note 127, at 257. As empirical research has
indicated, for example, the standards that courts use for determining a victim's capacity to con-
sent can oftentimes divert a court's attention away from those factors that it considers most
important in rape cases involving nonretarded victims-such as volition-and toward those fac-
tors that are far more amorphous, difficult to gauge, and, for a nonretarded victim, totally irrele-
vant-such as nature and consequences and knowledge of society's morals. See id.
416. 752 P.2d 416 (Wyo. 1988).
417. See id. at 418-19. According to the defendant, the Model Penal Code "accepts this
vagueness because the punishment is lowered precisely because the vagueness is balanced
against the need of society to protect mental deficients." Id. at 419.
418. See iii
419. A number of factors listed in Appendix, Table E, however, should no longer be used in
consent determinations because they are now considered to be outmoded ("mental age") or
irrelevant ("appearance of disability" and "prior sexual behavior").
420. See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
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other circumstances.42' In general, courts should instruct juries to
weigh victims' adaptive abilities over and above their particular IQ.
VI. SEX AND THE INSTITUTIONALIZED MENTALLY RETARDED:
FROM DENIAL TO DESIGNATION
An intriguing issue that courts have yet to confront systematically
is how sexual relations among mentally retarded individuals should be
regulated in the situational context of institutions or residential
homes. This issue is important for two reasons. Such regulation dem-
onstrates the maximum extent to which legal standards can infringe
upon the rights of mentally retarded individuals, and it illustrates the
most complicated dimensions of the contextual approach. Institutions
not only frequently house the more severely mentally retarded, they
can also isolate their residents from community norms and interaction
to a far greater extent than the separation experienced by the nonin-
stitutionalized mentally retarded. This part emphasizes that the
problems of institutionalized mentally retarded individuals constitute
the core of the sexual consent issue.
Liability for the rape and sexual abuse of mentally retarded indi-
viduals placed in institutions or residential homes does not typically
rest with the mentally retarded adults who may be the perpetrators.422
Rather, liability falls on the victims' service providers who are legally
and ethically responsible for protecting their clients from all harm, in-
cluding nonconsensual sexual conduct.423 Such service provider liabil-
ity stems from four potential sources: constitutional law,424 criminal
law,425 tort law,426 and the government licensing of professionals and
421. See supra notes 263-74 and accompanying text.
422. Rape or sexual abuse cases involving mentally retarded adults are unlikely to be prose-
cuted because such persons may be found incompetent to stand trial, or lack criminal responsi-
bility by reason of "mental disease or defect." See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
423. See Stavis, supra note 175, at 6-7; Sundram & Stavis, supra note 223, at 261.
424. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982) (holding a state and its professionals
liable for any "substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or stan-
dards" that fails to protect persons in their custody from harm); Shaw v. Strackhouse, 920 F.2d
1135, 1144-50 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that, in the case of a state institutionalized, profoundly
mentally retarded man who was sexually assaulted twice in 12 days by an unknown assailant,
service providers' "failure to increase [victim's] security or transfer him to another location after
... [the first assault] constituted a failure to exercise professional judgment"); Wyatt v. Stickney,
325 F. Supp. 781, 782-86 (M.D. Ala.) (discussing the boundaries of a constitutional right to treat-
ment by detailing the civil rights applicable to all patients), amended, 324 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D.
Ala. 1971), supplemental op., 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd in part and rev'd in part
sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Michael L. Perlin, Hospitalized Pa-
tients and the Right to Sexual Interaction: Beyond the Last Frontier?, 20 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 517, 520-37 (1993-94) (analyzing the development of patients' sexual rights and the
general public's attitudes toward their sexuality). Less clear is the extent of professional liability
for a constitutional claim of a failure to protect from harm those individuals occupying facilities
that are not directly state-run. See Sundram & Stavis, supra note 149, at 454.
425. See Sundram & Stavis, supra note 149, at 453 (noting that a provider could be charged
with facilitation of a statutory rape or sodomy if that provider either permits or encourages
mentally retarded clients to engage in sexual relations when they are incapable of consenting to
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programs.427 It is beyond the scope of this article to analyze the com-
plex and problematic issues surrounding service provider liability. In-
stead, this part describes briefly some of the controversies these issues
have raised and why a mentally retarded person's institutional or resi-
dential status is critical for inclusion in a contextual approach. Most
clear is the extent to which the conflicting obligations of service prov-
iders (to allow clients their sexual rights yet safeguard them from
harm) mirror the confusion that exists when mentally retarded indi-
viduals reside within the community.428
A. The Fine Line Between Denying and Designating a Sexual Life
Although all mentally retarded individuals are susceptible to sex-
ual harm,429 for a number of reasons those residing in institutions or
residential homes are particularly vulnerable. First, the institutional-
ized experience a disproportionate incidence of sexual abuse or as-
sault,430 especially if they are women or children.43' Second, much of
them, and even if those clients perpetrating the conduct lack the mental capacity to be held
responsible for it).
426. See id. at 454 (emphasizing that tort liability can result from client injury caused by "the
carelessness or negligence of a professional or program to follow established laws, regulations,
professional standards or societal norms," including "a failure to provide education or other
protection from pregnancy or sexually transmitted diseases, or a failure to protect incapacitated
persons from sexual assaults"); see also Shaw, 920 F.2d at 1144-50 (noting the potential for negli-
gent supervision or professional malpractice in a case involving a mentally retarded person who
was unable to consent to sexual conduct but was so inadequately supervised that he was sexually
assaulted); Foy v. Greenblott, 190 Cal. Rptr. 84, 92-95 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (discussing the poten-
tial for a violation of a per se rule designed to protect the mentally disabled, such as a failure to
provide proper sex education and make available birth control and disease protective devices).
427. See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323 (explaining that both the civil and criminal laws defer to
responsible clinical judgment); Sundram & Stavis, supra note 149, at 454 (stating that
"[p]rofessionals are required to comply with the law, regulation and policies of the jurisdiction in
which they practice" and that professionals employed by state programs "are obliged to imple-
ment the policies of the state agency which licenses the programs").
428. See Perlin, supra note 424, at 520 (emphasizing that the subject of sexuality among the
disabled "forces us to consider the extent to which rules that appear intended to protect individ-
uals with mental disabilities by limiting or subordinating their sexual autonomy are actually the
product of a patronizing paternalism toward persons with mental disabilities in institutions");
Stavis, supra note 175, at 6 (explaining that state guidelines firmly suggest that licensed programs
for mentally retarded persons should create their own sexual policies, focusing on two conflicting
obligations: to develop the freedom and abilities of mentally retarded persons who live in their
residential programs and, at the same time, to prevent such persons from being exposed to sex-
ual harm).
429. See supra notes 261-62 and accompanying text.
430. See Sundram & Stavis, supra note 223, at 256. For example, in 1992, 3321 allegations of
abuse or neglect from developmental disability programs were reported to the New York State
Commission on Quality of Care for the Mentally Disabled: 20% (670 cases) were reported from
state institutions and 80% (2651) were reported from community programs. Id. Cases involving
sexual conduct (sexual assaults, supervisory neglect leading to resident-to-resident interaction,
fondling, intercourse, etc.) constituted a substantial subset that comprised 16% of the 670 state
institution cases and 21% of the 2651 community program cases. Id. The New York legislature
mandates that all allegations of abuse or mistreatment of residents of mental hygiene facilities be
reported to the New York State Commission. Id. The enhanced vulnerability of mentally re-
tarded individuals to sexual harm may be due to a number of factors, including deficient commu-
nication skills, social isolation and powerlessness, perceived asexuality, lack of sex education,
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this sexual abuse or assault is directly attributable to the victim's insti-
tutional or residential home placement, given that over one-third of
the assaults are committed by the service providers themselves or
their employees.432 Third, victims in this context perceive themselves
as especially inferior and devalued; therefore, they are less able and
willing to report offenses.433 Fourth, others believe these victims do
and dependence on professionals and other caretakers who are most apt to abuse them. See
Anne Berkman, Professional Responsibility: Confronting Sexual Abuse of People with Disabili-
ties, 7 SEXUALITY & DISABILrT 89, 90 (1984); Charles K. Stuart & Virginia K. Stuart, Sexual
Assault: Disabled Perspective, 4 SEXUALITY & DISABILrTY 246, 246-53 (1981); Valenti-Hein &
Schwartz, supra note 82, at 291.
431. See Sobsey & Doe, supra note 261, at 251. Sexual offenses against disabled individuals
are demographically similar to those found among nonretarded individuals (e.g., predominantly
male offenders and female victims, similarity of relationships of offenders to victims in many
cases). However, the overall incidence of sexual offenses is greater, particularly for women and
children who are more likely to be isolated with potential offenders in institutions or residential
communities. See id. at 251-52. Moreover, cultural and social beliefs make disabled women and
children "doubly attractive" victims; not only are they perceived as being more weak and passive
in society generally, they may have been trained that way in rehabilitation and education pro-
grams. See id. "There is a special relationship between sexuality and aggression for offenders
who abuse disabled women and children. The dynamics between the offender and victim are
shaped by cultural and societal expectations." Id. at 252. Walker-Hirsch claims that because
women in general are often only valued "as a sexual object," this view is even more pronounced
for mentally retarded women because "they don't have the intellectual support and emotional
support that we all have when we do meet people who devalue us and want us to only be sex
objects." LAUFER, supra note 2, at 172.
432. See Berkman, supra note 430, at 89 ("Most sexual abuse is committed by caretakers,
people who are known to the victim, seldom by strangers."). Sobsey and Doe's study of 166
sexual assault reports from disabled victims for offenses occurring between 1960 and 1990, found
the following:
In 56% of the cases, abusers had a relationship to the client similar to those commonly
found among non-disabled victims of abuse [e.g., natural family members, acquaintances,
baby sitters, strangers, dates, step-family members]. In another 44% of the cases, the abus-
ers had a relationship with the victim that appeared to be specifically related to the victim's
disability. Disability service providers (e.g., personal care attendants, psychiatrists, residential
care staff) comprised 27.7% of the abusers, specialized transportation providers comprised
5.4%, and specialized foster parents comprised 4.3% [constituting a total of 37.4%]. Another
6.5% was comprised of other disabled individuals, typically clustered with the victim in a
specialized program. Based on the percentage of offenders that are associated with special-
ized services, it would be reasonable to expect risk to increase by an additional 78% due to
exposure to the "disabilities service system" alone. The extent of this elevation of risk
would be adequate to explain most of the findings of increased incidence among individuals
with disabilities.
Sobsey & Doe, supra note 261, at 248-49. See Berkman, supra note 430, at 90; Stuart & Stuart,
supra note 430, at 246-53; Valenti-Hein & Schwartz, supra note 82, at 291-92. As Berkman
notes, society's equation of sex with privacy can also be detrimental. See Berkman, supra note
430, at 90. "In the sexual arena traditional policy has been based on respect for privacy. Sex has
been seen as a personal matter. Unfortunately, this policy has also promoted the secrecy which
allows sexual abuse to flourish, hidden under a rock of silence." Id.; see also Sundram & Stavis,
supra note 223, at 256 (addressing privacy issues).
433. See Sobsey & Doe, supra note 261, at 252-55 (noting that "[tihis internalized devalua-
tion may be the most insidious and destructive form and help to explain some of the perceived
passivity and reluctance to report among victims with disabilities"). See generally ERrING
GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NoTEs ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY (1963) (suggesting
that stigmatized individuals frequently allow themselves to be victimized because of their per-
ceived devaluation in society). Such feelings are evident among mentally retarded individuals at
all levels of functioning, including the mildly mentally retarded. Lacking social competence as
well as self-worth, the mildly mentally retarded person is more apt to be manipulated and co-
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not desire or need sex education,434 even though sexual behavior is a
significant problem in institutionalized care.435 Finally, these victims
evidence substantially less sexual knowledge than the community-in-
tegrated mentally retarded, and the extent of sexual knowledge they
do acquire declines the longer they are institutionalized.436
These drawbacks have prompted greater efforts to integrate men-
tally retarded individuals into the community, where the risks of abuse
are substantially lower than those risks they encounter in institu-
tions.437 But for those individuals who must remain institutionalized,
a significant number of agencies have responded to incidences of sex-
ual abuse by prohibiting sexual activity altogether either through for-
erced into abusive or inappropriate behavior, oftentimes unaware that their body is a private
part of their self. See MONAT, supra note 137, at 8-9. For example, residential facilities com-
monly have an informal bartering system in which a mildly mentally retarded person may pro-
vide sex in exchange for a trivial item, such as a soda, while not comprehending the incongruity
of the transaction, the right to say "no," and the concept that friendship and sex need not be
purchased. See id. at 8.
434. See Paula J. Hepner, Sexual Expression and the Mentally Retarded: The Lawyer's Role,
2 SEXUALITY & DISABILITY 38, 42 (1979) (explaining that the subject of sexuality and the men-
tally retarded is associated with "two important myths: first, that the retarded are not function-
ing at an intellectual or emotional level high enough for them to want or need sex education, and
second, that the retarded 'know nothing about sex and it will not hurt them to remain igno-
rant'); Sundram & Stavis, supra note 223, at 256 (noting that "[m]isconceptions about the asex-
uality of people with developmental disabilities often have been responsible for depriving them
of access to sex education, which increases their vulnerability to exploitation by others and resul-
tant harm"). Whether or not mentally retarded persons have "sexual rights" to such education is
beyond the scope of this article, although some commentators have urged that such rights should
exist. See, e.g., Winifred Kempton & Emily Kahn, Sexuality and People with Intellectual Disabili-
ties: A Historical Perspective, 9 SEXUALITY & DISABILITY 93, 101 (1991) (outlining one version
of "sexual rights" that includes the right to "receive training in social-sexual behavior that will
open more doors for social contact with people in the community" and the right to "enjoy loving
and being loved by either sex, including sexual fulfillment"). As the United Nations Declaration
on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons has declared, mentally retarded persons have a right
"to such education, training, rehabilitation and guidance as will enable [them] to develop [their]
ability and maximum potential." UNITED NATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF IN-
TERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 141 (1993); see also Heshusius, supra note 138, at 53 (noting that
although sex education in institutions for mentally retarded individuals has improved recently,
such education emphasizes providing factual information about sex in general and does not
teach that sex can be a pleasant and intimate experience).
435. In one nationwide survey of 82 private and public residential institutions, results
showed that of the 84 individuals responding (such as superintendents), 67% stated that "sexual
frustration contributed to a significant or major degree to most retarded people's problems of
adjustment." Thomas J. Mulhem, Survey of Reported Sexual Behavior and Policies Characteriz-
ing Residential Facilities for Retarded Citizens, 79 AM. J. MENTAL DEFICIENCY 670, 672 (1975).
Regardless, most respondents were quite strict with the type of public and private expressions of
sexuality that they allowed. Id.
436. See MONAT, supra note 137, at 51 (noting that mentally retarded individuals are less
likely to have peer and family interactions where sexuality is discussed); Judy E. Hall & Helen L.
Morris, Sexual Knowledge and Attitudes of Institutionalized and Noninstitutionalized Retarded
Adolescents, 80 AM. J. MENTAL DEFICIENCY 382, 382-87 (1976) (reporting results based on the
questionnaire responses of 61 noninstitutionalized and 61 institutionalized mentally retarded ad-
olescents showing that institutionalized adolescents report substantially less access to informa-
tion on sexuality and that they therefore may be more vulnerable to sexual exploitation and the
infringement of their rights when they are released back into the community).
437. See Sobsey & Doe, supra note 261, at 255.
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mal policies or informal procedures, such as curtailing privacy. 38
Either way, many institutions ultimately deny the sexuality of all resi-
dents by failing to make available sex education and training and by
effectively constraining sexual activity "to furtive and secret en-
counters" whenever residents find the opportunity.4 39
Recently, a number of professionals have contended that such
policies not only unconstitutionally limit the fundamental rights of
many mentally retarded individuals, they collide with the professional
obligation to help clients achieve, as fully as possible, "normal"
lives." 0 These professionals also have debunked the primary judicial
tests for capacity to consent, contending instead that even the severely
and profoundly mentally retarded are sexual and can consent to sex-
ual activities.44' Unfortunately, this stance often has neglected to de-
438. See Hepner, supra note 434, at 40 (emphasizing the "paucity of judicial comment on the
issue of the sexual isolation of the retarded"); Sundram & Stavis, supra note 223, at 256-57; see
also Craft, supra note 48, at 22 (discussing the results of a British study finding that one quarter
of nurses in institutions and one-fifth of staff in hostels felt that adult residents should be dis-
couraged from developing sexual relationships); Robert W. Deisher, Sexual Behavior of Re-
tarded in Institutions, in HUMAN SEXUALrrY AND THE MENTALLY RETARDED 145, 145-52 (Felix
F. de la Cruz & Gerald D. LaVeck eds., 1973). According to Deisher's study of sexual behavior
in institutions, 94% of caregivers felt that masturbation was normal and that they were indiffer-
ent to it; yet, 37% said that they would stop clients they found masturbating, and 12% would
punish them for such behavior. Deisher, supra, at 148. In addition, 65% of the attendants would
not allow heterosexual behavior except that which was solely of a social nature, and 50% would
stop clients from kissing and hugging. Id. at 148-49. Indeed, caregivers reported that they were
more likely to stop such behavior if it was done in private rather than in public. Id. at 149. For
more on this issue, see Emily N. Coleman & William D. Murphy, A Survey of Sexual Attitudes
and Sex Education Programs Among Facilities for the Mentally Handicapped, 1 APPLIED RE-
SEARCH IN MENTAL RETARDATION 269, 269-76 (1980) (finding that although most staff members
approved of sex education and private masturbation, many did not approve of sexual behavior
involving partners); Lynda Mitchell et al., Attitudes of Caretakers Toward the Sexual Behavior of
Mentally Retarded Persons, 83 AM. J. MENTAL DEFCENCY 289, 295 (1978) (reporting that a
large percentage of staff members in three residential facilities felt that no sexual behavior
among clients at all was acceptable, even simple physical contact); Gerald J. Murphy, The Insti-
tutionalized Adolescent and the Ethics of Desexualization, in SEXUAL PROBLEMS OF ADOLES-
cENTS LN INSTITUTIONs 27, 31 (David A. Shore & Harvy L. Gochros eds., 1981) (observing that
in institutions for mentally retarded persons, "[g]estures of mutual affection and caring among
residents are strongly discouraged, and such behaviors as touching, holding hands, hugging, kiss-
ing, and/or being alone with a friend are generally held in check by the effective use of group
pressure and a prevailing sexist attitude toward appropriate male/female behavior").
439. See Sundram & Stavis, supra note 223, at 256-57; see also Hepner, supra note 434, at 43
("It is not possible, without professional guidance, to make a successful transition from a sexu-
ally isolated environment, whose outlets for sexual release are restricted to brief public and
private kissing or masturbation, to full sexual experience that may result in marriage or the birth
of children.... [T]he institutionalized retarded must begin by participating in coeducational and
'supervised dating' activities where acceptable sexual behavior in nonthreatening social settings
can be learned.").
440. See Hepner, supra note 434, at 39-40 (stating that the freedom of sexual expression
among mentally retarded individuals should not be diminished in priority relative to their other
rights).
441. See generally Thomas-Robert H. Ames, Guidelines for Providing Sexuality-Related
Services to Severely and Profoundly Retarded Individuals: The Challenge for the Nineteen-Nine-
ties, 9 SEXUALITY & DISABIrr 113 (1991); Ames & Samowitz, supra note 36, at 264; Richard
Card, Sex and the Severely Subnormal, 12 CAMBRIAN L. REV. 17 (1981); Fred Kaeser, Can Peo-
ple with Severe Mental Retardation Consent to Mutual Sex?, 10 SEXUALrry & DIsABILrr 33
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tail explicit guidance to service care providers to deal with the
resulting questions and problems: What are the privacy rights of adult
residents who want to engage in sexual relationships? What are the
rights or obligations of staff to curtail sexual activity between residents
who lack the capacity to consent? What should be the standard for
making sexual capacity determinations, and should it differ from that
applied to the community-integrated mentally retarded? How can a
balance be struck between normalization and the requirement for
staff to report the sexual conduct of their residents? What are the
appropriate kinds of sex education and training programs?" 2 Lastly,
where is the line to be drawn between "denying" a sexual life for the
institutionalized mentally retarded and "designating" it? This last
question can be more fully understood in the context of recent pro-
posals to essentially train the institutionalized mentally retarded on
how they should have sex.
1. Team Monitoring of Sexual Behavior
Mental health professionals have taken several approaches in
their attempts to provide guidelines to regulate sexual behavior
among institutionalized mentally retarded individuals. Some guide-
lines are far more controversial than others. For example, Thomas-
Robert Ames and Perry Samowitz have proposed "an inclusionary
standard" for evaluating the sexual consent of a wide range of the
mentally retarded population along with a Sexuality Rights and Advo-
cacy Committee to review all such clinical determinations." 3 Their
two-category proposal for determining informed consent considers the
client's (1) "knowledge, intelligence, and the ability to make a volun-
tary decision through verbal expression" and (2) ability to communi-
cate "through responsible interpersonal behavior. '"4' In suggesting
various indices for making an informed consent determination, the au-
thors explicitly exclude any reliance on morality or the New York mo-
rality test.445 Yet, despite their noble efforts, the authors' proposals
(1992). The few studies examining the sexual behavior of severely mentally retarded individuals
report that their behavior is similar to that of the general population. See R.R. West, The Sexual
Behaviour of the Institutionalised Severely Retarded, 5 AUSTRALIAN J. MENTAL RETARDATION
11, 11-13 (1979) (reporting that during the course of one month, 15 of the 31 individuals studied
were observed in sex play and seven were involved in sexual intercourse); see also Allan Cham-
berlain et al., Issues in Fertility Control for Mentally Retarded Female Adolescents: L Sexual
Activity, Sexual Abuse, and Contraception, 73 PEDIATRIcS 445, 448 (1984) (concluding from a
1982 review of the records of 87 mentally retarded females who attended a multiservice adoles-
cent clinic that "mildly mentally retarded adolescents are very much like all adolescents with
respect to sexuality [and sexual experiences], and that only occasional adjustments need to be
made for their special needs").
442. See Sundram & Stavis, supra note 223, at 256-57.
443. See Ames & Samowitz, supra note 36, at 265.
444. Id. at 265-66.
445. These indices are based, in part, on a modification of those indices originally published
by the New York State Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities. The au-
thors' primary modification resulted in the elimination of a section focused on "morality," which
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and indices" 6 look strikingly similar to the nature and consequences
test, and even contain some facets of the morality test." 7 Moreover,
the authors emphasize that staff members "continuously monitor" the
mentally retarded person's "responsible" sexual conduct and consent
"[e]ven when... [that] person demonstrates the ability to communi-
the authors replaced with a section on "legality." See id. at 266. "It is our opinion that assuming
that there is a single standard of morality for any community is bound to adversely affect those
whose values and lifestyles might not be congruent with the presumed current norm in that
community." Id.; see also Telephone Interview with Perry Samowitz, Project Director, Young
Adult Institute, New York, N.Y. (June 28, 1996) (critiquing the implications of the morality test).
446. Among the indices the authors recommend for determining informed consent in the
first category of individuals are the following:
-The person's awareness of the nature of the sexual act under consideration and the choice
to engage in or to abstain from the type of sexual conduct under consideration;...
-The person's understanding of how to prevent an unwanted pregnancy and the diseases
that are sexually transmitted;
-The person's understanding of the need for the restriction of sexual behavior as to time,
place, or type of behavior (e.g., public behavior, private behavior, leisure time vs. program-
ming time, holding hands vs. genital touching, etc.); and
-The person's understanding of being at risk in a potentially harmful, abusive, or exploita-
tive sexual situation and being capable of making a reasonable plan for removing himself or
herself from the situation.
Ames & Samowitz, supra note 36, at 266.
With regard to the authors' second category, which includes individuals who "do not
demonstrate the ability to communicate or do not have the intellectual capacity to fully under-
stand many of the indices required" in the first category, the authors suggest "a responsible
sexual behavior standard or communication demonstrating a practical understanding of those
indices in which the following reasonable questions should be viewed and evaluated in each and
every type of situation":
Voluntariness-Is each of the parties able to make a voluntary decision free from coercion?
What is the person's history with regard to making voluntary decisions? Can a person
demonstrate by his or her behavior the ability to discriminate with whom she or he wants, or
does not want, to have sexual relations?...
Avoidance of Exploitation-Are any of the parties in a situation in which others are using
them in a way that they could not be consenting to? Usually, this would involve someone of
a higher level of functioning than the possibly "exploited" party. Also, anyone who has any
type of power or official status (i.e., a staff member) should automatically be considered
exploitative. This does not mean that a person who has mental retardation could not choose
to be with someone of average intelligence, which is their right, but such a situation must be
examined to determine whether it is consensual.
Avoidance of Abuse-Is this a situation where the person is exhibiting a distraught reaction
based upon what is occurring in the context of sexual activity? This could entail psychologi-
cal or physical abuse.
Ability to Stop an Interactive Behavior When Desired-The person must be able to show an
ability to say no when they so desire, either verbally or by body language, such as gently but
firmly pushing the other person away, indicating that they want or need to get out of the
situation by stopping the behavior or leaving. Can a person demonstrate by his or her be-
havior the ability to communicate no and physically remove himself or herself from a sexual
situation that is not desired at that particular time?
Appropriateness of Time and Place-Is the person able to either choose the socially appro-
priate time and place or be prompted to go to the appropriate place or wait for an appropri-
ate time with minimum resistance?
Id. at 266-67.
447. For example, the authors consider "the person's history with regard to making volun-
tary decisions," the person's "ability to discriminate with whom she or he wants, or does not
want, to have sexual relations," and the person's ability "to either choose the socially appropri-
ate time and place or be prompted to go to the appropriate place or wait for an appropriate
time." Id.
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cate informed sexual consent through responsible sexual behavior in a
specific, interpersonal, sexual encounter." 44 8
Such monitoring can take various forms, depending on the ser-
vice care provider's philosophy and tactics. For example, some au-
thors have adopted the concept of "situational capability," which they
claim balances the "philosophical aim of enhancing individual self-ex-
pression" while enabling service providers to protect clients from un-
due harm."49 Case Number One, presented below, illustrates how one
monitoring team applied the concept of situational capability to the
relationship between "Peter" and his companion "Jane," both of
whom are severely mentally retarded.
Case Number One: Peter and JaneFor over five years, Peter engaged in a stable relationship with Jane. Their
relationship did not include sexual intercourse because Peter was known to
be impotent, but it did include other kinds of sexual contact (e.g., kissing and
petting). Peter's tested social age was approximately six years; his score on
the Socio-Sexual Knowledge and Attitudes Test was the lowest of any indi-
vidual judged capable of giving informed consent by the monitoring team.
The monitoring team drew two conclusions about Peter and Jane's sexual
relationship: (1) the probablity of pregnancy and communicable disease was
low because intercourse was unlikely; and (2) the probability of victimization
was low because Peter and Jane had known and liked each other for a long
time. The monitoring team judged Peter capable of giving informed consentto sexual contact with the expectation that he and Jane would not be engag-
ing in intercourse and that Peter's sexual contact would take place exclusively
with Jane.45°
In this situation, Peter was "allowed" a sexual life within the con-
fines of his own physical limits and monogamy. In all respects, the
risk of harm to him, to Jane, or anyone else was very low. Clearly,
Peter would never pass the three primary judicial tests that have been
applied to the community-integrated mentally retarded (morality, na-
ture and consequences, and nature of the conduct). His mental retar-
dation level suggests that he would most likely not even understand
the "distinctly sexual nature" of his behavior, much less its physical,
social, and moral consequences. Yet the authors' concept of situa-
tional capability meshes well with this article's proposed contextual
approach because it considers the sexual conduct within the relative
framework of a safe institutional environment and relationship.
But Peter and Jane are an "easy" case. Far more difficult are
those situations where the individuals are severely or profoundly men-
tally disabled, they are engaging in sexual intercourse (oftentimes with
more than one partner), and it is not always clear that the parties
448. Id.
449. See Niederbuhl & Morris, supra note 253, at 305-06.
450. See id. at 305. The names "Peter" and "Jane" are fictitious.
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"like" each other. Heated debate on how these situations should be
handled reflects the current two extremes on a sexuality rights contin-
uum, what this article calls the "pro-sexuality" and "conservative-sex-
uality" viewpoints.451
2. The "Smile Test" and Third-Party Consent to Sexual Conduct
Fred Kaeser,4 52 one of the most radical proponents of pro-sexual-
ity team monitoring, has proposed what some call the "smile test,"
whereby institutional staff "are thought to be able to interpret a plea-
surable response to sexual activity as consent to it."' 453 He contends
that if the severely mentally retarded show through their behavior
that they want to engage in sexual activity, and their institution's "in-
terdisciplinary team" decides that this activity can improve the quality
of their lives (which typically it should), then the team should provide
third-party consent in the same way it is used in other situations
judged to be in a person's best interest.4 54 Kaeser believes that the
institution's team also should create a "management plan" for negoti-
ating client sexual behaviors to ensure the lowest possible risk of sex-
ual abuse, assault, and rape by applying the same rape-avoidance
strategies used by the nonretarded (i.e., their knowledge, decision-
making abilities, and experience).455
In determining the types of education and training involved in
this strategy, several of the following issues need to be considered:
whether individuals can be instructed to request their sexual wants; if
such individuals are nonverbal, whether they can be trained to use
signs to initiate sexual activity; and whether such individuals can be
trained to use condoms. Kaesar emphasizes that the degree to which
the severely and profoundly mentally retarded can learn such tactics
varies by individual. He provides two examples (Cases Number Two
and Number Three), detailed below, of how such instruction takes
place.456 Case Number Two demonstrates Kaesar's "successful" ef-
forts to teach Edgar and John, both profoundly mentally retarded,
how to have sex with one another by gesturing signs. Case Number
Three illustrates Kaesar's relatively "unsuccessful" efforts to teach
Maryann how to have sex with just one person, given her proclivity to
engage in sexual relations with nearly everyone who requests it. It is
451. See Telephone Interview with Paul F. Stavis, Esq., Counsel to the State of New York
Commission on Quality of Care for the Mentally Disabled in Albany, New York (June 17, 1996)
(describing the pro-sexuality viewpoint).
452. Fred Kaesar is Director of Health Education, Community School District Two, New
York, NY.
453. Stavis, supra note 175, at 7.
454. See Kaesar, supra note 441, at 33-38.
455. See id. at 37-38; see also Hepner, supra note 434, at 44 ("As we have begun to see the
retarded as persons 'capable of benefitting from education' so we must now understand the
retarded also as 'capable of benefitting from intimate human contact.'").
456. See Kaesar, supra note 441, at 40.
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at this point that the interdisciplinary team had to intervene on Mary-
ann's behalf and select Ricky, an appropriate partner for her.
Case Number Two: Edgar and John
Kaesar has claimed success in teaching two profoundly mentally retarded
men, Edgar and John, how to sex with one another by gesturing signs.
Kaesar and his staff accomplished this goal by continual practice and positive
reinforcement which involved having the men practice their "courtship reper-
toire" each evening. For example, a staff member would assist Edgar in
presenting the sign suggesting intercourse to his partner, John. Together with
the verbal cue, "Does John want to have sex?," the staff member would
shake John's head to indicate, "Yes." Kaesar would repeat the phrase, "Yes,
John wants to have sex." Then the staff would escort both Edgar and John to
their bedroom. After entering the bedroom, Kaesar would say to Edgar,
"When John shakes his head 'yes' you may have sex." Kaesar would then
point to the bed. Immediately after this scenario, the staff would remove the
men from the bedroom and the procedure would be repeated, yet this time
with John responding "no" with a shake of his head. Kaesar explained to
Edgar that when John said "no," Edgar could go to his bedroom and mastur-
bate instead. Kaesar would show Edgar the gesture for masturbation while
stroking a penis model and stating, "See Edgar, you can masturbate. No sex
with John, you can masturbate." Edgar learned this type of courtship behav-
ior after practicing it five to ten times daily for approximately two months.
After seven years, Edgard still gestures to John when he wants to have sex
with him.457
Case Number Three: Maryann and Ricky
Kaesar claims he was unsuccessful in his initial attempts to teach Maryann, a
severely mentally retarded woman, not to engage in indiscriminate sex with
the men in her fifty-bed residence. Typically, Maryann would have inter-
course with any man who gave her any kind of "gift"-a comb, a hairpin, a
barette, etc. Kaesar attempted to explain to Maryann that sexual activity"should be confined to those men who she liked and who treated her well."
Because Maryann did not appear able to grasp this concept, an interdiscipli-
nary team convened to assess the degree to which staff may act on Maryann's
behalf. Even though the team "determined that Maryann gave every indica-
tion that she enjoyed her sexual involvement with men" and that she "con-
sented" to the sexual behavior, they also decided that "the potential risks
associated with being involved with so many different men were great
enough to warrant placing certain restrictions upon her." Because the team's
discussions revealed that Maryann "demonstrated a genuine fondness" for
the companionship of Ricky in particular, they agreed that they would con-
sider an arrangement that limited Maryann's sexual interactions to Ricky
only rather than eliminate Maryann's sexual activity altogether. Together
with a behavioral therapist, Kaesar wrote a behavior management plan for
Maryann with several goals in mind: (1) to ensure that Maryann would have
sexual relations only with Ricky; (2) to teach Ricky how to use a condom
457. See id. at 38-39.
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(Maryann had been taking oral contraceptives for several years); and (3) to
teach Maryann and Ricky to wash their genitals after every encounter.
Each time Maryann attempted to engage herself with any of
the men at the residence (e.g., another man entering her room or
her his) staff were instructed to intervene and say, "No, Maryann
you may not have sex with him," and she would be redirected to
another activity. Only when Ricky approached her would she be
allowed sexual opportunity. Staff would say to her, "It is alright
Maryann, it is Ricky," at which point Ricky would be issued a
condom. Staff were asked to monitor each of these encounters in
a minimally restricted manner by listening intermittently by the
door to ensure as [much as] possible that Maryann would not be
harmed. Upon finishing their lovemaking staff would have both
Maryann and Ricky proceed to the bathroom to wash their
genitals. 458
The staff was able to manage this approach "quite well." Mary-
ann engaged in sexual activity only with Ricky although she still at-
tempted to interact sexually with other men.459
B. The Pro-Sexuality Versus Conservative-Sexuality Debate
Kaesar's approach to the encounters between Edgar and John
(Case Number Two) and Maryann and Ricky (Case Number Three)
can best be discussed in terms of the pro-sexuality and conservative-
sexuality debate. According to pro-sexuality advocates, for example,
service care providers should help mentally retarded persons have sex
in the same way that such providers assist the mentally retarded with
other biological functions, such as eating or toileting; to treat sex less
importantly, or to relinquish its availability altogether, is a violation of
mentally retarded individuals' civil rights.46 These proponents claim
that the legal standards in effect for rape effectively prohibit any sex-
ual behavior among those mentally retarded persons who are institu-
tionalized; administrators who allow sexual behavior are "breaking
the law everyday."46' As Kaesar says:
458. Id. at 39.
459. See id.
460. See Hepner, supra note 434, at 42. As Hepner contends, the freedom of sexual expres-
sion among mentally retarded individuals should not be diminished in priority relative to their
other rights:
Institutional personnel, already under enormous pressure to initiate instruction in the most
elementary skills of daily living such as eating, grooming, toilet training and toothbrushing,
and to upgrade physical therapy, speech therapy, and recreation programming, should not
be permitted to obscure their responsibility to end sexual segregation and to establish sex
education programs by arguing that retarded individuals' freedom of sexual association is,
comparatively, less important, and that to accomplish any of the other goals, priorities have
to be set. Our Constitution does not prioritize the rights it guarantees. Civil rights are not
negotiable. Indeed, it is constitutionally impermissible to condition the exercise of one fun-
damental right upon relinquishment of another.
Id.
461. Telephone Interview with Perry Samowitz, supra note 445.
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It should be apparent to anyone who has a reasonable under-
standing of mental retardation that too strict a standard of com-
petency regarding mutual sex behavior has been established. All
the sex education and training in the world will still not afford a
significant number of these people [the ability] to become in-
formed decision makers.462
There are problems, however, with Kaesar's pro-sexuality ap-
proach. While pursuing the commendable goal of preventing harm,
he contravenes any semblance of privacy between those individuals
the interdisciplinary team monitors; the sexual behaviors of both
couples in Cases Number Two and Three appear to be watched con-
tinuously. With regard to Case Number Three's Maryann, the inter-
disciplinary team actually designates her sexual partner, at the same
time listening to her most intimate moments with their pick, Ricky.
At the very least, the team's approach to harm avoidance is perversely
overzealous. Then again, would the law ever call such behavior
consent?
Paul Stavis and others claim that the pro-sexuality proponents
hold "bizarre theories" regarding consent in the belief that the ends
justify the means in encouraging sexual intercourse.4 3 Because some
couples may never engage in sexual intercourse even though they may
be sexual or affectionate in other ways, some mental health profes-
sionals question the reasonableness of Kaesar's assumption that inter-
course is the "end all" of any kind of sexual behavior.4 6 Moreover,
program staff can come dangerously close to criminal facilitation of a
sexual offense for two different reasons: (1) if they encourage sexual
activity between mentally retarded individuals who may not be legally
capable of consent;'6 5 or (2) if they encourage sexual activity which,
appropriately or not, is illegal for even consenting nonretarded
adults.466
462. Kaesar, supra note 441, at 36.
463. Telephone Interview with Paul F. Stavis, supra note 451.
464. See Interview with Lara Beaty, developmental psychologist with an extensive back-
ground working with both severely and mildly mentally retarded individuals, in New York, NY
(Mar. 12, 1996) (noting that, with regard to the profoundly mentally retarded, she "couldn't
imagine any one capable of having sex"); Interview with three staff members at the Shield Insti-
tute, in Queens, New York (June 29, 1996). The Shield Institute is a day treatment facility that
offers one of the most comprehensive habilitation programs in New York City, serving individu-
als with developmental disabilities ranging from preschool age through adulthood. The three
staff members interviewed were: Pam Boyle, M.A., Clinical Coordinator of Sexuality Services;
Jeannie Matich-Maroney, Ph.D., Associate Director of Clinical Services; and Mike Crocker,
M.A., Clinical Director and also Director of the New York City Abuse and Disabilities Network.
465. See Interview with three staff members at the Shield Institute, supra note 464 (describ-
ing the pro-sexuality viewpoint).
466. See Green, supra note 224, at 546 (noting that one-half of the states and the District of
Columbia penalize homosexuality and 13 states and the District of Columbia penalize fornica-
tion); see also Eskridge, supra note 34, at 60-67 (discussing the law of sexual consent from a gay
perspective).
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Stavis is most concerned with the ambiguous type of behavior in-
corporated under the smile test, which he believes would not meet
legal standards.467 Moreover, staff determinations of which behavior
constitutes a "smile" are entirely discretionary. 4' Irrespective of the
pro-sexuality stance, some program staff do not take seriously acts
that would be viewed as criminal if committed by the nonretarded,
most particularly, incidents involving lower mentally functioning wo-
men and higher mentally functioning men. 69 Stavis provides his own
case example (Case Number Four) of what he considers to be the ex-
ploitative involvement between "Sally" and "Roger," given the imbal-
ance in their respective levels of functioning.
Case Number Four: Sally and Roger
Sally, a profoundly mentally retarded nonverbal woman residing in a state
institution, was found naked in a stairwell with Roger, a moderately mentally
retarded, "verbal, relatively 'street-wise' and sexually active man." Roger,
who was fully clothed, was found stuffing Sally's underwear behind a pipe
near the stairwell door. Many other pairs of underwear belonging to female
residents were also found behind the pipe. Three of those residents were
considered incapable of consenting to sexual activity. Although Roger in-
formed a physician that he had engaged in sexual intercourse with Sally on
the day he was discovered and many other occasions, there was no physical
evidence to confirm his statement. The institution's staff concluded that even
though Sally was unable to consent to sexual relations, there was no sexual
abuse and no incident to report because sexual intercourse most likely had
not occurred. Moreover, some staff thought Sally capable of rejecting un-
wanted sexual advances and expressed concern for her sexual privacy.
"There was no follow-up regarding the other underwear found and no special
precautions were taken to protect any of the women from further incidents of
this nature., 470
Stavis finds Sally's situation troublesome in part because of the
imbalance between her mental retardation level compared to Roger's,
as well as staff determinations that Sally was unable to consent to sex.
Yet, Stavis offers no clear recommendations for how such activities
should be handled in the future, apart from his belief that they should
be reported. For example, are staff now expected to monitor continu-
ously Sally's and Roger's whereabouts to ensure that they no longer
interact sexually, either between themselves or with others? More-
467. See Stavis, supra note 175, at 7.
468. See Interview with three staff members at the Shield Institute, supra note 464 (empha-
sizing that there must be "something more" to the smile test so that it can operate in practice).
469. See Telephone Interview with Paul F. Stavis, supra note 451. For more on this problem,
see NEW YORK STATE COMM'N ON QUALITY OF CARE FOR THE MENTALLY DISABLED, INVESTI-
GATION INTO ALLEGATIONS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT AT WESTERN NEW YORK Ci-ML-
DREN'S PSYCHIATRIC CENTER: FINAL REPORT (1990); NEW YORK STATE COMM'N ON QUALITY
OF CARE FOR THE MENTALLY DISABLED, SEXUALITY AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES: AN
INVESTIGATION OF SEXUAL INCIDENTS AT BERNARD FINESON DEVELOPMENTAL CENTER (1991).
470. Sundram & Stavis, supra note 149, at 449. The names "Sally" and "Roger" are
fictitious.
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over, Stavis's analysis implies that Sally can never have sex with any-
one under any circumstances, a stance beholden to current legal
standards that fail to address sexual behavior among the institutional-
ized. For example, is it morally appropriate to hold the institutional-
ized mentally retarded to the same consensual standards that are
applied to the community-integrated mentally retarded? Could Sally
be trained in a way to indicate her unwillingness to engage in sexual
intercourse? As prior parts of this article have shown,471 community-
integrated mentally retarded individuals are held to a higher standard
of consent relative to nonretarded persons, particularly if they are fe-
male. This standard is higher still for those mentally retarded females
who are institutionalized. Lastly, Stavis never acknowledges the lim-
ited research showing the benefits of allowing sexual expression in an
institution in terms of (1) an improvement in residents' overall adjust-
ment levels and a decrease in their aggressive or violent conduct 472
and, perhaps most importantly, (2) indications that when the institu-
tionalized are released into the community they are less vulnerable to
sexual attack and more equipped to interact socially.473
Both the pro-sexuality and conservative-sexuality views also re-
flect clear moral preferences. Kaesar's team prefers that Maryann be
monogamous (even though she passes the smile test with everyone), is
troubled that she exchanges sex for trinkets, and teaches her that sex
is reserved only "for men who treat her well." One pro-sexuality pro-
fessional critiqued the "love committees" in some institutions where
select staff decide that individuals can engage in sexual conduct only if
they appear to be "in love" with their partner.474 Yet, Case Number
Three's interdisciplinary team determined that Maryann can have sex
471. See supra notes 167-253 and accompanying text.
472. See Ellen Anderson Brantlinger, Influencing Staff Attitudes, in MENTAL HANDICAP
AND SEXUALITY, supra note 48, at 177, 179 (contending that the suppression of appropriate
channels of sexuality among mentally retarded individuals may lead to behavior that is "danger-
ous or disturbing," as well as to depression, lack of grooming and personal hygiene, and
"[fleelings of resentment, despair, frustration, and loneliness"); John W. Money, Some Thoughts
on Sexual Taboos and the Rights of the Retarded, in HUMAN SEXUALITY AND THE MENTALLY
RETARDED, supra note 438, at 3, 3-11 (finding that sexually active mentally handicapped individ-
uals are better adjusted and less aggressive than their sexually inactive peers); David A. Shore &
Harvy L. Gochros, Introduction, in SEXUAL PROBLEMS OF ADOLESCENTS IN INSTITUTIONS xiii,
xiv (David A. Shore & Harvy L. Gochros eds., 1981) (emphasizing that attempts to suppress
sexual behavior in institutions are not only ineffective, they may backfire because the suppressed
behavior "may manifest itself in less acceptable, more hidden and sometimes more violent
ways"); West, supra note 441, at 11-13 (reporting a decrease in aggression among the severely
and profoundly institutionalized mentally retarded when residents are allowed to be sexually
active).
473. For more on this issue, see Paul R. Abramson et al., Sexual Expression of Mentally
Retarded People: Educational and Legal Implications, 93 AM. J. MENTAL RETARDATION 328,
328-34 (1988); Brantlinger, supra note 472, at 177; Craft, supra note 48, at 20-26; Lynda K.
Mitchell, Intervention in the Inappropriate Sexual Behaviour of Individuals with Mental Handi-
caps, in MENTAL HANDICAP AND SEXUALITY, supra note 48, at 207, 207-37; Michelle Dobraw-
sky, Selected Case Histories of Developmentally Disabled Individuals (July, 1996) (on file with
the author).
474. See Telephone Interview with Perry Samowitz, supra note 445.
[Vol. 1997
HeinOnline  -- 1997 U. Ill. L. Rev. 392 1997
RAPE AND MENTAL RETARDATION
with only one person, and they designated the person she seemed to
"like" the most.Although the contextual approach incorporates institutional sta-
tus as one of its most important factors, this article suggests that this
approach need not be applied on the level of the pro-sexuality/con-
servative-sexuality debate. By acknowledging institutional status, the
contextual approach accepts per se the premise that even severely and
profoundly mentally retarded individuals can consent to sexual activ-
ity. How the institutional context influences determinations of con-
sent will be considered in light of the particular facts characterizing
the conduct.
The contextual approach recognizes that current legal definitions
of consent will simply not apply in many of the situations involved in
an institutional context, such as those discussed in Cases Number One'
through Four. In those situations, moral decisions will have to be
made and current legal notions discarded. Peter and Jane, Edgar and
John, Maryann and Ricky are not consenting in the legal sense. Yet, it
may well be argued that they pass a morally acceptable test. This test
does not require that they understand society's moral views of sexual
conduct before they can consent, but rather that it would be morally
unacceptable to prohibit them from engaging in relations that appear
to provide them happiness. 75
This discussion suggests that morals and moral choices pervade
determinations of sexuality, rape, and mental retardation at every
level of the legal system-legislative, judicial, and institutional.
Neither a contextual approach nor a court's jury instructions can elim-
inate moral considerations in a rape case, nor should they. But they
can discourage the inappropriate ways that morals may be used to
prohibit the sexual conduct of mentally retarded females or to unfairly
convict their nonretarded partners. In these instances, the concept of
"dignity of the risk" imparts one guiding philosophy, at least until we
decide that there may be no "dignity" when the "risk" involved can be
rape.
VII. CONCLUSION
This article addresses the question of when sexual relations with a
mentally retarded individual should be deemed nonconsensual and
therefore criminal. Throughout history, persons with mental retarda-
tion, especially women, have been viewed in contradictory ways-
either as asexual and childlike or as hypersexual and dangerous, capa-
ble of perpetuating offspring "as defective as themselves." Little has
changed in the present day, as the recent Glen Ridge rape case shows.
Consent determinations, difficult in any rape case, become the source
475. See State v. Olivio, 589 A.2d 597, 604 (N.J. 1991) ("Like all other citizens, the mentally
retarded have the right to pursue happiness.").
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of stigma and stereotype when the victim happens to be mentally
retarded.
This article contends that courts applying contemporary rape stat-
utes typically hold mentally retarded individuals to a higher consent
standard than their nonretarded counterparts because they presume
that mental retardation in itself may preclude an ability to consent.
This article suggests, however, that under appropriate circumstances,
most mentally retarded persons can engage in consensual sexual rela-
tions. It therefore proposes a contextual approach to consent deter-
minations that incorporates a wide range of factors, most particularly
modern knowledge about the adaptive capabilities of mentally re-
tarded individuals as well as the situational context of the sexual con-
duct. It suggests that such an approach bypasses the inappropriate
moral judgments reflected in many state consent tests, as well as the
pejorative perceptions of mentally retarded persons that have pre-
vailed in state legislatures, the courts, and society. A contextual ap-
proach also balances the competing interests inherent in protecting a
vulnerable class of individuals while allowing them their right to en-
gage in consensual sexual relationships.
The following are a selected number of recommendations that
this article proposes:
1. Apply a Contextual Approach to Determinations of Consent.
A contextual approach would focus on the situational context of the
sexual conduct as well as recent research on mental retardation. A
victim's mental ability would constitute only one of a number of fac-
tors courts would consider in determining consent. A contextual ap-
proach would also enrich current concepts of consent that are applied
to nonretarded individuals in rape cases.
2. Provide Specific Jury Instructions. Courts must provide juries
specific instructions to limit any potential vagueness inherent in the
contextual approach. Jury instructions must detail (a) which factors
jurors should evaluate in their determinations of consent; (b) if neces-
sary, how those factors should be defined (e.g., mental disability); and
(c) the weight such factors should be accorded relative to one another.
The factors that a court would instruct a jury to consider include many
of those listed in Appendix, Table E of this article, those used by prior
courts with the approval of mental health professionals, and those that
most courts have yet to incorporate sufficiently, such as situational
stress and the victim's ability to consent under other circumstances.
3. Encompass Mentally Retarded Individuals Under the General
Sex Offense Statutes. When courts take first-step assessments of
whether in fact a victim is mentally retarded in an effort to determine
that victim's consent, they artificially emphasize that victim's IQ and
the mental retardation label. By excluding from statutory specifica-
tion the term mental retardation or any other pejorative label cur-
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rently encompassing it, state legislatures would appropriately foster
the presumption that most mentally retarded individuals are able to
consent to sexual relations under most circumstances. Moreover, the
victim's level of mental functioning would acquire less significance.
4. Remove Statutory Differences in Degrees and Penalties Based
upon Mental Retardation. If the specific terms encompassing mental
retardation are removed in those state statutes that currently have
them, mentally retarded individuals would then be encompassed
under the general sex offense statutes applicable to the nonretarded.
This aggregation would render irrelevant the statutory differences in
degrees and penalties applicable to sex offenses incorporating men-
tally retarded victims in most states. It also would eliminate an addi-
tional statutory hurdle that potentially could preclude a rape
conviction in a case involving a mentally retarded victim in a way that
it would not if the victim were nonretarded, assuming the facts are the
same.
Although courts have applied vague, unworkable tests in deter-
mining a mentally retarded victim's capacity to consent, it would be
unrealistic to suggest that a rigid, precisely defined standard could
ever be effective in so amorphous an area as sexual relations. This
article does not propose a rigid standard. Rather, it strives to reflect
current research on mental retardation and rape law in an effort to
more appropriately guide courts and juries on those factors they
should consider in cases involving both mentally retarded and
nonretarded individuals. As a result, it offers a contextual approach
that does not impose a more stringent social, moral, or sexual stan-
dard on mentally retarded individuals. The mental retardation label
should only help, not hurt, such individuals.
Ed Murphy, a mentally retarded adult, describes the dilemma:
It is very hard to go through life with a label. You have to fight
constantly. Retarded is just a word. We have to separate individ-
uals from the word. We use words like "retarded" because of
habit-just like going shopping every week and getting up in the
morning. The word "retarded" must be there if you are going to
give people help, but what the hell is the sense of calling someone
retarded and not giving them anything?476
476. BOGDAN & TAYLOR, supra note 81, at 92.
N~o. 21
HeinOnline  -- 1997 U. Ill. L. Rev. 395 1997
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
APPENDIX
TABLE A




Retarded: IQ level of
50-55 to about 70
Moderately Mentally
Retarded: IQ level of
35-40 to 50-55
Severely Mentally
Retarded: IQ level of
20-25 to 35-40
Profoundly Mentally
Retarded: IQ level of
below 20 or 25
Characteristics of Sexual Expression
Similar to average or normal psychosocial-sexual
behavior in society
Explores, adapts, controls sexual impulses and urges
in similar ways as majority of society
Responds to verbal modes of sex education/sex
counseling/sex therapy
Capable of developing appropriate adaptive skills
with current sex education/sex counseling/sex therapy
methods
Secondary sexual characteristics might be delayed
Adaptive and psychosocial-sexual behavior not readily
accessible to individual
Functions more on a primary reward and primitive
reinforcement system level
May respond to verbal mode of sex education/sex
counseling to develop more appropriate adaptive
behavior; however, may require techniques of
behavior modification systems to be effective
Very poor control of sexual impulses
Lack of development of adaptive psychosocial-sexual
behavior
Limited ability to predict or to foresee consequences
of sensual/sexual behavior
Problems comprehending societal rules, especially
private versus public, and developing adaptive
behavior in these areas
Techniques of behavior modification may be most
effective in creating change in this group
Function primarily by having basic needs met
Very little adaptive behavior
Predominantly reactions are impulsive
Limited ability to predict or foresee consequences of
sensual/sexual behavior
Minimal recognizable adaptive skills
Pleasure seeking frequently in self-stimulating way
Often masturbates excessively or in harmful way
Techniques of behavior modification must be used to
affect change
477. MONAT, supra note 137, at 3-4 (verbatim depictions of sexual expression); DSM-IV,
supra note 96, at 40 (IQ levels).
[Vol. 1997
HeinOnline  -- 1997 U. Ill. L. Rev. 396 1997
RAPE AND MENTAL RETARDATION
TABLE B
STATE STATUTORY TERMS OR CATEGORIES THAT




Alabama "Incapable of consent" by being "mentally defective." ALA.
CODE § 13A-6-70(c)2 (1994). "Mentally defective" means a
disease or defect which renders him incapable of appraising
nature of conduct. Id. § 13A-6-60(5).
Arkansas "Incapable of consent" if "mentally defective" and such defect
renders him incapable of understanding the nature and
consequences of sexual acts. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-101(3)(A)
(Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995).
Connecticut "Mentally defective" means mental disease or defect which
renders such person incapable of appraising the nature of their
conduct. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-65(4) (West 1994).
Florida "'Mentally defective' means a mental disease or defect which
renders a person temporarily or permanently incapable of
appraising the nature of his or her conduct." FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 794.011(1)(b) (West 1992 & Supp. 1997).
Hawaii "Mentally defective" means a disease, disorder, defect which
renders him incapable of appraising the nature of his conduct.
HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-700 (1994).
Maryland "Mentally defective" means (1) mental retardation or (2)
mental disorder, either temporary or permanent, which renders
the victim substantially incapable of appraising the nature of his
or her conduct, or to communicate unwillingness. MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, § 461(b) (1996).
Mississippi Mentally defective "is one who suffers from a mental disease,
defect or condition which renders that person temporarily or
permanently incapable of knowing the nature and quality of his
or her conduct." Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-97(b) (1994).
Montana Sexual intercourse without consent-"without consent" means
victim is incapable of consent because he is mentally defective.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-501(1)(b)(i) (1995). "Mentally
defective" means that a person suffers from a mental disease or
defect that renders the person incapable of appreciating the
nature of his conduct. Id. § 45-2-101(39).
New Hampshire* "[Victim] is mentally defective and defendant knows or has
reason to know." N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 632-A:2(I)(h), -
A:3(I), -A:4 (1996).
New Jersey "Mentally defective" means "a condition in which a person
suffers from a mental disease or defect which renders that
person temporarily or permanently incapable of understanding
the nature of his conduct, including but not limited to, being
incapable of providing consent." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-1(h)
(West 1995).
478. An asterisk indicates that the statute has no separate section for definitions.
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Person is deemed incapable of consent to a sexual act if the
person is mentally defective. OR REV. STAT. § 163.315(2)
(1990). "'Mentally defective' means that a person suffers from
a mental disease or defect which renders the person incapable
of appraising the nature of the conduct of the person." Id.
§ 163.305(3).
"'Mentally' defective means that a person suffers from a mental
disease or defect which renders the person temporarily or
permanently incapable of appraising the nature of his or her
conduct." S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-651(e) (Law. Co-op. 1995).
"Mentally defective" means that the person "suffers from a
mental disease or defect which renders that person temporarily
or permanently incapable of appraising the nature of his
conduct." TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-501(3) (1991).
Lack of consent results from incapacity to consent and such
incapacity exists when such person is mentally defective. W.
VA. CODE § 61-8B-2(b)(2), (c)(2) (1992). "'Mentally defective'
means that a person suffers from a mental disease or defect
which renders such person incapable of appraising the nature of
his conduct." Id. § 61-8B-1(3) (Supp. 1996).
Mentally Disabled
Mentally disabled or deficient such that consent cannot be
given. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-1(3) (West 1986 & Supp.
1996).
"Mental disability" that is "reasonably apparent or known to
defendant and which in fact renders the other substantially
incapable of appraising the nature of the contact involved or of
understanding that the person has the right to deny or
withdraw consent." ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A,
§§ 253(2)(C), 255(1)(D) (West 1983 & Supp. 1996).
"Mental disability which renders the [victim] incapable of
consent." 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3121(5), 3123(5),
3125(6), 3126(a)(6) (West Supp. 1996).
"Mentally disabled" means "a person who suffers from a
mental impairment which renders that person incapable of
appraising the nature of the act." R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-1(4)
(1994).
Mentally Retarded
"Mentally retarded" for aggravated criminal sexual assault and
aggravated sexual abuse means victim must be an
institutionalized severely or profoundly mentally retarded
person. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-14(c), 12-16(e) (West
1993 & Supp. 1996). Incapable of consent for criminal sexual
assault and criminal sexual abuse if "unable to understand the
nature of the act or unable to give knowing consent." Id. 5/12-
13(a)(2), 12-15(a)(2).
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Kentucky "Incapable of consent" is defined in "Lack of Consent" statute.
Lack of consent results from incapacity to consent and a person
is deemed incapable of consent when he is mentally retarded or
suffers from a mental illness. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 510.020(2)(b), (3)(b) (Michie 1990). "Mentally retarded"
means "significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning
existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and
manifested during the developmental period." Id. § 510.010(4)
(Michie Supp. 1996).
Massachusetts* Included in definition of indecent sexual assault and battery on
a mentally retarded person, knowing such person to be
mentally retarded. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 13F (Law. Co-
op. 1992 & Supp. 1996).
Vermont "Without consent" means where the actor "knows that the
other person is mentally incapable of understanding the nature
of the act.., due to a mental illness or mental retardation as
defined in § 3061 of Title 14." VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 3254(2)(A)-(D) (Supp. 1996). "Mental retardation" means
significantly subaverage intellectual functioning which exists
concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior. Id. tit. 14,
§ 3061(4) (1989).
Mentally Incapable/Mental Incapacity
Alaska "Mentally incapable" means "a mental disease or defect that
renders the person incapable of understanding the nature or
consequences of the person's conduct." ALASKA STAT.
§ 11.41.470(4) (Michie 1996).
Nebraska* "Mentally incapable" of resisting or appraising the nature of his
or her conduct. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-319(1)(b), -320(1)(b)
(1995).
Nevada* "(V)ictim is mentally... incapable of resisting or
understanding the nature of his conduct." NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 200.366(1) (Michie 1988 & Supp. 1995).
South Dakota* Incapable because of a "mental incapacity" of giving consent to
such act. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-22-1(3), -7.2 (Michie 1988
& Supp. 1996).
Virginia "Mental incapacity" means that the condition of the victim
existing at the time of the offense prevents the victim from
understanding the nature or consequences of the sexual act
involved in such offense. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.10(3)
(Michie 1996).
Mental Disease or Defect
Delaware "Without consent" means defendant knows that the victim
suffered from a mental illness or mental defect which rendered
the victim incapable of appraising the nature of the sexual
conduct. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 761(g)(3) (1995).
Kansas Incapable of consent because of mental disease or defect. KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3502(a)(1)(C), -3506(a)(3)(C), -3518(a)(3)
(1995).
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Missouri "[Consent] may be express or implied. Assent does not
constitute consent if: (a) It is given by a person who lacks the
mental capacity to authorize the conduct charged to constitute
the offense and such mental incapacity is manifest or known to
the actor; or (b) It is given by a person who by reason of...
mental disease or defect.., is manifestly unable or known by
the actor to be unable to make a reasonable judgment as to the
nature or harmfulness of the conduct charged to constitute the
offense . . . ." Mo. ANN. STAT. § 556.061(5) (West Supp. 1997).
North Dakota* Mental disease or defect which renders him or her incapable of
understanding the nature of his or her conduct. N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 12.1-20-03(1)(e), 12.1-20-07(1)(b) (1985 & Supp. 1995).
Wisconsin "The following persons are presumed incapable of consent but
the presumption may be rebutted by competent evidence,
subject to the provisions of § 972.11(2): . . . (b) A person
suffering from a mental illness or defect which impairs capacity
to appraise personal conduct." Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(4)(b)
(West 1996).
Developmental Disability
California Incapable of consent because of a "mental disorder or
developmental ... disability." CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 261(a)(1),
286(g), 288a(d), 289(b)-(c) (West 1988 & Supp. 1996).
Wyoming* Victim through a mental deficiency or "developmental
disability" is incapable of appraising the nature of the victim's
conduct. WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-2-302(a)(iv), -303(b), -305
(Michie 1988).
Unsoundness of Mind
Idaho* Incapable through "unsoundness of mind" of giving consent.
IDAHO CODE §§ 18-6101(2), -6108(1) (Supp. 1996).
Louisiana* Victim is incapable through "unsoundness of mind," idiocy, or
imbecility of giving consent or understanding the act. LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 14:43(A)(2), :89.1(A)(4), :93.5(A)(4) (West 1986
& Supp. 1996).
Oklahoma* Incapable through mental illness or any "unsoundness of mind"
of giving legal consent regardless of the age of the person
committing the crime. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 888(B)(2),
1111(A)(2), 1114(A)(2) (West 1983 & Supp. 1997).
Without Consent
Arizona "Without consent" includes the category of incapable of
consent by reason of mental disorder or any impairment of
cognition. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1401(5)(b) (West 1989
& Supp. 1996).
[Vol. 1997
HeinOnline  -- 1997 U. Ill. L. Rev. 400 1997
RAPE AND MENTAL RETARDATION
Texas "Without consent" means the actor knows that as a result of
mental disease or defect the other person is at the time of the
sexual assault incapable either of appraising the nature of the
act or of resisting it. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(b)(4)
(West 1994 & Supp. 1997).
Utah "Without consent"-if the actor knows that as a result of
mental disease or defect, the victim is at the time of the act
incapable either of appraising the nature of the act or of
resisting it. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(6) (1995).
Multiple Terms or Categories
Iowa* "Mental defect or [mental] incapacity which precludes giving
consent or if victim lacks the mental capacity to know the right
or wrong conduct in sexual matters." IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 709.1(2) (West 1993).
Michigan "Developmental disability means an impairment of general
intellectual functioning or adaptive behavior which meets the
following criteria [criteria omitted]." MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 750.520a(b) (West 1991). "Mentally disabled means that a
person has a mental illness, is mentally retarded, or has a
developmental disability." Id. § 750.520a(e). "Mentally
incapable means that a person suffers from a mental disease or
defect which renders that person temporarily or permanently
incapable of appraising the nature of his or her conduct." Id.
§ 750.520a(f). "Mentally retarded means significantly
subaverage general intellectual functioning which originates
during the developmental period and is associated with
impairment in adaptive behavior." Id. § 750.520a(h).
New York Lack of consent results from incapacity to consent and a person
is deemed incapable of consent when he is mentally defective.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1997).
"Mentally defective means that a person suffers from a mental
disease or defect which renders him incapable of appraising the
nature of his conduct." Id. § 130.00(5).
North Carolina "Mentally defective" means "(i) a victim who suffers from
mental retardation, or (ii) a victim who suffers from a mental
disorder, either of which temporarily or permanently renders
the victim substantially incapable of appraising the nature of his
or her conduct, or of resisting the act of vaginal intercourse or
a sexual act, or of communicating unwillingness to submit to
the act of vaginal intercourse or a sexual act." N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-27.1(1) (1993).
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Washington "Developmental disability" means a "disability attributable to
mental retardation, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, autism, or another
neurological or other condition of an individual found by the
secretary to be closely related to mental retardation or to
require treatment similar to that required for individuals with
mental retardation, which disability originates before the
individual attains age eighteen, which has continued or can be
expected to continue indefinitely, and which constitutes a
substantial handicap to the individual." WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 71A.10.020(2) (West 1992). "'Mental disorder' means
any organic, mental, or emotional impairment which has
substantial adverse effects on an individual's cognitive or
volitional functions." Id. § 71.05.020(2).
Other Terms or Catgories Not Used Elsewhere
Colorado* Actor knows the victim is incapable of appraising the nature of
his or her conduct. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-3-403(1)(c), -
404(1)(b) (West 1989).
Georgia Drake v. State, 236 S.E.2d 748, 750-51 (Ga. 1977) (holding that
constructive force is found when the victim is mentally unable
to consent to the sexual act, for example, a state of being
mentally incompetent).
Minnesota* "Mentally impaired" means that "a person, as a result of
inadequately developed or impaired intelligence ... lacks the
judgment to give a reasoned consent to sexual contact or to
sexual penetration." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.341(6) (West
1987).
New Mexico "Force or coercion" means the perpetrator knows or has reason
to know that the victim suffers from a mental condition that
renders the victim incapable of understanding the nature or
consequences of the act. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10A(4)
(Michie 1994).
Ohio* Ability to resist or consent is substantially impaired because of a
mental condition. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.02(A)(1)(c),
.03(A)(2), .05(A)(5), .06(A)(2), .12(A)(1)(c) (Anderson 1996).
[Vol. 1997
HeinOnline  -- 1997 U. Ill. L. Rev. 402 1997
RAPE AND MENTAL RETARDATION
TABLE C
STATE STATUTORY DEFINITIONS OF THE ELEMENTS OF
SEX OFFENSES
State Statutory Definitions
Alabama Offenses & Degrees:
Rape 2nd: ALA. CODE § 13A-6-62(a)(2) (1994).
Sodomy 2nd: Id. § 13A-6-64(a)(2).
Sexual abuse 2nd: Id. § 13A-6-67(a)(1).
Consent: Not defined
Defendant's Knowledge of Victim's Capacity: Not mentioned
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned
Alaska Offenses & Degrees:
Sexual assault 1st: ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.410(a)(3) (Michie
1996).
Sexual assault 2nd: Id. §§ 11.41.420(a)(2), .420(a)(3)(A).
Sexual assault 3rd: Id. § 11.41.425(a)(1).
Consent: Not defined
Defendant's Knowledge of Victim's Capacity: Element of the
offense
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned
Arizona Offenses & Degrees:
Sexual abuse: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1404(A) (West
1989 & Supp. 1996).
Sexual assault: Id. § 13-1406(A).
Consent: Not defined
Defendant's Knowledge of Victim's Capacity:
Id. § 13-1401(5)(B): "'Without consent' includes ... (b) The
victim is incapable of consent by reason of mental disorder
... and such condition is known or should have reasonably
been known to the defendant."
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned
Arkansas Offenses & Degrees:
Rape: ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-103(a)(4) (Michie 1993).
Carnal abuse 2nd: Id. § 5-14-105(a) (Michie 1993 & Supp.
1995).
Sexual abuse 2nd: Id. § 5-14-109(a)(1).
Sexual abuse 1st: Id. § 5-14-108(a)(4) (Michie 1993).
Consent: Not defined
Defendant's Knowledge of Victim's Capacity: Not mentioned
Affirmative Defenses:
Id. § 5-14-102(d): "Actor reasonably believed that the
victim was capable of consent."
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California Offenses & Degrees:
Rape: CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(1) (West Supp. 1996).
Sodomy: Id. § 286(g)-(h) (West 1988 & Supp. 1996).
Oral copulation: Id. §§ 288a(d)(3), 288a(g)-(h), 261(a)(1).
Penetration of genital or anal openings by foreign or
unknown objects: Id. § 289(b)-(c) (West Supp. 1996).
Sexual battery: Id. § 243.4(b)-(c): Referring specifically to a"person who is institutionalized for medical treatment and
who is seriously disabled or medically incapacitated."
Consent:
Id. § 261.6: "Acting freely and voluntarily and have
knowledge of the nature of the act or transaction involved."
Defendant's Knowledge of Victim's Capacity: Element of the
offense
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned
Colorado Offenses & Degrees:
Sexual assault 2nd: COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-403(1)(c), -
403(1)(g) (West 1989).
Sexual assault 3rd: Id. §§ 18-3-404(1)(b), -404(1)(f).
Consent: Not defined
Defendant's Knowledge of Victim's Capacity: Element of the
offense
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned
Connecticut Offenses & Degrees:
Sexual assault 1st: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-70(a)(3)
(West 1994 & Supp. 1996).
Sexual assault 2nd: Id. § 53a-71(a)(2).
Sexual assault 4th: Id. § 53a-73a(a)(1)(b) (West 1994).
Consent: Not defined
Defendant's Knowledge of Victim's Capacity: Not mentioned
Affirmative Defenses:
Id. § 53a-67(a): An affirmative defense exists if, in a
prosecution based on the victim being mentally defective,
the defendant, at the time such actor engaged in the conduct
constituting such offense, did not know of such condition of
the victim.
Delaware Offenses & Degrees:
Unlawful sexual contact 1st: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 767
(1995).
Unlawful sexual contact 3rd: Id. tit. 11, § 769.
Unlawful sexual penetration 1st: Id. tit. 11, §§ 772(1),
772(3).
Unlawful sexual penetration 2nd: Id. tit. 11, § 771(1).
Unlawful sexual penetration 3rd: Id. tit. 11, § 770(a)(1).
Unlawful intercourse 1st: Id. tit. 11, § 775(a)(1)-(2).
Unlawful intercourse 2nd: Id. tit. 11, § 774(1)-(2).
Unlawful intercourse 3rd: Id. tit. 11, § 773(1).
Consent: Not defined
Defendant's Knowledge of Victim's Capacity:
Id. tit. 11, § 761(g)(3). " 'Without consent' means: ... [t]he
defendant knew the victim suffered from a mental illness or
mental defect which rendered the victim incapable of
appraising the nature of the sexual conduct."
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned
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Florida Offenses & Degrees:
Sexual battery: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(4)(e) (West 1992
& Supp. 1997).
Consent:
Id. § 794.011(1)(a) (West Supp. 1997): "Intelligent, knowing,
and voluntary consent and does not include coerced
submission. Consent shall not be deemed or construed to
mean the failure by the alleged victim to offer physical
resistance to the offender."
Defendant's Knowledge of Victim's Capacity: Element of the
offense
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned
Georgia Offenses & Degrees:
Rape: Listed only in annotations under constructive force-
when the victim is "mentally unable to give consent to the
act, as when he is... mentally incompetent, the
requirement of force is found in constructive force." Drake
v. State, 236 S.E.2d 748, 750-51 (Ga. 1977).
Consent: Not defined
Defendant's Knowledge of Victim's Capacity: Not mentioned
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned
Hawaii Offenses & Degrees:
Sexual assault 2nd: HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-731(1)(b)
(1994).
Sexual assault 3rd: Id. § 707-732(1)(c).
Consent: Not defined
Defendant's Knowledge of Victim's Capacity: Element of the
offense
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned
Idaho Offenses & Degrees:
Rape: IDAHO CODE § 18-6101(2) (Supp. 1996).
Male rape: Id. § 18-6108(1).
Consent: Not defined
Defendant's Knowledge of Victim's Capacity: Not mentioned
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned
Illinois Offenses & Degrees:
Criminal sexual assault: 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-
13(a)(2) (West 1993).
Aggravated criminal sexual assault: Id. 5/12-14(c) (West
1993 & Supp. 1996).
Criminal sexual abuse: Id. 5/12-15(a)(2) (West 1995).
Aggravated criminal sexual abuse: Id. 5/12-16(e) (West 1993
& Supp. 1996).
Consent: Not defined
Defendant's Knowledge of Victim's Capacity: Element of the
offense
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned
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Indiana Offenses & Degrees:
Rape: IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-1(3) (West 1986 & Supp.
1996).
Criminal deviate conduct: Id. § 35-42-4-2(3) (West 1986).
Sexual battery: Id. § 35-42-4-8(2) (West Supp. 1996).
Note: The above are lesser degree felonies, but increase to
higher degree if there is a threat or use of deadly force or if
offense is committed with a deadly weapon.
Consent: Not defined
Defendant's Knowledge of Victim's Capacity: Element of the
offense
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned
Iowa Offenses & Degrees:
Sexual abuse defined: IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.1(2) (West
1993).
Sexual abuse 1st: Id. § 709.2.
Sexual abuse 2nd: Id § 709.3.
Sexual abuse 3rd: Id. § 709.4(2)(a) (West 1993 & Supp.
1996).
Consent: Not defined
Defendant's Knowledge of Victim's Capacity: Not mentioned
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned
Kansas Offenses & Degrees:
Rape: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3502(a)(1)(C) (1995).
Aggravated criminal sodomy: Id § 21-3506(a)(3)(C).
Aggravated sexual battery: Id. § 21-3518(a)(3).
Consent: Not defined
Defendant's Knowledge of Victim's Capacity: Element of the
offense
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned
Kentucky Offenses & Degrees:
Rape 3rd: Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.060(1)(a) (Michie
1990).
Sodomy 3rd: Id. § 510.090(1)(a).
Sexual abuse 2nd: Id. § 510.120(1)(a).
Consent: Not defined
Defendant's Knowledge of Victim's Capacity: Not mentioned
Affirmative Defenses:
Id. § 510.030: "In any [sexual offense] prosecution under
this chapter in which the victim's lack of consent is based
solely on his incapacity to consent because he was...
mentally retarded... defendant may prove in exculpation
that at the time he engaged in the conduct constituting the
offense he did not know of the facts or conditions
responsible for such incapacity to consent."
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Louisiana Offenses & Degrees:
Simple rape: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:43(A)(2) (West
1986 & Supp. 1996).
Aggravated crime against nature: Id. § 14:89.1(A)(4) (West
1986).
Sexual battery of the infirm: Id. § 14:93.5(A)(4) (West
Supp. 1996).
Consent: Not defined
Defendant's Knowledge of Victim's Capacity: Element of the
offense
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned
Maine Offenses & Degrees:
Gross sexual assault: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A,
§ 253(2)(C) (West 1983 & Supp. 1996).
Unlawful sexual contact: Id. tit. 17-A, § 255(1)(D).
Consent: Not defined
Defendant's Knowledge of Victim's Capacity: Element of the
offense
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned
Maryland Offenses & Degrees:
Rape 2nd: MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 463(a)(2) (1996).
Sexual offense 3rd: Id. art. 27, § 464A(a)(2).
Sexual offense 2nd: Id. art. 27, § 464B(a)(2).
Consent: Not defined
Defendant's Knowledge of Victim's Capacity: Element of the
offense
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned
Massachusetts Offenses & Degrees:
Indecent assault and battery on a mentally retarded person;
assault and battery: MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 13F (Law.
Co-op. 1992 & Supp. 1996).
Consent: Not defined
Defendant's Knowledge of Victim's Capacity: Element of the
offense
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned
Michigan Offenses & Degrees:
1st degree criminal sexual conduct: MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 750.520b(1)(d)(i), .520b(1)(g), .520b(1)(h)(i)-(ii)
(West 1991).
2nd degree criminal sexual conduct: Id. §§ 750.520c(1)(d)(i),
.520c(1)(h)(i)-(ii), .520c(1)(g).
4th degree criminal sexual conduct: Id. §§ 750.520e(1)(c)
(West Supp. 1996).
Consent: Not defined
Defendant's Knowledge of Victim's Capacity: Element of the
offense
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned
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Minnesota Offenses & Degrees:
Criminal sexual conduct 1st: MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.342.1(e)(ii) (West 1987 & Supp. 1997).
Criminal sexual conduct 2nd: Id. § 609.343(e)(ii).
Criminal sexual conduct 3rd: Id. § 609.344(d).
Criminal sexual conduct 4th: Id. § 609.345(d).
Consent:
Id. § 609.341(4)(a) (West Supp. 1997): Words or overt
actions by a person indicating a freely given present
agreement to perform a particular sexual act with the actor.
Consent does not mean the existence of a prior or current
social relationship between the actor and that the [victim]
failed to resist a particular sexual act.
Defendant's Knowledge of Victim's Capacity: Element of the
offense
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned
Mississippi Offenses & Degrees:
Sexual battery: Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-95(1)(b) (1994).
Consent: Not defined
Defendant's Knowledge of Victim's Capacity: Not mentioned
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned
Missouri Offenses & Degrees:
Sexual assault: Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.040 (West Supp.
1997).
Deviate sexual assault: Id. § 566.070.
Sexual misconduct lst: Id. § 566.090.
Consent:
Id. § 556.061(5): "[Consent] may be express or implied.
Assent does not constitute consent if: (a) It is given by a
person who lacks the mental capacity to authorize the
conduct charged to constitute the offense and such mental
incapacity is manifest or known to the actor; or (b) It is
given by a person who by reason of... mental disease or
defect... is manifestly unable or known by the actor to be
unable to make a reasonable judgment as to the nature or
harmfulness of the conduct charged to constitute the offense
Defendant's Knowledge of Victim's Capacity: Element of the
offense
Affirmative Defenses:
Id. § 566.023: marriage as a defense.
Id. § 566.020(1) (West 1979 & Supp. 1996): mistake as to
incapacity or age.
Montana Offenses & Degrees:
Sexual assault (not specifically for "mentally retarded"
victims): MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-502 (1995).
Sexual intercourse without consent: Id. § 45-5-503.
Consent: Not defined
Defendant's Knowledge of Victim's Capacity: Element of the
offense
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned
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Sexual assault 1st: NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-319(1)(b) (1995).
Sexual assault 2nd/3rd: Id. § 28-320(1)(b).
Consent: Not defined
Defendant's Knowledge of Victim's Capacity: Element of the
offense
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned
Offenses & Degrees:
Sexual assault: NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.366(1) (Michie
1988 & Supp. 1996).
Consent: Not defined
Defendant's Knowledge of Victim's Capacity: Element of the
offense
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned
Offenses & Degrees:
Aggravated felonious sexual assault: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 632-A:2(I)(h) (1996).
Felonious sexual assault: Id. § 632-A:3(I).
Sexual assault: Id. § 632-A:4.
Consent: Not defined
Defendant's Knowledge of Victim's Capacity: Element of the
offense
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned
Offenses & Degrees:
Aggravated sexual assault: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-
2(a)(5)(b) (West 1995).
Sexual assault: Id. § 2C:14-2(c)(2).
Aggravated criminal sexual contact: Id. § 2C:14-3(a).
Criminal sexual contact: Id. § 2C:14-3(b).
Consent: Not defined
Defendant's Knowledge of Victim's Capacity: Element of the
offense
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned
Offenses & Degrees:
Criminal sexual penetration lst: N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-
11C(2) (Michie 1994).
Criminal sexual penetration 2nd: Id. § 30-9-11D(3)-(4).
Criminal sexual penetration 3rd: Id. § 30-9-11E.
Criminal sexual penetration 4th: Id. § 30-9-12C(1)-(2).
Consent: Not defined
Defendant's Knowledge of Victim's Capacity: Element of the
offense
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned
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Rape 3rd: N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.25(1) (McKinney 1987).
Sodomy 3rd: Id. § 130.40(1).
Sexual abuse 2nd: Id. § 130.60(1).
Sexual abuse 3rd: Id. § 130.55.
Sexual misconduct: Id. § 130.20(1)-(2): For sexual
misconduct and sexual abuse, "without her consent" is not
specific for mentally defective individuals.
Consent: Not defined
Defendant's Knowledge of Victim's Capacity: Not mentioned
Affirmative Defenses:
Id. § 130.10: "If the [victim]'s lack of consent is based solely
upon his incapacity to consent because he was mentally
defective . . . ,it is an affirmative defense that at the time
the defendant engaged in the conduct constituting the
offense [he] did not know the facts or conditions responsible
for such incapacity to consent."
Offenses & Degrees:
2nd degree rape: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.3(a)(2) (1993).
2nd degree sexual offense: Id. § 14-27.5(a)(2).
Consent: Not defined
Defendant's Knowledge of Victim's Capacity: Element of the
offense
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned
Offenses & Degrees:
Gross sexual imposition: N.D. CErr. CODE § 12.1-20-
03(1)(e) (1985 & Supp. 1995).
Sexual assault: Id. § 12.1-20-07(1)(b) (1985).
Consent: Not defined
Defendant's Knowledge of Victim's Capacity: Element of the
offense
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned
Offenses & Degrees:
Rape: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(A)(1)(c)
(Anderson 1996): Marriage or cohabitation are not
defenses.
Felonious sexual penetration: Id. § 2907.12(A)(1)(c):
Marriage or cohabitation are not defenses.
Sexual battery: Id. § 2907.03(A)(2).
Gross sexual imposition: Id. § 2907.05(A)(5).
Sexual imposition: Id. § 2907.06(A)(2).
Consent: Not defined
Defendant's Knowledge of Victim's Capacity: Element of the
offense
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned
Offenses & Degrees:
Sodomy: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 888(B)(2) (West 1983
& Supp. 1997).
Rape by instrumentation: Id. tit. 21, § 1111.1.
Rape 1st: Id. tit. 21, § 1114(A)(2).
Consent: Not defined
Defendant's Knowledge of Victim's Capacity: Not mentioned
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned
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Rape 1st: OR. REV. STAT. § 163.375(1)(d) (Supp. 1996).
Sodomy 1st: Id. § 163.405(1)(d).
Unlawful sexual penetration 1st: Id. § 163.411(1)(c).
Sexual abuse lst: Id. § 163.427(1)(a)(C).
Consent: Not defined
Defendant's Knowledge of Victim's Capacity: Not mentioned
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned
Offenses & Degrees:
Rape: 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121(5) (West Supp.
1996).
Involuntary deviate sexual intercourse: Id. § 3123(a)(5).
Sexual assault: Id. § 3124.1: "Without the complainant's
consent" is not specific for mentally disabled individuals.
Aggravated indecent assault: Id. § 3125(6).
Indecent assault: Id. § 3126(a)(6).
Consent: Not defined
Defendant's Knowledge of Victim's Capacity: Not mentioned
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned
Offenses & Degrees:
Sexual assault lst: R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-2(1) (1994).
Sexual assault 2nd: Id. § 11-37-4(1).
Consent: Not defined
Defendant's Knowledge of Victim's Capacity: Element of the
offense
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned
Offenses & Degrees:
Criminal sexual conduct 3rd: S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-654
(Law. Co-op. 1985).
Consent: Not defined
Defendant's Knowledge of Victim's Capacity: Element of the
offense
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned
Offenses & Degrees:
Rape 2nd: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-1(3) (Michie 1980
& Supp. 1996).
Sexual contact with a person incapable of consenting: Id.
§ 22-22-7.2.
Consent: Not defined
Defendant's Knowledge of Victim's Capacity: Not mentioned
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned
Offenses & Degrees:
Aggravated rape: TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-502(a)(3)(B)
(1991 & Supp. 1996).
Rape: Id. § 39-13-503(a)(3) (Supp. 1996).
Aggravated sexual battery: Id. § 39-13-504(a)(3)(B) (1991 &
Supp. 1996).
Sexual battery: Id. § 39-13-505(a)(3) (Supp. 1996).
Consent: Not defined
Defendant's Knowledge of Victim's Capacity: Element of the
offense
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned
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Texas Offenses & Degrees:
Sexual assault: TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(a)(1)
(West 1994).
Aggravated sexual assault: Id. 88 22.021(a)(1)(A),
22.021(a)(2)(A) (West 1994 & Supp. 1997).
Consent: Not defined
Defendant's Knowledge of Victim's Capacity:
Id. § 22.011(b)(4) (West 1994): Without Consent: Actor
knows that as a result of mental disease or defect the other
person is at the time of the sexual assault incapable either
of appraising the nature of the act or of resisting it.
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned
Utah Offenses & Degrees:
Rape: UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-402(1) (1995).
Object rape: Id. § 76-5-402.2.
Sodomy-forcible sodomy: Id. § 76-5-403(2).
Forcible sexual abuse: Id. § 76-5-404(1).
Aggravated sexual assault: Id. § 76-5-405(1) (1995 & Supp.
1996).
Consent: Not defined
Defendant's Knowledge of Victim's Capacity:
Id. § 76-5-406(6) (1995): Without consent: "actor knows
that as a result of mental disease or defect, the victim is at
the time of the act incapable either of appraising the nature
of the act or of resisting it."
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned
Vermont Offenses & Degrees:
Sexual assault: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252(a)(1)(A)
(Supp. 1996).
Aggravated sexual assault: Id. tit. 13, § 3252(a)(1)-(9).
Consent:
Id. tit. 13, § 3251(3): "Words or action by a person
indicating a voluntary agreement to engage in a sexual act."
Defendant's Knowledge of Victim's Capacity:
Id. tit. 13, §8 3254(1), (2)(A)-(D): Lack of consent may be
shown without proof of resistance. If the actor knows that
the other person is mentally incapable of understanding the
nature of the sexual act; or knows that the other person is
mentally incapable of resisting, or declining consent to the
sexual act due to a mental illness or mental retardation as
defined in section 3061 of Title 14.
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned
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Virginia Offenses & Degrees:
Rape: VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61(A)(ii) (Michie 1996).
Forcible sodomy: Id. § 18.2-67.1(A)(2).
Object sexual penetration: Id. § 18.2-67.2(A)(2).
Aggravated sexual battery: Id. § 18.2-67.3(A)(2).
Sexual battery: Id. § 18.2-67.4(A).
Consent: Not defined
Defendant's Knowledge of Victim's Capacity:
Id. § 18.2-67.10(3): "'Mental incapacity' means that [the]
condition of the complaining witness existing at the time of
an offense.., prevents the complaining witness from
understanding the nature or consequences of the sexual act
involved in such offense and about which the accused knew
or should have known."
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned
Washington Offenses & Degrees:
Rape 2nd: WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.050(1)(b), (c),
(e) (West Supp. 1997).
Indecent liberties: Id. § 9A.44.100(1)(b), (c), (e).
Consent:
Id. § 9A.44.010(7): "[A]t the time of the act of sexual
intercourse or sexual contact there are actual words or
conduct indicating freely given agreement to have sexual
intercourse or sexual contact."
Defendant's Knowledge of Victim's Capacity: Not mentioned
Affirmative Defenses:
Id. § 9A.44.030(1): When "lack of consent is based solely
upon the victim's mental incapacity ... it is a defense which
the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that at the time of the offense the defendant
reasonably believed that the victim was not mentally
incapacitated."
West Virginia Offenses & Degrees:
Sexual assault 3rd: W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-5(a)(1) (1992).
Sexual abuse 2nd: Id. § 61-8B-8(a).
Consent: Not defined
Defendant's Knowledge of Victim's Capacity: Element of the
offense
Affirmative Defenses:
Id. § 61-8B-12(a): If "lack of consent is based solely on
incapacity to consent because such victim was ... mentally
defective ... it is an affirmative defense that defendant, at
the time of the offense, did not know of the facts or
conditions responsible for such incapacity to consent, unless
the defendant is reckless in failing to know such facts or
conditions."
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Wisconsin Offenses & Degrees:
Sexual assault 2nd: WIs. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(2)(c) (West
1996): "[S]exual contact... with a person who suffers from
a mental illness or deficiency which renders that person
temporarily or permanently incapable of appraising the
person's conduct, and defendant knows of such condition."
Consent:
Id. § 940.225(4): Consent is defined as "words or overt
actions by a person who is competent to give informed
consent indicating a freely given agreement to have sexual
intercourse or sexual contact .... The following persons are
presumed incapable of consent .... [a] person suffering
from a mental illness or defect which impairs capacity to
appraise personal conduct."
Defendant's Knowledge of Victim's Capacity: Element of the
offense
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned
Wyoming Offenses & Degrees:
Sexual assault 1st: WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-302(a)(iv)
(Michie 1988).
Sexual assault 2nd: 1d § 6-2-303(b).
Sexual assault 4th: Id. § 6-2-305.
Consent: Not defined
Defendant's Knowledge of Victim's Capacity: Element of the
offense
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned
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Brooks v. State, 555 So. 2d 1134, 1138 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989)
("It cannot be seriously argued that this young man [victim]
had the mental capacity to appreciate how the acts would be
regarded in his social environment and to appreciate the
taboos of his society, or the stigma and ostracism to which he
would be exposed.").
Metzger v. State, 565 So. 2d 291, 292 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990)
(affirming rape conviction based on victim's lack of consent
due to her "difficulty assessing the nature and consequences of
her behavior"); see also ALA. CODE ANN. § 13A-2-7(c)(2)
(1994) (consent is ineffective if given by person unable "to
make a reasonable judgment as to the nature or harmfulness
of the conduct").
Jackson v. State, 890 P.2d 587, 591 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995)
("A person is 'mentally incapable' of consenting to an act of
sexual penetration when the victim suffers from 'a mental
disease or defect' that renders the person incapable of
understanding the nature or consequences of the person's
conduct, including the potential for harm to that person."); see
also ALAsKA STAT. § 11.41.470(4) (Michie 1996) (defining
mentally incapable).
State v. Johnson, 745 P.2d 81, 84 (Ariz. 1987) (en banc)
("[Wlhen the state asserts that the victim was incapable of
consenting due to a mental disorder, it must prove that the
mental disorder was an impairment of such a degree that it
precluded the victim from understanding the act of intercourse
and its possible consequences.").
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-101(3)(A) (Michie 1993 & Supp.
1995): "'Mentally defective' means that a person suffers from
a mental disease or defect which renders him incapable of
understanding the nature and consequences of sexual acts."
Id. § 5-14-101(3)(B): "A determination that a person is
mentally defective shall not be based solely on his intelligence
quotient."
State v. Howard, 172 Cal. Rptr. 539, 540-41 (Cal. Ct. App.
1981) ("Both Penal Code §§ 288a(f) and 286(f) provide that it
is a crime to commit the proscribed acts when 'the victim is at
the time unconscious of the nature of the act and this is
known to the person committing the act.' .. . This section is
aimed precisely at this situation-an adult engaging in this
type of sexual activity with a mentally retarded person who
simply does not understand the nature of the act in which he
participates.").
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People v. Gross, 670 P.2d 799, 800 (Colo. 1983) ("The actor
knows that the victim is incapable of appraising the nature of
the victim's conduct.. . .") (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-
403(1) (1973)). According to the Gross court, "[I]f a victim is
incapable of understanding how her sexual conduct will be
regarded within the framework of the societal environment of
which she is a part, or is not capable of understanding the
physiological implications of sexual conduct, then she is
incapable of 'appraising the nature of [her] conduct' under the
language of the statute." 670 P.2d at 801.
State v. Wyman, 173 A. 155, 156 (Conn. 1934) ("The history
of the statute ... [providing that "any man who shall carnally
know any female under the age of forty-five years who is
epileptic, imbecile, feeble-minded or a pauper shall be
imprisoned"] shows the classification to be sound, its moving
purpose being to check the increase of mental defectives and
abnormal persons in the community which results by
inheritance from defective parents.... In view of the purpose
of the statute in question (section 6277), it is of less
importance whether the woman has sufficient mental capacity
to know the distinction between right and wrong. She may be
able to draw these distinctions and yet be 'epileptic, imbecile
[or] feeble-minded,' and so within the prohibited class, for
either marriage or carnal intercourse.").
State v. Tunis, No. 94-03-0582, 1994 WL 710948 at *1 (Del.
Super. Ct. Nov. 18, 1994) ("Without consent means the
defendant knew that the victim suffered from a mental illness
or mental defect which rendered the victim incapable of
appraising the nature of the sexual conduct .... "); see also
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 761(g)(3) (1995) (same language).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(1)(b) (West 1992 & Supp. 1997):
"'Mentally defective' means a mental disease or defect which
renders a person temporarily or permanently incapable of
appraising the nature of his or her conduct."
Ely v. State, 384 S.E.2d 268, 271-72 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989)
(stating that a female victim is incapable of consenting to
sexual activity if she, "due to the degree of mental retardation
suffered, is incapable of giving an intelligent assent or dissent
and to exercise judgment."); see also Payne v. State, 428
S.E.2d 103, 108 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (citing Whitaker v. State,
34 S.E.2d 499, 502 (Ga. 1945)).
[Vol. 1997
HeinOnline  -- 1997 U. Ill. L. Rev. 416 1997












In re Doe, 918 P.2d 254, 262 (Haw. Ct. App. 1996) ("[A]
person is mentally defective if he or she is 'suffering from a
disease, disorder, or defect which renders the person incapable
of appraising the nature of the person's conduct."' (citing
HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-700 (1994))); State v. Gonsalves, 706
P.2d 1333, 1337-38 (Haw. Ct. App. 1985) ("People v. Easley,
supra, points out that appraisal of conduct cannot mean just
an understanding of the physiological elements of the sex act.
Rather, it must include an understanding of the moral and
societal elements of the act .... Additionally, the woman
must have the ability to appraise the possible medical
consequences of the act.... Without the ability to
comprehend these factors, the victim cannot be said to be
capable of appraising the nature of the act. She would see
only the shiny wrappings on Pandora's box, and none of the
contents. She would be truly, in the old-fashioned phrase,
taken advantage of.").
State v. Soura, 796 P.2d 109, 114 (Idaho 1990) (stating that a
victim's resistance and lack of resistance to defendant's sexual
advances "does not conclusively establish that she understood
and appreciated the physical, emotional and moral
consequences of sexual intercourse with the defendant....
The purpose of ... [IDAHO CODE § 18-6101 (1987)] is to
protect women with mental disabilities, such as the woman
involved in this case, from the many potential difficulties
resulting from non-marital sexual relations.").
People v. Whitten, 647 N.E.2d 1062, 1067 (IlM. App. Ct. 1995)
("The ability to give knowing consent should involve more
than measuring complainant's IQ or ability to physically resist
defendant. Knowing consent requires us to examine all of the
circumstances to see if defendant knowingly exercised such
control over complainant that a trier of fact could find that
complainant did not submit to the sexual advances of
defendant voluntarily, intelligently, and by an active
concurrence.").
People v. McMullen, 414 N.E.2d 214, 217 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)
("In this case, the evidence showed that although the victim
seemed to understand the physical nature of sexual activity,
she did not understand how such activity can affect a person's
life and how illicit sexual activity is regarded by other people.
Thus, she was unable to understand the social and personal
costs of the act. Her inability to understand this important
facet of the consequences and nature of sexual activity,
combined with other testimony concerning her mental
deficiencies, is sufficient to support a guilty verdict based upon
her incapacity to consent to intercourse.").
Stafford v. State, 455 N.E.2d 402, 405 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983)
("[Clapacity to consent presupposes an intelligence capable of
understanding the act, its nature and possible consequences.")
(following People v. McMullen, 414 N.E.2d 214, 217 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1980)); see also Bozarth v. State, 520 N.E.2d 460, 463 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1988) (citing Stafford); Hall v. State, 504 N.E.2d 298,
300 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (citing Stafford).
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State v. Chancy, 391 N.W.2d 231, 235 (Iowa 1986) ("Persons
who are so mentally incompetent or incapacitated as to be
unable to understand the nature and consequences of the sex
act are incapable of giving consent.") (relying on State v.
Sullivan, 298 N.W.2d 267, 273 (Iowa 1980) (holding that "the
standard imposed by subsection 709.4(2) is clear: To avoid the
proscribed conduct one must refrain from performing a sex act
with a person who is mentally incapable of understanding the
nature and possible consequences of sexual activity.")).
State v. Juarez, 861 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993)
("[W]hen the capacity of a mentally deficient individual to
consent to a sexual act is at issue, the jury is capable of
determining whether that individual is able to understand the
nature and consequences of engaging in such an act."); see
also Keim v. State, 777 P.2d 278, 280 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989).
Salsman v. Commonwealth, 565 S.W.2d 638, 640 (Ky. Ct. App.
1978) (upholding conviction for sexual assault in the first
degree based on the finding of "forcible compulsion." Victim's
mental retardation and deafness were considered in finding
forcible compulsion. "In determining whether a woman is
incapable of granting consent because she is mentally
defective, the sole question is whether she is capable of
appraising the nature of the sexual act being performed.").
State v. Peters, 441 So. 2d 403, 409 (La. Ct. App. 1983) ("[LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:43 (West 1986)] ... defines simple rape
and reads in pertinent part: Simple rape is a rape committed
where the anal or vaginal sexual intercourse is deemed to be
without the lawful consent of the victim because it is
committed under one or more of the following circumstances:
... (2) Where the victim is incapable, through unsoundness of
mind, whether temporary or permanent, of understanding the
nature of the act; and the offender knew or should have
known of the victim's incapacity .... "); see also State v.
Watley, 301 So. 2d 332, 333 (La. 1974).
State v. Ricci, 507 A.2d 587, 588 (Me. 1986) ("There is no
evidence that the victim was substantially incapable of
appraising the nature of the Defendant's contact with her.")
(citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 253(2)(C) (West
1983)).
Edmondson v. State, 185 A.2d 497, 497 (Md. 1962) ("The
specific offense [charged] was carnal knowledge of an imbecile
woman .... the girl having been chronologically eighteen
years of age, but of a mental age of about four years.") (citing
MrD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 462 (1957)).
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Commonwealth v. Roderick, 586 N.E. 967, 969 (Mass. 1992)
("The [severely retarded] victim's presence and conduct in the
courtroom were relevant to the issue whether the defendant
would have known that the victim was mentally retarded, an
element of one of the crimes of which the defendant was
found not guilty."); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 514 N.E.2d
1309, 1315 (Mass. 1987) (jury instructions included two
elements for conviction of the offense of indecent assault and
battery on a retarded person: "if they found there was a
nonpermissive touching, and if they also found the victim was
retarded, the defendant was guilty").
People v. Baker, 403 N.W.2d 479, 480 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986)
("A person is criminally responsible under [Michigan law] ...
if he engages in sexual penetration with another which causes
personal injury to the victim and he 'knows or has reason to
know' that the victim is mentally incapable, mentally
incapacitated, or physically helpless.") (citing MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 750.520b(1)(g) (1983)).
State v. Underhill, No. C9-92-2058, 1993 WL 165682 at *1
(Minn. Ct. App. May 18, 1993) ("A person is 'mentally
impaired' when 'as a result of inadequately developed or
impaired intelligence, or a substantial psychiatric disorder of
thought or mood, [the person] lacks the judgment to give a
reasoned consent to sexual contact or to sexual penetration.'
MINN. STAT. § 609.341 subd. 6 (1990)."); State v. Willenbring,
454 N.W.2d 268, 270 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) ("'Mentally
impaired' is defined as meaning that 'a person, as a result of
inadequately developed or impaired intelligence . . . lacks the
judgment to give a reasoned consent to sexual contact or to
sexual penetration."') (citing MINN. STAT. § 609.341 subd. 6
(1988)); see also In re Welfare of R.L.A., No. CX-88-1884,
1989 WL 41771 at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. May 2, 1989).
Martin v. State, 415 So. 2d 706, 707 (Miss. 1982) (noting
testimony of a clinical psychologist indicating that the victim"was incapable of giving informed consent to the act of sexual
intercourse. Moreover .... a stressful situation which could
include a sexual encounter, would further reduce the
likelihood that a person within [the victim's] range of
intelligence could make a good decision in consenting to
sexual relations with appellant."); Anderson v. State, 381 So.
2d 1019, 1021-22 (Miss. 1980) ("Here, the proof shows without
contradiction that the victim was mentally incapable of
consenting to sexual intercourse."); Wilson v. State, 221 So. 2d
100, 103 (Miss. 1969) ("Under the common law proof of
sexual intercourse with a woman mentally incapable of
consent because of imbecility, idiocy or insanity, establishes
the crime of rape. Where the victim in a rape case was
mentally incapable of consent, it was not necessary to prove'actual force' beyond the mere force of penetration so that the
actual resistance was not necessary to constitute the offense.").
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State v. Robinson, 136 S.W.2d 1008, 1009 (Mo. 1940) ("Where
the woman in point of fact yields an apparent assent to the
act, the burden is on the state to prove that at the time of the
act she was incapable, because of mental disease, of assenting
to or dissenting from the act, and that the defendant knew of
such incapacity. And further: it would not be enough to show
merely that she was weak-minded, and that the defendant
knew that she was so. The mere fact that a woman is weak-
minded does not disable her from consenting to the act.").
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-501(1)(b)(i) (1995): "(1) As used in
45-5-503, the term 'without consent' means: ... (b) the victim
is incapable of consent because he is ... (i) mentally defective
or incapacitated." Id. § 45-2-101(39): "'Mentally defective'
means that a person suffers from a mental disease or defect
that renders the person incapable of appreciating the nature of
the person's own conduct."
State v. Doremus, 514 N.W.2d 649, 652 (Neb. Ct. App. 1994)
("The purpose of the proposed examination in the present
case was to rebut the State's expert testimony that the victim
was incapable of understanding the concept of sexuality, i.e.,
whether he was mentally capable of appraising the nature of
defendant's conduct. See [NEB. REV. STAT.] § 28-320(1)(b)
[(1989)].").
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.366(1) (Michie 1988 & Supp.
1995): "A person who subjects another person to sexual
penetration, or who forces another person to make a sexual
penetration on himself or another, or on a beast, against the
victim's will or under conditions in which the perpetrator
knows or should know that the victim is mentally or physically
incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of his
conduct, is guilty of sexual assault."
State v. Call, 650 A.2d 331, 332 (N.H. 1994) ("[N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 632- A:2(I)(h) (Supp. 1979)] ... prohibits sexual
penetration with mentally defective persons, that is, 'only with
those persons whose mental deficiency is such as to make
them incapable of legally consenting to the act."'); State v.
Degrenier, 424 A.2d 412, 413 (N.H. 1980) ("The term'mentally defective,' as used in this section, is not defined
anywhere in the statutes of this State.... We construe the
statute in question to prohibit intercourse only with those
persons whose mental deficiency is such as to make them
incapable of legally consenting to the act.") (comparing MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520a (Supp. 1980), "which defines a'mentally defective' person as a 'person [who] suffers from a
mental disease or defect which renders that person
temporarily or permanently incapable of appraising the nature
of his or her conduct.' Inasmuch as the General Court
modeled ... [the New Hampshire statute] after the Michigan
statute, . . . it is logical to conclude that the legislature
intended the same meaning of the words 'mentally defective,'
and we so hold.").
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State v. Olivio, 589 A.2d 597, 605 (N.J. 1990) (explaining that
a person is mentally defective "if, at the time of the sexual
activity, the mental defect rendered him or her unable to
comprehend the distinctively sexual nature of the conduct, or
incapable of understanding or exercising the right to refuse to
engage in such conduct with another").
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10A(4) (Michie 1994): "(A) Force or
coercion means ... (4) the perpetration of criminal sexual
penetration or criminal sexual contact when the perpetrator
knows or has reason to know that the victim... suffers from
a mental condition that renders the victim incapable of
understanding the nature or consequences of the act . . .
People v. Cratsley, 653 N.E.2d 1162, 1165 (N.Y. 1995) ("In
Easley, we discussed what it meant to be incapable of
appraising the nature of one's own sexual conduct.
Understanding the 'nature' of one's sexual conduct implicates
a range of human responses, only a part of which is
intellectual. We noted that care must be taken not to restrict
the freedom of persons with mental retardation who are
capable of knowing consent to a sexual relationship by
confusing deliberate failure to adhere to a particular set of
values with lack of understanding that values exist. Only the
latter-a lack of understanding-is an appropriate
consideration in assessing legal capacity."); People v. Easley,
364 N.E.2d 1328, 1332-33 (N.Y. 1977) ("An understanding of
coitus encompasses more than a knowledge of its physiological
nature. An appreciation of how it will be regarded in the
framework of the societal environment and taboos to which a
person will be exposed may be far more important. In that
sense, the moral quality of the act is not to be ignored....
Therefore, there also needs to be inquiry as to whether there
is a capacity to appraise the nature of the stigma, the
ostracism or other noncriminal sanctions which society levies
for conduct it labels only as immoral even while it yet'struggles to make itself articulate in law."'); see also People v.
Jenkins, 633 N.Y.S.2d 996 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995); People v.
Novak, 622 N.Y.S.2d 783 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995); People v.
Patterson, 560 N.Y.S.2d 357 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); People v.
Dixon, 412 N.Y.S.2d 42 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978).
State v. Oliver, 354 S.E.2d 527, 537 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) ("We
find the State's evidence was not sufficient to show the victim
was substantially incapable of 'appraising the nature of... her
conduct' or 'communicating unwillingness to submit to the act
of vaginal intercourse or sexual act.' However, we find the
State did present sufficient evidence to support a finding that
the victim was substantially incapable of 'resisting the act of
vaginal intercourse or sexual act."').
State v. Kingsley, 383 N.W.2d 828, 830 (N.D. 1986) (stating
that the victim must, "by reason of mental disease or defect,
be, incapable of understanding the nature of the conduct
involved").
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State v. Zeh, 509 N.E.2d 414, 418 (Ohio 1987) ("[S]ubstantial
impairment must be established by demonstrating a present
reduction, diminution or decrease in the victim's ability, either
to appraise the nature of his conduct or to control his
conduct."); see also State v. Bennett, Nos. 4033, 4034, 1986
WL 13702 at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 3, 1986).
Slaughterback v. State, 594 P.2d 780, 781 (Okla. Crim. App.
1979) ("Legal consent presupposes an intelligence capable of
understanding the act, its nature, and possible consequences.
This degree of intelligence may exist with an impaired and
feeble intellect, or it may not.").
State v. Anderson, 902 P.2d 1206, 1207 n.1 (Or. Ct. App.
1995) ("'[M]entally defective' means that person suffers from a
mental disease or defect that renders that person incapable of
appraising the nature of the conduct of the person.") (citing
OR. REV. STAT. § 163.305(3) (1990)).
Commonwealth v. Thomson, 673 A.2d 357, 359-60 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1996) (considering victim's mental deficiency, "the expert
concluded that the victim did not have good judgment, was
highly influenced by people and was unable to understand the
consequences of her actions").
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-1(4) (1994): "'Mentally disabled'-a
person who suffers from a mental impairment which renders
that person incapable of appraising the nature of the act."
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-651(e) (Law. Co-op. 1995): "'Mentally
defective' means that a person suffers from a mental disease
or defect which renders the person temporarily or
permanently incapable of appraising the nature of his or her
conduct."
State v. Schuster, 502 N.W.2d 565, 569 (S.D. 1993) ("Rape of
a person incapable of giving consent, [S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 22-22-1(2) (Michie 1990)].... is analogous to the
statutory rape of a person less than sixteen years old,... [id.
§§ 22-22-1(4), -1(5)]."); see also State v. Willis, 370 N.W.2d
193, 199 (S.D. 1985) (stating that appellant "admitted having
sexual intercourse with the victim on the night in question and
the evidence reflects S.R.'s mental incapacity to give consent.
These latter facts support a jury verdict in themselves."); State
v. Fox, 31 N.W.2d 451, 454 (S.D. 1948) ("Upon proof of carnal
intercourse where the female is incapable, through lunacy or
unsoundness of mind, of giving legal consent, the law
conclusively presumes that the carnal intercourse was by force
and violence.").
State v. Green, CCA No. 01-C-01-9002-CC-00045, 1990 WL
143777 at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 3, 1990) ("Numerous
cases support the broad proposition that the capacity to
consent, that is, to give consent which the law will recognize
as sufficient to relieve the perpetrator of the illicit act from
criminal liability for rape or a similar offense, presupposes the
mental capability to form an intelligent opinion on the subject,
with an understanding of the act, its nature, and its possible
consequences.").
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Wootton v. State, 799 S.W.2d 499, 501 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990)
("[T]he actor knows that as a result of mental disease or
defect the other person is at the time of the sexual assault
incapable either of appraising the nature of the act or resisting
it.. . ."); see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(b)(4)
(West 1994 & Supp. 1997); Rider v. State, 735 S.W.2d 291, 292
(Tex. Ct. App. 1987); Garcia v. State, 659 S.W.2d 843, 846
(Tex. Ct. App. 1982), rev'd, 661 S.W.2d 96, 98 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1983); Martinez v. State, 634 S.W.2d 929, 934 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1982); Smith v. State, 555 S.W.2d 747, 749 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1977).
State v. Archuleta, 747 P.2d 1019, 1022 (Utah 1987)
(explaining that although defendant was convicted under the
general rape statute, the court refers to the standard set forth
in UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(6) (Supp. 1987) charging that
a person commits rape under this provision when "[t]he actor
knows that as a result of mental disease or defect, the victim
is at the time of the act incapable either of appraising the
nature of the act or of resisting it").
State v. Jewett, 193 A. 7, 8 (Vt. 1937) (holding that conviction
of rape is impossible "under the circumstances of this case
unless the woman was incapable of understanding the act, its
motive and possible consequences").
Adkins v. Commonwealth, 457 S.E.2d 382, 388 (Va. Ct. App.
1995) ("Manifestly, the legislature did not intend to include as
part of the protected class of people under [VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-61(A)(ii) (Michie 1994)] ... those whose mental
impairment or handicap may prevent them from
comprehending the more complex aspects of the nature or
consequences of sexual intercourse, but who, nevertheless,
have the mental capacity to have a basic understanding of the
elementary and rudimentary nature and consequences of
sexual intercourse.").
State v. Ortega-Martinez, 881 P.2d 231, 236-37 (Wash. 1994)
("Evidence showing that a victim has a superficial
understanding of the act of sexual intercourse does not by
itself render [WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.010(4) (1988)] ...
inapplicable. A finding that a person is mentally incapacitated
for the purposes of... [this statute] is appropriate where the
jury finds the victim had a condition which prevented him or
her from meaningfully understanding the nature or
consequences of sexual intercourse.... For example, the
nature and consequences of sexual intercourse often include
the development of emotional intimacy between sexual partners;
it may under some circumstances result in a disruption in one's
established relationships; and, it is associated with the
possibility of pregnancy with its accompanying decisions and
consequences as well as the specter of disease and even
death." (emphasis added)); see also State v. vanVlack, 765
P.2d 349, 352 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988) (victim "did not, as a
result of mental defect, understand the nature and
consequences of sexual contact").
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State v. Burks, 267 S.E.2d 752, 753 (W. Va. 1980) (stating that
a conviction requires that a person engages "in sexual
intercourse with another person who is incapable of consent
because he is mentally defective or mentally incapacitated").
State v. Richardson, No. 94-1906-CR, 1995 WL 556274 at *1
(Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 1995) (noting that evidence was
sufficient to find that defendant had intercourse with a victim
who was "suffering from a mental deficiency which rendered
her incapable of consenting to sexual intercourse").
Righter v. State, 752 P.2d 416, 420 (Wyo. 1988) ("[O]ne must
refrain from performing a sex act with a person who the actor
knows, or should know, is mentally incapable of understanding
the nature and possible consequences of sexual activity.").
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State v. Olivio, 589 A.2d 597, 604 (N.J. 1991) ("[M]entally-
retarded persons range 'from the virtually independent to the
totally dependent.' Mental retardation is not easy to define
and categorize."); People v. Easley, 364 N.E.2d 1328, 1331
(N.Y. 1977) ("As do all others, the mentally aberrant differ
from one another in greater or lesser degree. Even mental
retardation does not mean that an individual is incapable of
consenting as a matter of law. The requisite degree of
intelligence necessary to give consent may be found to exist in
a person of very limited intellect."); State v. Kingsley, 383
N.W.2d 828, 831 (N.D. 1986) (Levine, J., concurring) ("It is
well to bear in mind that there is no presumption of
incompetence simply because a developmentally disabled
person is receiving special services or living at a residence for
the developmentally disabled .... Nor is a developmentally
disabled person deprived of the right to 'interact' with
members of the opposite sex.") (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-
01.2-03(3) (1985)).
State v. Soura, 796 P.2d 109, 115 (Idaho 1990) (noting trial
court found the victim's answers "to be slow and short; her
facial expressions consisted of a 'sagging jaw, mouth open ...
she appeared to stare off into space at times"'). But see id. at
116 (Bistline, J., concurring) ("If I did not know better, I
would have thought that the day was long gone when a
person's intelligence was judged by a person's appearance.");
In re Welfare of R.L.A., No. CX-88-1884, 1989 WL 41771 at *1
(Minn. Ct. App. May 2, 1989) ("The trial court, however,
based its determination of mental impairment not only on the
fact that P.E. has Down's Syndrome, but also on the court's
evaluation of P.E.'s testimony. The court stated that it was
clear that P.E. is mentally impaired and that this fact should be
obvious to anyone, including someone of R.L.A.'s age and
experience."); State v. Call, 650 A.2d 331, 332 (N.H. 1994)
(describing testimony "that the victim was 'handicapped'; that
she 'looked mentally retarded'; that she was once a resident of
New Hampshire Hospital; that there was 'something mentally
wrong' with her"); People v. Easley, 364 N.E.2d 1328, 1331
(N.Y. 1977) ("[A]fter observing her .... you would have to
agree she is mentally retarded.").
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IQ Payne v. State, 428 S.E.2d 103, 107-08 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993)
(victim had "a full scale IQ of 59, which fell within the middle
range of mild mental retardation, equipped her with the
mental development of an 11- or 12-year-old child, and
rendered her incapable of relating in an adult-like manner or
consenting to sexual activity"); Ely v. State, 384 S.E.2d 268,
269 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (fourteen-year-old victim "functions at
the level of a person between the ages of 5 and 10. She has a
verbal IQ of 65; a performance IQ of 58 and a full scale IQ of
61. The appellant has a verbal IQ of 73; a performance IQ of
72; and a full scale IQ of 72. He is classified as being in the
lower portion of the borderline range. His mental age is
11.2."); People v. Patterson, 560 N.Y.S.2d 357, 358 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1990) (victim "was incapable of understanding the nat;"e
of sexual conduct since he had been diagnosed as having a
moderate retardation, organic brain syndrome, and psychosis,
and possessed an I.Q. capacity between 35 to 49, which is
equivalent to the mental capacity of about a five year old").
Compare State v. Soura, 796 P.2d 109, 113, 115 (Idaho 1990)
(married woman with an IQ in the 70s was determined
incapable of consenting), with Adkins v. Commonwealth, 457
S.E.2d 382, 388-89 (Va. Ct. App. 1995) (woman with an IQ of
58-70 was deemed capable of understanding the nature and
consequences of sexual activity).
Mental Age People v. Howard, 172 Cal. Rptr. 539, 540 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981)
("The victim, 19 year old Kenyon W., acted as though he were
5 to 7 years of age; his reading level was on the first or second
grade level; and he spoke as if he were a 6 or 8 year old child.
He resided in a home for developmentally disabled persons
with the mentality of 5 to 7 year olds."); Salsman v.
Commonwealth, 565 S.W.2d 638, 639 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978)
("According to a clinical psychologist who examined her, the
prosecutrix had a verbal I.Q. of 57. With regard to verbal
skills and reasoning skills, the prosecutrix was functioning at
the level of a ten year old. The prosecutrix performed better
in exercising performance skills which did not require the use
of language. Respecting performance skills she was functioning
on the level of a twelve to thirteen year old child. Her overall
I.Q. average was in the 60's. This placed her in the retarded
range."); State v. Oliver, 354 S.E.2d 527, 529 (N.C. Ct. App.
1987) ("Both experts had personally interviewed the alleged
victim who was 16-years old at the time. Dr. Scott testified
that in his opinion, the victim functioned mentally at an eight
to ten-year-old level. Dr. Gordon's opinion was that she
functioned at an eight-year-old level."); State v. Ortega-
Martinez, 881 P.2d 231, 238 (Wash. 1994) ("S.G.'s case worker
... estimated S.G.'s mental age to be between the ages of five
and nine .... A police officer with experience in child abuse
cases testified S.G.'s mental age seemed close to that of a 4- or
5-year old.").
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Metzger v. State, 565 So. 2d 291, 292 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990)
(victim "had attended a school for the mentally retarded for
seven years, where she learned to print her name and count to
ten"); Garcia v. State, 659 S.W.2d 843, 845 (Tex. Ct. App.
1982) (victim "did not know the year of her birth or the ages
of her three siblings. She could not tell time, read or write...
her reading and spelling skills were on a second-grade level,
and her arithmetic abilities were gauged at first-grade level.");
Martinez v. State, 634 S.W.2d 929, 933-34 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982)
(responding to questions, victim "indicated that she was both
five years old and twenty-five years old. She could not say her
age but could only write it on the board. She was unable to
write anyone's name ... knew what street she lived on but not
what city, did not know what day of the week it was, nor what
month, and could recognize only the numbers one through
six.... The tests conducted on prosecutrix revealed that she
could not count past eight, could not state her age, although
she could write it.... She could write her name, but
misspelled it."); State v. Ortega-Martinez, 881 P.2d 231, 238-39
(Wash. 1994) (victim "was unable to assess the fundamental,
nonsexual concept of time. She could not remember when she
had been raped.... She was also unable to estimate in
minutes or hours how long she waited at the bus stop: 'waited
for a long time' was as specific as she was able to get.").
In re Welfare of R.L.A., No. CX-88-1884, 1989 WL 41771 at *1
(Minn. Ct. App. May 2, 1989) ("The record reveals that P.E.
had difficulty understanding simple questions, communicated
poorly and was easily confused."); State v. Ortega-Martinez,
881 P.2d 231, 238-39 (Wash. 1994) (30-year-old victim"exhibited the skills of a child and whose answers were often
nonresponsive.... Her vocabulary and syntax also reflected
her mental deficiencies. S.G. did not understand the meaning
of the word 'position,' ... and spoke in child-like language
when referring to sexual organs, using the term 'gina' for
vagina and 'boops' for breasts .... ).
Adkins v. Commonwealth, 457 S.E.2d 382, 385 (Va. Ct. App.
1995) ("At trial, Teresa's mother testified that Teresa is
mentally retarded, but that she knows how to take care of
herself, how to call 911, and how to go shopping."); State v.
Ortega-Martinez, 881 P.2d 231, 233-34 (Wash. 1994) ("The
victim of the rape was S.G., a 30-year-old woman with an IQ
in the 40s. S.G. and her husband live in an 'intensive tenant
support program' which houses mentally retarded individuals
and has staff available 24 hours a day.... S.G. has a
significant eating disorder which prevents her from knowing
when to stop eating ... ; cannot live independently ... ; and
suffers from an inability to resist the instructions of others
.... A case worker works with S.G. and her husband 60 hours
a week to ensure they receive support and education .... S.G.
also has an advocate who works closely with her and a case
manager who monitors her development and general well-
being.").
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People v. Whitten, 647 N.E.2d 1062, 1065 (IM. App. Ct. 1995)
("While complainant cooked some meals for herself and could
go shopping and received money for her work at the
rehabilitation center, the evidence presented at trial created
the inference that she had never lived alone."); People v.
McMullen, 414 N.E.2d 214, 215 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (victim"performed such duties at home as vacuuming, dusting, and
washing dishes. She could not, however, cook or run a
washing machine or use a stove.").
Metzger v. State, 565 So. 2d 291, 292 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990)
(victim "cannot spell, is not employed, and receives a Social
Security disability check each month"); State v. Soura, 796 P.2d
109, 113 (Idaho 1990) ("Testimony was presented that (1) the
woman has never held a job and would probably be capable of
performing only menial tasks and then only under close
supervision .... ).
State v. Johnson, 745 P.2d 81, 84 (Ariz. 1987) (en banc) (victim"was capable of handling money and using a bank account");
People v. McMullen, 414 N.E.2d 214, 215 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)
(victim "could not shop alone because she did not understand
the value of money"); Martinez v. State, 634 S.W.2d 929, 933
(Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (victim "did not know how to exchange
money").
People v. McMullen, 414 N.E.2d 214, 215 (IlM. App. Ct. 1980)
(victim's stepmother testified that "the victim's younger sisters
(ages 11 and 6) were able to manipulate the victim and get her
to do their jobs for them, following even the six-year-old's
orders without objection"); State v. Juarez, 861 P.2d 1382, 1385
(Kan. Ct. App. 1993) ("In reaching its determination, the jury
should evaluate the individual's behavior in normal social
intercourse as well as consider any expert testimony concerning
the individual's mental deficiency."); People v. Cratsley, 653
N.E.2d 1162, 1164 (N.Y. 1995) (victim "had a steady boyfriend
with whom she went out to eat and visit acquaintances in the
supervised community where he lived"); People v. Easley, 364
N.E.2d 1328, 1331 (N.Y. 1977) ("Crucial to a determination [of
ability to consent] may be how such a person actually functions
in society."); People v. Dixon, 412 N.Y.S.2d 42, 43 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1978) (victim described as "pleasant and also anxious to
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People v. Howard, 172 Cal. Rptr. 539, 540-41 (Cal. Ct. App.
1981) ("Because of [victim's] mental retardation, the acts of
sodomy and oral copulation meant nothing to him. He was
not aware of the nature of these acts. He liked the defendant,
wanted to please him and actually liked it when the defendant
stuck his 'boner in my ass.' This is unconsciousness of the
nature of the act."); State v. Olivio, 589 A.2d 597, 606 (N.J.
1991) ("The evidence presented would permit a jury to find
that [the victim] had a rudimentary and childish understanding
of some of the physical aspects of sexual conduct, but a jury
could conclude also that her understanding of sexual conduct
was incomplete and inadequate even with respect to the
physical aspects of sex. Furthermore, even if [the victim] was
found to have a minimally-adequate comprehension of sex, it is
not clear that a reasonable jury would determine that she
understood that her body was private and that she had a right
to be free from the invasions of others, and capacity to refuse
to engage in sexual activity."); People v. Dixon, 412 N.Y.S.2d
42, 43 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (A psychologist testified that the
victim "had the mental age of approximately an 11-year-old
child, and that she had childish conceptions of a boy friend-girl
friend relationship, of marriage, and of sex, and she defined
making love as kissing and hugging and being happy, but not
as having sex."); Adkins v. Commonwealth, 457 S.E.2d 382,
389 (Va. Ct. App. 1995) (Victim stated on cross-examination
that "she 'made love' to the appellant, that she knew that she
could get pregnant from 'making love' and could catch AIDS,
that she had had sex education classes in school, and she used
the words 'penis' and 'vagina' when describing the act of
sexual intercourse .... In fact, her testimony shows that she
was the person who conceived the notion of having sexual
intercourse with Adkins and initiated the sexual liaison
between them.").
In re Doe, 918 P.2d 254, 256 (Haw. Ct. App. 1996) (The court
must "evaluate whether the complaining witness has the ability
to appraise the possible medical consequences of the sex act,
such as incurable or even fatal sexually transmitted diseases,
since such consequences are not remote, spring directly from
the act."); State v. Soura, 796 P.2d 109, 114 (Idaho 1990)
("Although she had previously delivered a child, testimony was
presented that the woman did not understand the potential
physical consequences of sexual intercourse, e.g., pregnancy,
syphilis, gonorrhea and herpes.").
State v. Kingsley, 383 N.W.2d 828, 830 (N.D. 1986) ("Although
Pamela was able to relate the incident using such terms as'penis' and 'vagina,' which she learned from sex-education
counseling, she did not know the meaning of the term
'ejaculate' and she believed that pregnancy was caused 'by
having your period."'); State v. Anderson, 902 P.2d 1206, 1207
(Or. Ct. App. 1995) ("The victim understands sex as
intercourse, with the man on top and the woman on the
bottom. She also understands that condoms can prevent
pregnancy and venereal disease, but she does not understand
other forms of birth control.").
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State v. Underhill, No. C9-92-2058, 1993 WL 165682 at *1
(Minn. Ct. App. May 18, 1993) ("Significantly, the court has
minimized any psychological or emotional discomfort to J.A.G.
by prohibiting any inquiry as to specific past sexual attitude or
the events surrounding these allegations .... Here the APE
[adverse psychological examination] is strictly limited to
J.A.G.'s understanding of sexual acts, and any questioning on
actual sexual activities is specifically prohibited."); State v.
Anderson, 902 P.2d 1206, 1208 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) ("We agree
with the state that the victim's alleged reputation for
promiscuous sexual activity is immaterial to that inquiry.");
State v. Green, CCA No. 01-C-01-9002-CC-00045, 1990 WL
143777 at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 3, 1990) (victim testified
that "she had been previously married, that her male friend
Dan Goff 'took care of me' on a regular basis, and seemed to
have understanding of the sexual activity that was taking place
without protest between her and Grover Green").
State v. Soura, 796 P.2d 109, 110 (Idaho 1990) ("The woman's
[victim's] husband, like his wife, was a person with mental
disabilities. The woman's husband worked as a night janitor in
a local motel."); State v. Green, CCA No. 01-C-01-9002-CC-
00045, 1990 WL 143777 at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 3, 1990)
("While a resident at another nursing home she married a
male resident there, and they lived in the nursing home as
husband and wife until his death.").
People v. Cratsley, 653 N.E.2d 1162, 1166 (N.Y. 1995)
("Complainant displayed no understanding that defendant was
married, or that engaging in sexual conduct with him might be
considered inappropriate."); Righter v. State, 752 P.2d 416, 421
(Wyo. 1988) ("While both [victims] were determined to
understand the difference between having sexual intercourse
with a woman as opposed to a man, and to some degree the
social stigma often associated with homosexual relations,
neither victim was considered to be capable of making adult
rationalizations or decisions about the activity itself, or to
understand the ramifications of adult relationships which
include sexual activity.").
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McQuirk v. State, 4 So. 775, 776 (Ala. 1888) ("It has been said
that a woman with a less degree of intelligence than is
requisite to make a contract may consent to carnal connection,
so that the act will not be rape in the man .... "); State v.
Soura, 796 P.2d 109, 114 (Idaho 1990) (giving no weight to the
fact that victim had previously consented to marriage and to
terminating parental rights in her child, the court states that
"determination of capability for legal consent depends in large
part on the activity involved and the purposes of the laws
governing that activity"); People v. Whitten, 647 N.E.2d 1062,
1067 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (illustrating the benefit of the
"totality of circumstances" test: "Complainant could knowingly
consent to sexual relations with one person and yet be unable
to knowingly consent with another."); State v. Peters, 441 So.
2d 403, 409 (La. Ct. App. 1983) ("It seems beyond question
that competency to testify is not the same as the capacity to
understand the nature of the sexual act. There is a vast
difference between understanding the distinction between the
truth and a lie and understanding the nature and consequences
of a sexual assault."); State v. Ortega-Martinez, 881 P.2d 231,
239 (Wash. 1994) ("It is important to distinguish between a
person's general ability to understand the nature and
consequences of sexual intercourse and that person's ability to
understand the nature and consequences at a given time and in
a given situation.... The evidence supporting a finding that
S.G. had a condition which prevented her from understanding
the nature or consequences of sexual intercourse at the time of
the incident includes the following. S.G.'s case manager
testified, 'If you teach her something in one situation, she
wouldn't necessarily understand that same thing applied in
another situation unless she experienced that."').
Metzger v. State, 565 So. 2d 291, 292 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990)
(defendant was the victim's brother-in-law); State v. Soura, 796
P.2d 109, 110 (Idaho 1990) ("Soura worked as a nurse's aide
for a quadriplegic man who lived near the [victim] and her
husband.... During the early part of 1987, Soura and the
[victim] spent a great deal of time together socializing while
her husband slept or worked. Soura and the woman soon
began to have sexual intercourse together. In early April,
Soura moved into the couple's trailer, where the acts of sexual
intercourse continued .... "); People v. McMullen, 414 N.E.2d
214, 215 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (defendants and victim were
students at Urbana High School); People v. Cratsley, 653
N.E.2d 1162, 1163 (N.Y. 1995) (defendant was a cousin of
victim's stepfather); People v. Easley, 364 N.E.2d 1328, 1330
(N.Y. 1977) (defendant Easley was "a family friend; for five
years immediately preceding the occurrence he was a close
neighbor and ... had actually been a member of the
grandmother's household for three weeks").
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People v. Whitten, 647 N.E.2d 1062, 1066-67 (Ill. App. Ct.
1995) ("[Defendant] knew complainant was developmentally
disabled and he knew this before entering her room; he knew
that he was violating the rules of employment and possibly the
criminal law by not obtaining complainant's permission before
entering her room; he knew that he had no direct duties to
discharge with CLA residents; he knew that he was in a
position of trust and authority in his relationship with
complainant ... he knew that he should not be having sexual
relations with anyone, while on duty, considering his
responsibility for the safety of the CILA residents under his
supervision; [and] he committed the act when he knew no one
of authority would be around, indicating that this was a
planned encounter and not a spur-of-the-moment act ....
These circumstances indicate that defendant knew, intended,
and had the capability to take sexual advantage of one who
was unable to give knowing consent because of the disparity
not only in IQs but also in defendant's ability to use his
position of power and authority over complainant."); State v.
Underhill, No. C9-92-2058, 1993 WL 165682 at *1 (Minn. Ct.
App. May 18, 1993) ("Respondent Michael Dwayne Underhill
was retained as a 24-hour care provider for J.A.G. [victim] in
January 1990."); People v. Patterson, 560 N.Y.S.2d 357, 358
(N.Y. App. Div. 1990) ("While the defendant was a personal
care aide at an adult home, he twice sodomized and once
attempted to sodomize a resident of the home."); People v.
Dixon, 412 N.Y.S.2d 42, 42 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) ("Defendant
was the bus driver for Alternatives Industry ... which
employed persons who were mentally or physically
handicapped. One of the employees was Rosalie Miller who
was 28 years of age and was a regular passenger on
defendant's bus."); State v. Willis, 370 N.W.2d 193, 198 (S.D.
1985) ("S.R. and C.F. were both mentally retarded adult
females; both were under the influence of appellant, as well as
his supervision.., using his authority figure, he isolated the
females to prepare and accomplish his plan, namely, to
sexually take advantage of them; both females were placed in
fear because of appellant's size and his expression of the loss
of their privileges; both females were warned or threatened not
to tell anyone. Using his official position of dominance and
superior intelligence, coupled with his superior size and
strength, appellant ravished the physically mature, yet
vulnerable, females.").
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Ely v. State, 384 S.E.2d 268, 269 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989)
(Appellant "has a verbal IQ of 73; a performance IQ of 72;
and a full scale IQ of 72. He is classified as being in the lower
portion of the borderline range. His mental age is 11.2.");
People v. McMullen, 414 N.E.2d 214, 219 (I11. App. Ct. 1980)
(Craven, J., dissenting) ("It cannot be, in this most unfortunate
fact situation, that the victim was not capable of consent by
reason of her incapacity while the defendant, with the same
incapacity, is guilty of rape because he failed to appreciate the
inability to give consent." (emphasis added)); Adkins v.
Commonwealth, 457 S.E.2d 382, 384 (Va. Ct. App. 1995)
(Defendant's sister received his social security check "because
he is not capable of handing his own money.").
State v. Tunis, No. 94-03-0582, 1994 WL 710948 at *1-*2 (Del.
Super. Ct. Nov., 18, 1994) (Despite lay testimony establishing
that mentally retarded victim has a chronological age of 52, is
incapable of independent living but can work under
supervision, and victim's own testimony, defendant was
acquitted on appeal because, in part, of the lack of "medical
testimony or expert testimony as to the victim's mental illness
or mental defect. There was no direct testimony from any
witnesses concerning the victim's capacity to appraise the
nature of the sexual conduct which the defendant was charged
to have committed."); People v. Cratsley, 653 N.E.2d 1162,
1166 (N.Y. 1995) ("People who observe the complainant
daily-family members, teachers, employers-are often most
familiar with his or her capacity to cope with challenge and
can illuminate for the jury the complainant's ability to
understand and cope with a sexual encounter."); State v.
Kingsley, 383 N.W.2d 828, 831 (N.D. 1986) (Levine, J.
concurring) ("I believe the State should, in cases like the
instant one, present testimony of a medical expert on the
subject of mental defect or mental disease and its effect on a
particular individual's comprehension."); State v. Green, CCA
No. 01-C-01-9002-CC-00045, 1990 WL 143777 at *2-*3 (Tenn.
Crim. App. Oct. 3, 1990) (Evidence was insufficient to prove
that mental defect rendered victim incapable of appraising
nature of conduct: "No psychologist or psychiatrist testified."
Evidence presented by victim's family physician "inconclusive
at best.").
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State v. Soura, 796 P.2d 109, 114 (Idaho 1990) ("Concerning
the woman's capability to consent to marriage and sexual
relations with her spouse, understandably the law has granted
leeway so that even persons of limited intelligence, such as this
woman and her husband, may exercise their constitutionally
recognized right to marry and procreate. Marriage has long
been favorably recognized in our society as one of the
fundamental institutions upon which our society is founded.
Accordingly, the laws reflect a certain favorability toward
creating and maintaining stable and harmonious marriages.
The same cannot be said about non-marital sexual relations
which are not considered by society in a favorable light, in part
because of the difficult consequences that may follow, e.g.,
unplanned pregnancy, single parent families, divorce, venereal
disease and AIDS. The laws reflect this societal attitude
against non-marital sexual intercourse and aim to protect those
most vulnerable, due to unsoundness of mind or immaturity,
from incurring some of the resulting difficult consequences.");
State v. Olivio, 589 A.2d 597, 604 (N.J. 1991) ("This Court has
expressed its concern about unenlightened attitudes toward
mental impairment and about the importance of according the
mentally handicapped their fundamental rights.... Moreover,
as earlier noted, the Legislature itself was solicitous of the
status of mildly-impaired adults in attempting to narrow the
scope of the statute's protection .... These significant policy
considerations commend a narrow interpretation of the
concept of mentally defective under [N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-
1(h) (West 1983)] .... "); Righter v. State, 752 P.2d 416, 419
(Wyo. 1988) ("The statute in question expresses a public policy
goal of protecting a class of particularly vulnerable citizens
from sexual exploitation. Simply because the Wyoming
legislature has chosen to more severely punish one engaging in
the conduct proscribed by § 6-2-302(a)(iv), than other states,
does not in itself render the statute unconstitutionally vague.").
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